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Abstract: Human ethology is defined as the biology of human behavior. The methods it employs and the questions it poses are elaborations of
those generally used in the various fields of biology, but especially adapted to the study of man. Observation and experimentation in the natural
and seminatural setting as well as the comparative method derived from morphology play important roles in human ethology, and the
exploration of phylogenetic adaptations constitutes one of its focal interests. On the basis of observations on experientially deprived and
nondeprived children, comparative primate and animal behavior studies, and cross-cultural investigations, certain universal phylogenetic
adaptations (in terms of fixed action patterns, innate releasing mechanisms, releasers, innate motivating mechanisms, and innate learning
dispositions) have been found to occur. However, human ethology does not restrict itself to the investigation of phylogenetic adaptations. The
question as to how a behavior pattern contributes to survival can be posed with respect to cultural patterns as well. Similar selection pressures
have shaped both culturally and phylogenetically evolved patterns. Through cross-cultural studies a number of universal social interaction
strategies have been discovered. Some of their apparent variation can be accounted for by the fact that innate and culturally evolved patterns of
behavior can often substitute as functional equivalents for one another within a given context. Some social interactions can even become
completely verbalized. Nevertheless, underlying structural rules remain the same. The discovery that nonverbal and verbal behaviors can
substitute for one another bridges the gap between these seemingly distinct categories of behavior, and opens the way for the study of a
grammar of human social behavior encompassing both the verbal and nonverbal.
Keywords: communication; cross-cultural studies; cultural evolution; environment; ethology; evolution; heredity; human ethology; nature/nur-
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Comparative studies based on the quasi-scientific theories of the in-
heritance of behavior and the predominance of genetic processes as
causal in evolution and development of all species, including peo-
ple - Lorenzian ethology, Wilsonian sociobiology - overlook signifi-
cant differences among species and reduce quantitiative and quali-
tative differences in behavior to a unitary causal mechanism which
is not sufficient to explain complex behavior.
Tobach, 1976, p. 14
Far from underestimating the differences which exist between the
[above described] behavior patterns of higher animals and those ac-
complishments of man based upon reason and responsible morality,
I assert: No one is more in a position to see the uniqueness of those
specific human capacities than he who perceives them against the
background of those far more primitive actions and norms of reac-
tion that we still share with the higher animals.
Lorenz, 1971, p. 509; translated from the German original
When Darwin (1859) published his revolutionary ideas, many of his
contemporaries felt insulted by the mere suggestion that they might
have evolved from animal ancestry. Since then, the fact of our
phylogenetic history has been accepted, but it is obvious that many
people recognize this fact only as far as their morphology and basic
physiology are concerned. Whether the concepts of phylogeny,
selection, and inheritance are applicable to human behavior, howev-
er, is still a matter of considerable controversy.
Holzkamp-Osterkamp (1975), for example, expresses the view that
man has withdrawn from the biological laws of selection; they
shaped his evolution only until he began to live in a society based
upon cultural convention. One also reads the opinion, expressed in
many versions, that there exists no such thing as "human nature,"
man being the rawest of all raw materials, shaped by his environment
according to the standards set by culture. Certainly, the tabula rasa
concept of the British empiricists, which holds that man is born as a
blank slate for experience to write upon, is nowadays espoused only
by a few, but genetic contributions are still largely conceived as
merely providing very general boundary conditions for behavior,
such as in determining the bodily structures. Thus, sex is recognized
to be genetically determined, but gender roles are attributed to
cultural factors. And if, in referring to gender roles, one ventures to
suggest that certain aspects of their associated behaviors may be
"innate" too, one risks being called sexist (Tobach et al., 1974).
Apparently, a basic fear of any sort of "biological determinism"
prevails, something to the effect that anything recognized as innate
to man must then be accepted as an inevitable fate.
The ethological point of view in particular is often represented in a
distorted way in secondary sources. We need only examine Monta-
gu's most recent book (1976, p. 55), in which he writes: "Konrad
Lorenz and other ethologists of his persuasion hold that almost all
animal behavior - and they include human behavior in this sweeping
generalization - is instinctive." Since Lorenz, as well as the present
author, has so often emphasized that man is a cultural being by
nature, selected for adaptive modifiability of his behavior, Montagu's
statement seems odd indeed. In the same book, the ethological
concept of instinct is crudely depicted as an explanatory principle of
the uncritical ethologist:
" 'Instinct' undoubtedly constitutes the most popular of such
explanations. Spiders spin webs by instinct, cats nurse their young by
instinct, beavers build dams by instinct, and so on. Hence, when
women nurse their young, and men 'defend their country' by killing
other men, they do so by instinct. Are we to suppose that when
women make beds and men build dams, such activities too are
1
 1979 Cambridge University Press 0140-525X/79/IEIB019$04.00
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00060611
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:53:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Eibl-EIbesfe!dt: Human ethology
referable to some appropriate instinct? The absurdities of thought
that have been committed in the name of 'instinct' constitute an
object lesson in the systematics of confusion" (Montagu, 1976, pp.
63 - 64).
Having thus exposed the simplistic ways of ethological thinking
and the obsoleteness of the concept of the innate (see the chapter
"The Innate and the Acquired or Learned - a False Dichotomy"),
Montagu emphasizes marrs lack of instincts. Tobach et al. (1974)
attack ethologists in a similar vein, accusing them, amongst others, of
biological determinism.
It seems timely, therefore, to present our point of view for
discussion in this multidisciplinary forum. In particular, I shall
examine the concept of the "innate" and its relevance to an under-
standing of human behavior. A discussion of the comparative,
approach and the subject of functions and adaptations will introduce
our theme. I wish to express the hope that this discussion will serve to
bridge the gulf between ethologists and opposing groups of behav-
ioral scientists. We share, after all, the basic objective of attempting
to understand why we behave as we do, and even though some of
what will be said concerning our approach is still tentative, I hope to
demonstrate that even these speculations derive from observations
worthy of consideration.
L What is human ethology?
Human ethology can be defined as the biology of human behavior.
Its special interests are distributed along lines largely congruent with
its parent discipline, biology, namely morphology, ecology, genetics,
phylogenetics, developmental biology, sociobiology, and physiology.
The questions posed, and the methods employed in the efforts to
answer them, are elaborations of the approach of these parent fields,
but specially adapted to the study of man. Human ethology is based
upon the theory of selection and inquires, for example, as to what
selective pressures have operated to bring an observed structure into
being, on the assumption that the structure somehow contributes to
the inclusive fitness of its possessors.
Students of animal behavior have developed refined observational
techniques, employed primarily in the natural setting. These allow
for the discovery of regularities in the flow of events, from which
conclusions as to function as well as underlying causal factors can be
derived. The studies of Baerends and Drent (1970) exemplify the
approach. This method of passive observation in the natural context
is the basis for any study in human ethology, which begins with
documentation and description and then proceeds to experimental
analysis. Of particular importance is the comparative approach,
arising from an interest in the phylogenetic aspects of behavior.
The formal application of ethological methods to the study of man
began about fifteen years ago. During the last ten years human
ethological research has concentrated upon a number of focal points.
These can be subsumed under the following headings: nonverbal and
verbal communication, aggression, mechanisms of bonding, and
aspects of social structure (rank order, incest taboo, gender roles,
etc.). The themes listed under these headings overlap, of course.
Moreover, the categories are broad. The ethology of aggression
encompasses questions as to ontogeny and socialization, phylogeny,
functional and physiological matters, territoriality, individual
distance, conflict management, war, and so forth (Eibl-Eibesfeldt,
1975a). Names have been given to these subfields; "proxemics," for
example, deals with certain aspects of man's distance keeping (Hall,
1966). And research on communication covers no less diverse fields.
In terms of their objects and methods, certain focal areas of research
could also be subsumed under the general rubric of "child ethology"
(Blurton-Jones, 1972; McGrew, 1972). This wide category also
impinges upon, amongst others, all four themes listed above.
Although not the sole concern of human ethology, one of its
principal questions is whether biological heritage has determined
human behavior to any significant degree. We will pursue this
question below, and in order to do this, the comparative method, as
well as adaptation, function, and some other basic concepts of
ethology will be discussed.
Originally, human ethologists tended to issue from the ranks of
biology and closely related disciplines (e.g., Tiger, 1969; Morris,
1968, 1977; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1966, 1972; Bowlby, 1969; Ainsworth,
1967). But scientists from more distant disciplines are now converg-
ing upon this field in increasing numbers, either by their emphasis on
observation in the natural setting (Goffman, 1966, 1971; Marsh,
Rosser, and Harre, 1978), or by a shared theoretical emphasis on the
phylogenetic dimension.
2. The comparative approach
The comparative approach is a basic source of information, but it has
been criticized for making too much of "similarities." Yet if we
compare the structure or the behavior of animals and man, we do
indeed encounter striking similarity. In greeting rituals, for example,
weapons are turned away in a conspicuous fashion to indicate
peaceful intent. Boobies sky-point with their beaks, the Masai thrusts
his spear into the ground, and in our culture we salute state visitors
with twenty-one averted guns. Similarities of this kind call for an
explanation. They can be accidental, but most of the time they are
not, being due rather to similar selective pressures that have shaped
behavior during phylogenetic and cultural evolution alike, or else to
a common heritage resulting from a shared ancestor.1 In the latter
case, we speak of homologies, in the former of analogies. Some
comparisons between human and animal rituals will now be
described in order to illustrate this principle.
Human and animal rituals* When a flightless cormorant
(Nannopterum harrisi) returns to the nest to relieve his mate, he is
allowed to stay only if he brings a twig. If he approaches without this
present, he will be attacked. The ritual of proffering nesting material
has an appeasing function. Analogous culturally evolved rituals of
gift-passing are abundant in man.
Patterns of maternal care and infantile appeals are used for
bonding in man as well as in birds. Mutual feeding is an example of a
common courtship ritual in birds. Female herring gulls beg like
nestlings, and thereby block the aggressiveness of the males, which
results in their getting fed instead of being attacked. Mouth-to-mouth
feeding is widespread as a feature of maternal behavior in man; it is
also found to occur as "kiss-feeding," expressing affection (Figures 1
-3). Finally, the same movement patterns are often performed,
without passing food, as a tender act, usually described as a "kiss"
(Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1972).
These similarities again are far from accidental. The patterns serve
a similar function in birds as well as in man, and in both they are
derived from parental behavior. Nonetheless, they cannot be traced
to a common heritage. Parental behavior evolved independently in
birds and mammals, and so did the rituals derived from them. The
patterns must therefore be classified as analogies. If we turn,
however, to the great apes, we find that kiss-feeding is part of the
maternal behavior of chimpanzees, orangutans, and gorillas, and that
chimpanzees kiss as an expression of friendly intent during greeting.
We may, with much greater confidence infer from these
closely-related cases that kiss-feeding is homologous in the great apes
and man (Rothmann and Teuber, 1915; Bilz, 1944; Lawick-Goodall,
1975; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975b).
Patterns of aggressive behavior have become independently
ritualized along similar lines in animals and man, developing into
touraamentlike patterns of combat as well as occasionally into
displays serving the function of bonding during greeting encounters.
There even exist analogies between culturally evolved rituals and
phylogenetically evolved patterns: indeed the processes of cultural
and phylogenetic ritualization often follow a similar course, since
many of the selection pressures and preadaptive starting points are,
in principle, the same in both cases.
Signals - and ritualization concerns the evolution of signals - must
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Figure 1. Kiss-feeding as a sign of affection. A !Ko bush girl feeding her little
half-sister. At this age, !Ko babies are, in fact, not fed other than in this symbolic
way. From a 16-mm film by the author (50 frames/second; the frame number
appears on each photograph).
be conspicuous and easily recognizable, and they must unmistakably
convey their meaning to their specific targets. The changes that
movement patterns undergo during cultural as well as phylogenetic
ritualization are therefore the same in principle. Movement patterns
tend to become simplified and accentuated during the course of their
evolution into signals, with their performance emphasized by
rhythmic repetition. The courtship ritual "Tanim Hed," which we
have filmed in New Guinea (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1974), provides a good
example. During the courtship dance couples kneel side by side.
Touching foreheads, they perform two sideward swaying movements
with the head, which leads to nose-rubbing. This highly stereotyped
sequence of movements is followed by two deep bows and then a
return to synchronized head-turning. The entire ritual plays a role in
mate selection and it is assumed that partners who easily achieve
synchronization of their movements will find each other attractive
(Pitcairn and Schleidt, 1976).
HomoSogy versus analogy. It is often suggested that analogies can
contribute little toward the understanding of human behavior, that
only homologies are of interest, and that consequently one should
concentrate predominantly upon the comparative study of primates.
From this viewpoint, studies of greylag geese and cichlid fish could
hardly contribute very much to our knowledge of ourselves.2 I hope
that the above examples succeed in suggesting that such
restrictiveness may not be fully justified. It just depends on what one
wants to know. Certainly the comparative ethology of primates has
contributed enormously to the understanding of human nature.
Indeed, the results of primate sociology make it appear probable that
many of the universal features of human behavior (ranking,
territoriality, incest avoidance) are rooted in our primate heritage.
But if one wished to learn the laws, independent of phylogenetic
relationship, underlying the construction of a ritual, one might be
well advised to look at as many different forms of the ritual as
possible: to proceed like a functional morphologist, who compares
the wing of an insect with that of a bird, a bat, and even of an
airplane. The functional laws governing the construction are in all
cases the same, and can be derived from the study of analogy.
In a similar fashion one may ask under what ecological conditions
a particular social structure evolves in different species. What are the
selection pressures that give rise to ordering in terms of rank in
various animal groups? What are the functional laws that underly
monogamy, incest avoidance, or other features of social behavior?
The study of analogies in fact reveals laws of much more general
applicability than can be derived from the study of homologies
(Wickler, 1967a). Thus, if we discover that ranking in groups as
diverse as fish, reptiles, mammals, birds, and even insects obeys the
same basic rules, the hypothesis that similar rules guide the analogous
phenomenon in man is certainly not farfetched. Lorenz emphasized
this point very clearly:
"If I were the first scientist to see a dead octopus and, on dissecting
it, discovered an eye built like ours, with a cornea, a lens, an iris,
focusing muscles and a retina, I would be justified in assuming that
this was a visual organ and in calling it an eye without further ado,
even if I had no other proof of its function. 'Eye' denotes a
functional concept; cephalopods and vertebrates have no common
ancestors with eyes of this type: their eyes are functionally
analogous, not phylogenetically homologous. An even better case
can be made for the application of our functional concept of
ritualization to both the biological and the cultural spheres, because
we need not rely on detailed formal analogy alone. We know from
observation and ample experimental verification that rituals,
whether phylogetically or culturally evolved, do in fact perform the
same functions of communication - those of canalizing aggression
and of effecting the cohesion of pairs or groups" (Lorenz, 1966).
The value of this type of approach is clearly documented in
Wilson's Sociobiology (1975). The study of analogies allows us to
develop working hypotheses, which, of course, have to be tested as to
their relevance to man by a detailed study of man.
3. Adaptation
Adaptation is another controversial issue. By definition, any structure
that contributes to survival and fitness as reflected in reproductive
success may be termed an adaptation.3 Certainly, contribution to
fitness as measured by reproductive success cannot always be derived
from immediate observation, but rather by careful experimental
analysis, as exemplified by the work of Tinbergen et al. (1962) on
eggshell removal in the blackheaded gull. What can be inferred from
observation, however, is the immediate beneficial effect of a behav-
ior to its performer, which in turn permits a fairly good guess as to
adaptive function in most cases.
We must also be aware that not every observed pattern fulfills an
adaptive function. Sometimes, for example, structures lose their
original adaptive value in a changed environment (including a
changed social environment). They may be dragged along as historic
burdens (like the appendix) and, if disadvantageous, they may be
removed by subsequent selection. Thus, the Galapagos dove shows
distraction displays, even though predators responsive to these behav-
ior patterns fail to occur on the islands. The redheaded finch, a
nest-parasite, still performs nonfunctional nestbuilding movements
in a random fashion when sitting on a nest. And owing to his fear of
strangers (see below), man is predisposed to live in individualized
groups. Therefore, modern life in anonymous groups subjects him to
a certain amount of stress. In this context fear of strangers is
maladaptive.
Adaptations reflect particular features of the environment. The
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1979), 1
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00060611
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:53:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Eibl-Eibesfeldt: Human ethology
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1979), 1
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00060611
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:53:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
s y<'.~.*.
Figure 2. Kiss-feeding as a sign of affection. A Yanomami girl kiss-feeding her
baby sister with saliva. From a 16-rnrn film by the author (25 frames/second).
Eibl-EIbesfeldt: Human ethology
hoof of the horse, as Lorenz (1965) once said, reflects the steppe, that
is to say, it developed as a locomotor organ to fit this special type of
ground. Every adaptation logically presupposes that by a prior
process of interaction between the organism and its environment,
information concerning certain environmental features was some-
how acquired by the organism. This can either take place during
phylogeny by the well-known processes of mutation, recombination
and selection, or by cultural and individual adaptation. In the former
case, the acquired information is stored in the genome of the species
and decoded during ontogeny.
Experiential deprivation experiments. Whether an organism's
behavioral adaptation is the result of phylogenetic, cultural, or
individual adaptation can be tested by means of experiential
deprivation experiments. For example, if birds of the same species
sing an identical song, chance concurrence can be excluded and one
can inquire as to what common source of information they may have
tapped. If individuals of such a species are raised in complete social
isolation in soundproof chambers and nonetheless produce their
species-specific song, then we are forced to conclude that the
information concerning the specific patterning must have been
encoded in the genome (Sauer, 1954; Konishi, 1964, 1965a,b). The
song pattern is then said to be phylogenetically adapted or "innate."
The latter term is a shorthand description and means more precisely
that the specific afferent, efferent, and interneuronal network
responsible for this motor-coordination grows in a process of
self-differentiation according to a developmental recipe
("blueprint") encoded in the genome. Of course, this is a process of
individual development, and particular environmental stimuli may
be influential at different developmental stages. The all-important
point, however, is that in this special case no patterned information
concerning the adaptation needs to be available to the growing
organism for the adaptive pattern to occur.
I want to emphasize that we are fully aware that there is nothing
like a song or any other behavior per se contained in the zygote: this
disclaimer is necessary because certain writers have implied that
ethologists believe in such simplistic preformationism. Eisenberg
(1971), for example, clearly expressed this opinion:
"I would argue that there is no behavior, certainly nothing like
intelligence, or mating behavior or display patterns . . . in the
zygote. Such notions are utterly absurd carry-overs from
preformationism. What the DNA specifies are chemical
constituents. These constituent enzymes and substrates interact with
one another and with the internal and external environment of the
developing organism to produce successive stages of ever greater
complexity, with the sequential emergence of new properties at
each succeeding stage of development. It is the nature of
interactions that must concern us, not so that we can disregard the
genetic code, but so that we can understand it and its environmental
dependence" (p. 522).
Ethologists certainly agree, and so one wonders who the intended
target of this passage might be! Certainly biologists are aware that
developmental processes involve interactions between the organism
and its internal and external environment. Spemann's classic experi-
ments (Spemann, 1938) as well as those of Sperry (1945a,b, 1965,
1971), have provided basic insight into these processes of self-
differentiation.
Sperry demonstrated that growing neuronal fibers selectively seek
their receptor and effector organs and thus prefunctionally establish
proper connection. If the eye of a newt larva is rotated 180 degrees,
inverted vision results. With further cutting and scrambling of the
optic fibers, the subsequent neural regeneration does not restore
normal vision, but continues to produce inverted vision so long as the
eye remains in the rotated position. If a piece of skin from the back of
a frog embryo is transplanted to the belly region, the frog will scratch
its back when tickled on this graft. This indicates that the graft is
innervated by the same fibers that would have innervated it in its
original location.
"Each fiber in the brain pathways has its own preferential affinity
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Figure 3. Kiss-feeding as a sign of affection. A Himba baby girl with a morsel
in her mouth offers it to her grandmother, kiss-feeding it to her. From a 16-mm
film by the author (50 frames/second).
for particular prescribed trails in the differentiating surround. Both
pushed and pulled along these trails, the probing fiber tip eventually
locates and connects with certain other neurons, often far distant,
that have the appropriate molecular labels. The potential pathways
and terminal connection zones have their own individual
biochemical constitution by which each is recognized and
distinguished from all others in the same half of the brain and cord.
Indications are that right and left halves are chemical mirror
maps. . . . In general outline at least, one could now see how it would
be entirely possible for behavioral nerve circuits of extreme
intricacy and precision to be inherited and organized
prefunctionally solely by the mechanism of embryonic growth and
differentiation. . . .
"As yet the meaning and impact of these changes has only begun
to permeate into areas outside biology and ethology. In the more
human areas of behavioral science like clinical psychology,
psychiatry, anthropology, education, and the social sciences
generally, the prevailing conceptual approach on this subject
remains today essentially unchanged or very little changed from
where it stood thirty years ago" (Sperry, 1971, pp. 31 - 32).
These and other experiments (see Grobstein and Chow, 1975, for a
discussion of the more recent findings) have in fact demonstrated
that modifiability by external inluences is often quite limited,
particularly as far as the central nervous system is concerned. Ikeda
and Kaplan (1970) have gone on to show the existence of genetically
programmed behavior by providing evidence that the patterned
neural activity underlying particular movement of a Drosophila
mutant is coded by a single gene. For further evidence, see Bentley
(1971) and Bentley and Hoy (1972).
Gene-environment interaction. In this case of bird song
mentioned above, one may still argue that at a lower level of
integration, learning, say, breathing coordination, may have contrib-
uted to developing prerequisites for singing. This could well be the
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case. However, if the bird is able to perform its specific song even
when reared in complete social isolation, this proves that at a higher
level of integration the information underlying the specific pattern-
ing was indeed encoded in the genome. The environment simply did
not provide that specific information. Numerous agents like oxygen,
temperature, nutrition, and a variety of sensory stimuli have exerted
their inluence on the growing bird, but there is no indication as to
how these could have provided the patterned information character-
istic of its song.
The often repeated argument that a distinction between innate
and acquired components of behavior cannot be made since both
inextricably and diffusely intermingle at every stage of development
can no longer be upheld in the face of these facts. Deprivation
experiments clearly reveal the source of the information underlying
such an adaptation, although questions must of course be addressed
to the appropriate level of integration and only to the specific
adaptations under investigation (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975b; Lorenz,
1965). Then, if the information underlying the behavioral pattern in
question proves to be phylogenetically acquired, we can use the
expression "phylogenetic adaptation," with the terms "innate" or
"instinctive" as synonyms.
I wish to emphasize that the whole nature/nurture issue should not
be considered as a matter of either/or, nor can the contribution of
each be measured quantitatively, in terms of percentages. It is a
matter of how both contribute to the development of certain
characteristics, "nature" providing a range of modifiability. What is
inherited is a "prospective potential." Ethologists seek the source of
the information underlying an adaptation, a decisive step in the
analysis of behavioral development.
4. Pfaylogeeetic adaptations in animal behavior
Fixed action patterns, Innate releasing mechanisms, and
releasers. Ethological studies of the past three decades have
demonstrated that phylogenetic adaptations determine behavior in
various ways. Animals are provided with functional motor patterns at
birth or at hatching: each newly hatched duckling teaches us this
fact. The duckling can walk, swim, or preen its feathers; and it makes
no difference whether It is brooded by a hen or a duck: its behavior
will be ducklike. Some of its specific patterns, however, are not
present at birth. Stereotyped courtship patterns, such as the
grunt-whistle, head- and tail-bobbing, and the like, mature during
ontogeny (Lorenz, 1935). As soon as a newly hatched chaffinch
emerges from its egg, it shows the very characteristic food-begging
response of gaping. Other behavioral patterns mature during
ontogeny without need of further patterned information concerning
their specific adaptive function. A mallard develops all the highly
specific courtship postures of its species even if reared in complete
social Isolation. These motor patterns are called fixed action patterns
or Erbkoordinationen.4 Animals are thus equipped with innate
motor patterns. In addition, they are capable of responding
adoptively to certain stimuli upon first encounter, manifesting a
kind of a priori "knowledge."
A frog that has just undergone metamorphosis and climbs out of
the water does not need to learn how to catch flies with a flick of the
tongue. Until then it has been a tadpole, scraping algae from the
substrate by means of specialized scraping jaws. Yet all at once it
knows how to catch small prey with a steady tongue-flick movement.
Experiments with dummies have shown that the newly
metamorphosed frog will snap at anything that moves, including
small leaves and pebbles (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1951), but it quickly learns
to avoid noxious prey. The originally unselective response serves its
purpose, since normally the only moving objects in the frog's
environment are prey. The innate ability to respond to simple stimuli
- in this case moving objects - presupposes a filtering mechanism
which "selects" certain specific stimuli, releasing the relevant
behavioral sequences only in response to them. This has been termed
the "innate releasing mechanism" - IRM - (Tinbergen, 1951) or
"innate template" - angeborenes Schema - (Lorenz, 1935). The
neuroethological investigations of Ewert (1974) have illuminated the
processes by which the visual stimuli of prey and predator are
analyzed within the central nervous system of the toad. Numerous
social responses in animals are initiated by such innate releasing
mechanisms, for example, courtship behavior, fighting, following
responses, and submission (Tinbergen, 1955; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975b).
In these cases, in which communication is advantageous to both
participants in an interaction, mutual adaptation between the sender
and the receiver of a signal takes place. The sender develops
signaling devices like conspicuous colored spots, feathers, expressive
movements, pheromones, vocalizations, and so on. These signals are
called releasers and evolve by a process called ritualization (Huxley,
1923). They are matched to IRMs in the receiver.
During its reproductive period the male stickleback establishes a
territory and develops a red belly; it drives rivals away, but courts
females sporting a silver swollen belly. If the male is exposed to an
exact model of a stickleback with neither a red nor a swollen belly, it
will show no interest; but a sausage-shaped wax dummy with a red
underside is attacked immediately, while a silver swollen-bellied one
is courted. This behavior is displayed even by male sticklebacks
raised in isolation (Cullen, 1960; Tinbergen, 1951).
Behavioral sequences can often be elicited by several different key
stimuli of this sort, each being individually effective. Male
sticklebacks threaten each other at the border of their territories by
adopting a head-down, threatening posture. If a horizontally
positioned dummy without a red belly is presented to a male, no
attack is released, but when the same dummy is presented in a
vertical position, attack results. If the two attack-releasing signals
occur in one presentation, they combine additively, eliciting a
stronger response. This law of heterogenous summation was
discovered by Seitz (1940) and has since been confirmed in a number
of studies.
The same releasing structure can act differentially on the two
sexes. The red belly of the male stickleback releases aggression only
In other males; females exhibit attraction toward and preference for
red-bellied males. An interesting variant is exhibited by a subspecies
of the three-spined stickleback living in the Cephalis river of western
North America, where it is preyed upon by the fish Novumbra
hubbsi. In this case, predation counteracts selection for red coloration
and all males in the area are black. Females in the area, however, are
still attracted toward red-bellied males, which in experiments are
preferred by a ratio of 5:1. The receptor mechanism in the female
underlying responsiveness to the original stimulus has apparently
failed to adapt to the change that took place some 8,000 years ago,
but has instead remained conservative (McPhail, 1969). Some
behavioral traits in man can be similarly interpreted (see
Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975b).
The strength of a response to a stimulus is partially a function of
the releasing quality of the stimulus. From an evolutionary point of
view, it is interesting that releasing stimuli are to a certain extent
susceptible to exaggeration. It is possible to create an experimental
situation in which an exaggerated stimulus leads to a grotesque
response. Such is the case when an oyster-catcher prefers an egg four
times the length of its own, although it cannot even settle down on it
(Koehler and Zagarus, 1937).
Both external and internal factors determine the magnitude of a
response. Baerends et al. (1955) have shown that in Lebistes both the
strength of the fish's motivation and the releasing quality of external
stimuli determine the resultant observable behavior.
Innate releasing mechanisms operate in monkeys as well. Sackett
(1966) reared rhesus monkeys from birth under conditions of social
deprivation: they could neither look out of their cages nor see their
own mirror images. They were then shown slides representing
conspecific monkeys, landscapes, geometric shapes, and so on. After
a given slide had been presented once, the monkeys could voluntarily
view it again by pressing a lever. With frequency of voluntary
projection as an indicator of picture preference, it turned out that the
monkeys enjoyed looking at pictures of conspecifics. Projection
frequency for these slides increased rapidly; upon seeing them the
young animals emitted contact calls, approached, and even tried to
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play with the image. Slides that did not depict monkeys evoked only
brief periods of interest and the projection rate remained low.
Among the monkey pictures there was one which represented a
threatening adult, and even this remained popular for a while. At the
age of two and a half months, however, the monkeys' behavior
changed. Suddenly the "threat" picture released withdrawal,
self-clasping, and fear vocalizations, and projection rate dropped
rapidly. As the animals had been deprived of any social experience
until that time, this change must have resulted from maturation of an
IRM for recognition of expressive patterns. It is certainly plausible
that this should occur at two and a half months, for at that time
juveniles normally make contact with others in the group and
recognition of the threat expression assumes paramount importance.
Releasers are not only found in the visual modality. The varieties
of frog calls, cricket chirps, and bird songs are also characteristics
subserving the, recognition of conspecifics. Distress calls are the only
signal to a mother hen indicating that her young are in danger. If a
glass bell is placed over a chick so that its mother can see but not hear
it, all its struggling will fail to restrain the hen from departing with
the rest of her brood. In contrast, a mother hen will respond quickly
upon hearing one of her chicks call from the other side of a wooden
fence. She runs to the barrier and stays there calling, although she
cannot see the chick.
A female turkey will provide maternal care to any object that
vocalizes like one of her brood. A stuffed polecat, which in no way
resembles a turkey, elicits brooding behavior when fitted with a
speaker emitting the appropriate calls. Such vocalizations are the
only signals releasing brooding behavior; deaf female turkeys will kill
their own young because they cannot hear their calls (Schleidt et al.,
1960).
Drives, neurogenic motivation, and central motor generators.
Animals are known to be motivated by built-in physiological
machinery giving rise to "drives!" This term is to be understood as
generally descriptive of the fact that animals do not always wait
passively for stimuli to impinge upon them before emitting a
response: they actively seek certain stimuli. There is no unitary drive
mechanism, however. A diversity of physiological systems must act to
incite an animal to seek (through so-called appetitive behavior)
stimulus situations that allow specific motor patterns to be performed
(Lehrman, 1953; Hinde, 1966; von Hoist, 1935). Sexual behavior,
hunting, feeding, drinking, and, at least in some species, aggressive
behavior, are in part based upon such internal motivating
mechanisms.
Of particular interest is the neurogenic motivation, first described
by von Hoist (1935) as underlying the swimming movement of eels
and other fishes. He found that completely deafferentiated spinal
eels (i.e., with spinal transections cutting off sensory input) swam
with perfect coordination and without any pause until death
occurred, demonstrating that groups of motoneurons could
spontaneously generate impulses that were centrally integrated
sufficiently to produce coordinated muscle activity.
Neurogenic spontaneity and central coordination have since been
demonstrated to occur for a number of other motor patterns. Lorenz,
on learning about von Hoist's findings, elaborated on the hypothesis
that all innate motor patterns are more or less driven by spontaneous
groups of neurons, and showed that the latter's constant discharge in
motor action is blocked by inhibitory mechanisms. A long-lasting
blockage without release causes action-specific energy to be dammed
up, releasing appetitive behavior, which in turn causes the animal to
search for the adequate stimulus stiuation in order to perform the
action. During this phase the animal is so eager to perform that he
responds to stimuli that would not normally release the action. Some
hints as to the physiology of such storage are suggested by
neuropharmacology: neurotransmitters stored in submicroscopic
vesicles seem to play an important role in spontaneous neuronal
acitivity.
Numerous studies on vertebrates as well as invertebrates have
demonstrated the existence of central motor activity generators, and
the notion of neurogenic motivation is thus well supported by
neurophysiological evidence (Roeder, 1955; Bullock, 1961; Bullock
and Horridge, 1965; Pearson, 1972; Eisner and Huber, 1973:
Fentress, 1976).
Imprinting, early learning dispositions, and the
preprogramming of behavior. Finally, learning is determined by
phylogenetic adaptations such that animals learn what contributes to
their survival and adaptively change their behavior through
experience. For instance, it has been found that some animals learn
during early sensitive periods to perform specific responses to certain
objects, and once these responses are conditioned to them, the
connection seems to be resistant to behavioral extinction, in some
cases to the extent of irreversibility. If male zebra finches are raised
for the first three months of their lives by society finch foster parents,
they will at sexual maturity prefer female society finches as mates.
This preference will show up at maturity even if the finches are
returned to their conspecifics after the first three months, and even
after being mated to females of their own kind: if given a choice after
successfully mating and raising young of its own species, the finch
will prefer the foster-parent species to its own. This phenomenon has
been called imprinting (Lorenz, 1935; Hess, 1973; Immelmann,
1966).
A further learning disposition has manifested itself during these
foster-parenting experiments: zebra finches exposed to the song of
their foster parents for the first thirty-five days of their lives, at
sexual maturity sang like their foster parents, even if after exposed
exclusively to the song of their own species. They evidently
memorize the song during a sensitive period and this has priority
over any later experience.
"Learning disposition," like "drive," is a descriptive term and does
not imply a unitary mechanism. The study of bird song, for example,
has clearly demonstrated that identical outcomes - in this case that a
bird learns the song of a conspecific - can be achieved in different
ways (Konishi, 1964, 1965a,b; Marler, 1959; Thorpe, 1961);
Chaffinches, for example, know what they have to imitate. From a
variety of tapes presented to them they pick the preferred species
song for imitation. By means of an innate schema - Konishi coined
the term "template" - they know which is the right song to imitate.
Male swamp sparrows learn their songs and fail to learn those of the
song sparrow from the same region. Marler (1978) spliced syllables
from tape recordings of both species into an array of
swamp-sparrow-like and song-sparrow-like temporal patterns.
Swamp sparrows learned only those songs composed of conspecific
syllables, irrespective of whether the temporal pattern was
swamp-sparrow-like or song-sparrow-like. This was also found to
occur in birds reared in total isolation from adult conspecific sounds.
We are therefore forced to assume that the birds are phylogenetically
tuned to recognize their species-specific syllables and that they show
an innate preference for imitating them.
In considering our own phylogenetic origins, would it not be
reasonable to ask whether human behavior might be
preprogrammed in similar ways? The mere suggestion, however,
that man's behavior, and in particular his social conduct, might be in
part preprogrammed by phylogenetic adaptations has evoked
polemical replies from environmentalists. These have accused
biologists of "biological determinism," of tending to support
authoritarian, conservative principles, and thereby justifying the
status quo and fostering fatalistic attitudes on the grounds that
nothing can be done about innate traits. This, even though ethologists
have repeatedly emphasized that man is able culturally to control all
his behavior, including its innate components: that man has to be
educated. Before we discuss the consequences of a strict
environmentalism as opposed to the biologist's approach, let us
examine the evidence for our hypothesis that human behavior is in
part preprogrammed.
5. Phylogenetic adaptations as determinants of human behavior
Man is certainly programmed to act in predictable ways, and much
of his behavioral repertoire is clearly acquired during ontogeny. This
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remains undisputed. Less clear, however, is the magnitude and
significance of the genetic contribution. Is human behavior to a
certain extent preprogrammed by phylogenetic adaptations?
Montagu (1968, p. 11) has written:
"There is, in fact, not the slightest evidence or ground for assuming
that the alleged 'phylogenetically adapted instinctive' behavior of
other animals is in any way relevant to the discussion of the motive
forces of human behavior. The fact is that, with the exception of the
instinctoid reactions in infants to sudden withdrawals of support and
to sudden loud noises, human behavior is entirely instinctless."
And he has not changed position since. In answering the question:
Why should instincts not exist in humans?, he wrote (1976, p. 77):
"For the best of all reasons: because they would be adaptively
utterly useless to a creature that responds to the challenges of the
environment by the use of intelligence and learning. Instinct may
serve a useful purpose in other creatures, creatures that still live
largely in a biological universe, but in the case of humanity, which
has evolved as such in a largely human made environment,
instinctive behavior not designed to meet the requirements of the
human environment would have been thoroughly maladaptive, and
would quickly have led to extinction of a population constitutionally
so ill endowed. . . . If human beings ever had any remnants of
instincts to begin with, they would have lost them."
Similar statements are not uncommon. I intend to show that they are
basically incorrect, and that what is innate to man is not a negligible
quantity but of fundamental importance, in particular with respect
to social behavior.
Evidence is derived from four main sources: the study of babies
and children; the study of the congenitally deaf and blind, and other
experientially deprived individuals; cross-cultural investigations; and
comparative studies of primates. It can be shown that a variety of
motor patterns and unconditioned responses to certain stimuli deter-
mine not only certain innate motivating mechanisms but also many
of man's basic social interaction strategies. Furthermore, there are
strong indications that many complex cultural rituals are in fact
elaborations of phylogenetically evolved interaction strategies.
The behavior of babies and children.
a. Motor and perceptual skills. The neonate already exhibits a
number of functional motor patterns. It can suck and search for the
breast with rhythmic head-turning movements; it has a highly
differentiated repertoire of vocal utterances; it can smile, hold itself
to objects by a grasping reflex, and so on. Of the five non-crying
signals that Morath (1977) reports, one is produced during sleep and
acts as a contact call. If a baby fails to emit this sound, mothers wake
up and check, without being able to say why. Other sounds are
emitted during drinking, signaling either comfort or discomfort.
Sound spectrograms reveal similarities with nonhuman infant
primate vocalizations. Babies are also capable of responding to
stimuli in an adaptive way upon first encounter, prior to any
particular relevant experience.
When human infants from two to eleven weeks old are restrained
in chairs and exposed to symmetrical expanding silhouettes, they
respond as if objects were approaching and about to collide with
them. They avert their heads, lift their hands in self-protection, and
exhibit higher pulse rates. They react similarly to large objects
actually moving toward them. On the other hand, if the silhouettes
are expanded asymmetrically, as if moving past, no such reactions on
the part of the infants are observed (Ball and Tronick, 1971). Bower
(1971, p. 32) comments as follows:
"The precocity of this expectation is quite surprising from the
traditional point of view. Indeed, it seems to me, that these findings
are fatal to traditional theories of human development. In our
culture it is unlikely that an infant less than two weeks old has been
hit in the face by an approaching object, so that none of the infants
in the study could have learned to fear an approaching object and
expect it to have tactile qualities. We can only conclude that in man
there is a primitive unity of sense, with visual variables specifying
tactile consequences, and this primitive unity is built into the
structure of the human nervous system."
At two months of age, infants are capable of recognizing form
invariants under various transformations. It has been possible to train
infants to manipulate with their heads electrical switches attached to
a head rest; the reward was the appearance of a smiling person. The
training signal was a cube measuring 30 cm at the edges presented to
the subject at a distance of one meter. Infants rarely responded to a
cube measuring 90 cm at the edges and presented at a distance of
three meters, although the retinal image would be of the same size as
that projected by the 30 cm cube one meter away (Bower, 1966).
Children also have an innate ability to integrate visual and tactile
information. We know that an object that disappears behind a screen
is still there. According to classical developmental theory, a child
should acquire this constancy from experience in reaching behind
the screen. Bower (1971) has measured the startle responses (rise in
pulse rate) of infants being tested with various optical illusions. He
projected apparent objects onto a screen, whereupon the infant
would attempt to reach out for them. Failure to grasp the "objects"
induced surprise, as measured by elevated pulse rate. In contrast, no
change in pulse rate was recorded when the infant was allowed to
actually grasp something. Thus an infant expects to be able to touch
an object it sees. And since at the age of two weeks infants already
respond to this experimental condition in the manner described, one
can conclude that there is an innate expectation of tactile conse-
quences following visual information.
A particular preadaptation to language learning is the phenome-
non of categorical perception. If we present a continuum of syllables
with all physical gradations from "ba" to "pa," for example, subjects
do not perceive a continuum but hear either "ba" or "pa" in each
case. The abrupt change in the perception from "ba" to "pa" occurs
at approximately the same physical location in the continuum in all
cultures. Categorical perception has also been shown to occur in the
one-month-old baby, which suggests that it is an innate characteris-
tic. IRMs seem tuned to syllables in a fashion similar to that found in
the swamp sparrow and discussed above (Cutting and Rosner, 1974;
Pastore, 1976; Liberman and Pisoni, 1977).
These and other auditory and visual experiments (see Bornstein,
1978) demonstrate the existence of specific innate inforrnation
processing mechanisms in humans and are hence of considerable
theoretical importance. They substantiate the viewpoint of Lorenz,
who asserts that innate releasing mechanisms form the basis of many
of our thought and attitude patterns. (For further information, see
Bower, 1977.)
bo Imitative capacities of the baby. Meltzoff and Moore (1977)
discovered that infants between twelve and twenty-one days of age
can imitate facial movement patterns such as mouth opening, tongue
protrusion, and lip protrusion, as well as some finger movements.
They argue convincingly that learning was not involved and
hypothesize that the imitative performance is accomplished through
an active matching process mediated by an abstract representational
system, which comes close to the assumption of an innate schema or
template by which visual input and motor responses are matched.
The authors seem to be unaware that this is the original concept of
the innate releasing mechanisms. The hypothesis that early imitation
might be based on an innate releasing mechanism is in fact discarded
by the authors, since they feel that the motor patterns observed lack
stereotypy in the baby. This, and the fact that four different gestures
are imitated, renders the approach in their opinion unwieldy. But
this argument is not convincing. We know that "fixed" action
patterns show variability, in particular during their ontogenetic
development. Even a simple smile can occur in a variety of
intensities, and variability increases when other motor patterns are
superimposed. Nonetheless, our detectors are tuned to recognize
smiles and many other expressive patterns. Should it be found,
however, that babies were able to imitate a great variety of observed
motor patterns - and in a recent letter to the author Meltzoff
indicates this to be the case - then we would be confronted with an
interesting case of a phylogenetic adaptation tuned to recognize and
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Figure 4. The ambivalence of approach and withdrawal in encounter situa-
tions. A Balinese mother waving "hello" to a visitor with her little boy's hand.
She indicates her readiness for contact at the same time by an eyebrow flash.
Following this, both show gaze avoidance and hiding by cuddling together. The
baby boy finally establishes full-face contact again and smiles. From a 16-mm
film by the author (50 frames/second).
categorize a great variety of observed behaviors, and connected to
the motor system so as to generate the appropriate performance. The
authors' discovery is in any case exciting proof of a highly specific
phylogenetic adaptation in man.
c. Avoidance of strangers. A phenomenon that has puzzled many
investigators is the "fear of strangers" which develops in babies at six
to eight months. At this age, babies begin to discriminate between
their familiar reference persons and strangers. If the latter approach,
the child exhibits withdrawal responses, sometimes accompanied by
signs of fear, such as crying, turning toward the mother, and hiding.
In other cases we observe less pronounced "flight" reactions, but
usually the child will show ambivalent behavior, including reactions
of turning away.5 This fear response develops in any baby that can
attach itself to a familiar reference person, and does not depend on
any particular aversive experience with strangers. I might add that I
have encountered fear of strangers exhibited by all cultures I have
visited so far (see Figure 4). Konner (1972) has provided detailed
data on the phenomenon in !Kung bushmen. It is a universal trait, for
which learning theory could hardly account. It can be reinforced by
education, but it occurs with or without maternal training. The
behavior has been interpreted as separation anxiety (see Rajecki et
al., 1978), but a less psychologistic explanation would be that at a
certain age the child responds with fear to the features of a fellow
human. The fear-releasing quality of these stimuli is canceled out if
the baby knows the person. But a certain amount of ambivalence
often remains detectable even if the baby interacts with its mother,
and it remains detectable in the behavior of the adult (cf. Figure 12).
One of the signals that releases this fear response seems to be the eyes.
There is much evidence that staring is perceived as a threat (Argyle
and Cook, 1976) and that eyespot patterns in general have a highly
arousing effect (Coss, 1972). This explains cutoffs during
conversations. On the one hand, we have to look at our interlocutor in
order to signal attention and readiness for communication, but we
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must interrupt eye contact at intervals in order to prevent the
escalation into staring, which could easily be considered as an intent
to dominate or even become aggressive.
One may argue that this fear of strangers can be overcome by
education, and this is to a certain extent true. It would be wrong,
however, to play down its importance in everyday life. To a
considerable extent this apparently simple underlying program
determines our social conduct. That we are inclined to live in closed
individualized groups and tend to react with ambivalence and
reservation or even hostility to a stranger, unless he is formally
introduced, is a universally encountered fact. We can certainly
identify with strangers, and we are actually taught to consider our
fellow man in the anonymous crowd as a brother. But the fact
remains that we view the stranger with strong ambivalence; one need
only observe the gaze avoidance of strangers sharing an elevator
(Goffman, 1966). Fear of strangers is one of the reasons why life in
the anonymous society of a city exposes us to stress; city dwellers
adapt by strategies of avoidance (cutoffs, noninvolvement) but still
complain about overexposure to strangers, which continuously elicits
stress (Newman and McCauley, 1977). Paradoxically, one hears at
the same time that people feel alone. They miss the individualized
groups of friends and family members, all scattered nowadays as a
result of the celebrated mobility of modern man. City planners take
man's inclination to avoid strangers into consideration by effectively
isolating families in city blocks. What they do not realize is man's
urge to bond, to get acquainted gradually with the stranger, and thus
to form individualized groups.
Stranger avoidance has led man to live through most of his history
in small, fairly closed groups, where all know one another; this has
probably been one factor spurring cultural and biological evolution.
Certainly it is an innate disposition of fundamental importance.
d. Basic social interaction strategies. I have promoted the
hypothesis that many cultural rituals are differentiations and
elaborations of basic, universally encountered social-interaction
strategies and that they constitute phylogenetic adaptations
(Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1972, 1976). This is certainly in part speculative.
However, cross-cultural study of ontogeny provides enough evidence
to make it worthwhile to pursue this idea further. As examples, I wish
to discuss strategies of agonistic buffering; patterns of sharing and
giving, and the rituals derived from them; and focus of attention
seeking. We will return to this subject in the later analysis of complex
ritualistic events.
i. Agonistic buffering. The following example may serve to
illustrate one universally observable strategy of conflict
management. In this case a Yanomami girl is playing around a pole
(Figure 5). Earlier she has had a brief conflict with the boy, who tried
to chase her away. He approaches her again. The girl smiles
prominently, with the intent to appease. This strategy fails; the boy
hits the girl, who now lowers her gaze, pouts, and turns her head
away. This behavior blocks the aggression of the boy, who turns
away, leaving the girl unmolested.
The attempt to block aggression by smiling or by gaze aversion
(cutoff) and pouting is universally encountered. In most cases it not
only blocks aggression but also releases efforts to reestablish friendly
relations on the part of the injuring party. The hypothesis that these
constitute innate social interaction strategies is backed by a finding of
Murray (1977). He told mothers during interaction sessions with their
three-month-old babies to keep their faces motionless. This caused
distress in the babies, and when the mothers, after the period of
nonresponsiveness, attempted to talk to their children, the latter
showed clear withdrawal by turning away as if resentful. For a
gregarious organism a social cutoff is a serious threat since it isolates
the individual by symbolically severing a bond. Such a threat induces
efforts at bond-repair.
This strategy can be observed at the level of individual as well as
group encounters. Man has the further capacity to verbalize this
interaction. While children mostly act out in nonverbal behavior, an
adult may say: "I will not speak to you any more." A sentence in this
case acts as the functional equivalent of a nonverbal behavior. It is a
characteristic of human ritualistic events that functional equivalents
can substitute for one another. The cross-cultural analysis of greeting
encounters provides numerous examples. Nonetheless, the basic rules
by which such events are structured remain universally the same
(Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1979).
ii. Giving and sharing. Sharing and giving are widespread means
of establishing friendly bonds. A wealth of anthropological literature
refers to ritual gift exchange, which serves to establish bonds via
obligations. Gift exchange is based on reciprocity, but usually with
delay. In primitive societies like those of the bushmen, gifts chain-
link people into a system of social security (Wiessner, 1977). Gifts are
exchanged on occasions of meeting (see below). In our culture,
birthdays and Christmas are two events when giving and exchanging
gifts are of particular importance. Gift exchange is certainly a
universal mode of establishing and reinforcing bonds. Since from
early childhood children experience the rewarding effect of being
given food by their mothers, one might assume that sharing and
giving are learned as a bonding strategy. They are certainly
reinforced by education as of early childhood, and to be "stingy" is
considered bad in many societies and treated with reproach.
What intrigues me, however, is that as early as one year of age
children already spontaneously part with objects when seeking
friendly contact (Stanjek, 1978). They employ this strategy, for
example, toward a visiting stranger, once initial shyness has been
overcome. And even at an earlier age, one can see babies performing
with the clear intention of feeding a morsel to a sibling or to the
mother. While doing so they open their mouths in the same way their
mothers do when feeding their babies. Again, this could be playful
imitation. But the spontaneity with which the strategy is
instrumentally employed to achieve friendly relations surpasses, in
my opinion, the cognitive capacity of the child at this age, and seems
to hint at a phylogenetic basis.
Children readily share when appropriately approached by their
sibs or playmates. They do, however, resent attempts at forceful
acquisition. The accompanying photographs illustrate this (Figure 6).
Two Yanomami girls are eating berries. The one who finishes first
tries to grab some berries from the other, who withdraws. The first
child then discontinues her acquisitive attempt, and the other girl
willingly shares with her. Whether consciously or not, children want
their property to be respected, and only if this respect is accorded,
will they fulfill a demand.
The second series of photographs (Figure 7) illustrates a similar
sequence taken in a completely different culture, namely a recently
contacted neolithic Papuan tribe (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1976). Two
half-sibs are sitting side by side. The boy is eating a piece of roasted
taro; the girl wants some and tries to grasp It, whereupon the boy
withdraws. The mother of the boy then comes and takes the morsel,
which is willingly given to her; she parts It in two halves and returns
both to the boy with the verbal and gestural instruction to share,
which he does without reluctance. In this case intervention and aid
were necessary, since the boy was not capable of breaking the morsel
in two. The readiness to share is evident, even though sometimes in
conflict with egocentric inclinations. In such cases education
endeavors to reinforce the altruistic tendencies. It is remarkable how
this mother returns both pieces of taro to the boy In order to allow
him to share with his half-sister.
At such an early stage objects serve as mediators of social relations,
so we assume the existence of an innate disposition even though we
are aware that incontrovertible evidence is not yet available (Figure
8). Supportive data come from man-animal comparisons.
Meat-sharing plays an important role in bonding chimpanzee group
members (Teleki, 1973a,b) and the analogous giving of greeting
presents is found in many birds.
Objects are not only used as tokens for friendly bonding; at an
early age children already employ them as mediators to place
themselves at the center of attention. This behavior again finds Its
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Figure 5. A Yanomami girl is approached by a boy with the aggressive intention of taking over the pole which she has been climbing. They have already
engaged in this sort: of competition (or struggle) before. The girl attempts to block the aggression by smiling, but her attempts are in vain. The boy hits her, she
lowers her gaze in a clear cutoff, and pouts. Thereupon he withdraws. From a 16-mm film by the author (25 frames/second).
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Figure 7. Two Eipo children (half sibs) sitting side by side, the boy at the left eating a piece of taro. When his half-sister tries to grab some, he reacts by
withdrawing. Upon observing this, the mother of the boy intervenes by taking the taro, breaking it into two halves, and returning both to her son, who willingly
gives one to his half-sister. From a 16-mm film by the author (25 frames/second; frame rate not shown because the sequence was interrupted during filming).
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Figure 8. Dialogues of giving and taking are often initiated by very young children. Here a Yanomami baby offers her sister a morsel. The readiness with
which small children in all cultures exhibit the pattern suggests a shared disposition. From a 16-mm film by the author (25 frames/second).
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elaboration in a rich diversity of cultural rituals, the potlatch being
one well-known example (see also Heeschen et al, in press).
Hi. Focus of attention seeking. High-ranking monkeys and apes
are characteristically the focus of attention (in terms of gaze patterns,
etc.) for other members of the group (Chance and Larsen, 1976).
They are mostly adult males, with a conspicuous outer appearance; a
high-ranking hamadryas baboon, for instance, stands out visually by
virtue of his impressive fur. In addition, high-ranking individuals
position themselves in such a way that they are easily seen by other
group members. Finally, they use a variety of displays to draw
attention to themselves.
In studying groups of children, Hold (1976) was able to
demonstrate that the structure-of-attention criterion is a valid one for
indicating rank in man as well. Individuals who are the focus of
attention are characterized by a number of behavioral traits. They
are the ones who initiate and organize games, they comfort others in
distress, they share more readily and show an above-average amount
of aggression, although they are never the most aggressive. Others
preferentially seek their company and like to engage them by
displaying various objects of interest.
The strategies employed among children to achieve rank are a
mixture of friendly bonding behaviors and display and agonistic
patterns. Helping, comforting, sharing, and cooperating in games are
combined with aggressive threats against competitors and children
who attack others. Individuals seek attention by conspicuous forms of
behavior, such as dress, the use of various objects for display
purposes, and conspicuously positioning themselves. Very small boys
already know how to show off. And it is not difficult to recognize
most of these displays, whether in dress or in preferential seating
behavior, at the adult stage of life.
Studies of sensorily deprived children.
Most of our facial expressions develop during ontogeny. Are these
motor patterns learned or the result of maturation? Studies on the
congenitally deaf and blind provide an answer. Children born deaf
and blind grow up in eternal darkness and silence: they lack the
opportunity to hear or see other individuals' actions, and if the
environmentalist's conception were valid, their behavior would
deviate very much from that of children not deprived of this basic
information. We have examined such children and found that the
basic facial expressions, such as smiling, laughing, crying, anger-
frowns, clenching of teeth, pouting, and the like, occur in the same
situations as with healthy children. The congenitally deaf and blind
smile when their mothers play with them, cry when they have hurt
themselves, and demonstrate fits of anger, to mention just a few
examples (Figure 9).
It could be argued that the deaf and blind have derived informa-
tion from their sense of touch and learned their facial expressions
from tactile models. I have had the opportunity, however, to study
congenitally deaf and blind thalidomide children, whose truncated
limbs prevented them from exploring their environment with the
help of a sense of touch (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1973a). They nonetheless
exhibited the basic repertoire of facial expressions such as smiling,
laughing, and crying. The argument remains that shaping could have
occurred, for example, by the mother responding to smiling with
friendly fondling and to crying with comforting. Such reinforcement
can be expected to occur, but it must start with already recognizable
patterns of facial expression for the mother to respond to. For the
more complicated patterns of expression, such as anger, it is difficult
to conceive how this could be determined by accidental shaping.
Information derived from the study of the congenitally deaf and
blind is of great theoretical interest, but limited, however, since
many of our social behavioral patterns are released by auditory and
visual cues. As these channels are blocked in those born deaf and
blind, we have to explore other ways if we want to find out whether
more complicated patterns of social interaction belong to our phylo-
genetically acquired behavioral program. We have investigated this
Figure 9. The expressions of a nine-year-old girl born deaf and blind: smiling;
neutral; and distressed (crying). From a 16-mm film by the author.
question in studies of the congenitally blind and through cross-
cultural comparison.
In speaking to the congenitally blind, it is possible to release quite
complex behavior patterns, for example, coyness. One need only
make a compliment to a young girl to evoke blushing, lowering of the
head, and turning away in a brief cutoff, alternating with patterns of
approach such as turning toward the speaker, looking in his direction,
and smiling. A congenitally blind boy hid his face behind his hands
when slightly embarrassed.
Comparative studies of primate behavior.
The comparative study of primate behavior has revealed a large
number of homologies between human and nonhuman primates.
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The human smile is homologous to the silent bared-teeth display of
monkeys and apes; human laughter is homologous to their play face
or relaxed open-mouth display. In children arid chimpanzees both
expressions are strikingly similar, and van Hooff (1971), who studies
these patterns of expression, has published a picture of a boy playing
with a young chimpanzee, both displaying a nearly identical play
face. I have filmed the play face in children of the Yanomami, the
Kalahari !Ko Bushmen, and the Eipo (Papuan). Kortlandt (1972) and
van Lawick-Goodall (1975) have pointed to the striking similarities
in the greeting display of chimpanzee and man. On occasions of
friendly encounter chimpanzees have been observed to embrace one
another and kiss (see above: Human and animal rituals, section 2).
Very peculiar phallic displays have been reported in a number of
monkeys and apes (Ploog et al, 1963; Wickler, 1967b). These
function as aggressive threats against conspecifics and are derived
from the male's intention to mount, an expression of dominance in
many mammals (Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Wickler, 1968). When a group
of vervet monkeys forages on the ground, some males sit on guard
with their backs to the group, exposing their brilliantly colored
genitals (red penis, blue scrotum); erection occurs when conspecifics
of another group approach. This phallic threat serves a spacing
function.
In man, phallic displays serve similar functions. Direct phallic
displays occur in confrontation with enemies. The Eipo of Westirian
(New Guinea) wear phallocrypts. When mocking the enemy, they
first loosen the string that fastens the tip of the phallocrypt around
the waist. Then they jump up and down at an elevated spot, which
makes the phallocrypt swing up and down conspicuously. When
startled, the Eipo click their thumbnails against their phallocrypts,
thus drawing attention to their phallic display organ. This is an
apotropaic (evil-averting) display, safeguarding against potential
threat (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1976). Phallic figures or verbal threats are
substitutes for phallic displays in man. Phallic figures serving as
guardians to protect an edifice (Figures 10a-c,e) or the fields,
(Figure lOd), or as personal amulets, are known from Europe,
tropical Asia, New Guinea, South America, and Africa (Eibl-
Eibesfeldt, 1970; see also Figure 10).
Results of cross-cultural comparison.
a. Universal motor patterns* In this section we wish to discuss
some results of cross-cultural comparison with respect to our
hypothesis that phylogenetic adaptations preprogram human
behavior to a significant extent. Some observations concerning our
cross-cultural work have already been presented in previous sections.
Our cross-cultural studies are based on film documentation.
Although man is certainly the most filmed being on earth, we have
rarely been able to make use of the film material of others for present
purposes, since this has tended to be focused primarily upon aspects
of survival strategies and material culture: how people hunt, fish,
trap, build huts, weave, and so on is fairly well documented. Unique
ritualistic activities have been filmed, too, but here the
documentation is less complete; and when one is interested in
unstaged social interactions, one rarely finds useful existing
documentation, except for a few interspersed snapshots. To my
knowledge only Bateson and Mead have made a pioneering effort to
record everyday life on film (Bateson and Mead, 1942). Most
ethnographic film and photography have focused on the "strange
ways of life" of other cultures, but how people greet each other when
they meet, how siblings interact, how mothers hug their babies have
not been systematically filmed in an unstaged form, even though
these features are of interest to the ethnocinematographer.
We have accordingly begun a cross-cultural documentation
program, filming people, without their knowledge, by means of
mirror lenses (for details see Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1973b, 1975b;
Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Hass, 1966, 1967). During the last ten years we
have focused on rapidly vanishing cultures that still follow their
original ways of life, selecting those that represent models for
different stages of cultural evolution. At regular intervals we have
Figure 10. Examples of phallic displays in human artifacts and nonhuman
primates, a) Phallic figure on the capital of a column in the cloister of St.-Remy,
France. The phallus of the figure, which stands on its head, has been chiseled
away, b) Phallic figure under the pulpit of the Romanesque church in Lorch,
Germany, c) Greek herm. d) Scarecrow from a Balinese rice field, e) Balinese
guardian figure ("scare-devil"), f) House guardian from Borneo, g) Male sexual
display posture of a squirrel monkey, h) Hamadryas baboon sitting guard for
group protection. From Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970 (a, b, d, e); Wickler, 1967a (c, f);
Ploog et al., 1967 (g).
visited the Kalahari Bushmen (!Ko, G/wi, !Kung), who live as hunters
and gatherers; the Yanomami (Upper Orinoko), who are incipient
agriculturists; the Eipo, Biami, and other neolithic agriculturists of
New Guinea; the Himba (Kaokoveld, South-West Africa),
representing pastoralists; the Balinese, representing rice farmers; and
many other groups. We have principally collected films of unstaged
social interaction. In order to allow later correlational analysis to be
performed, every scene is accompanied by a protocol stating the
context in which the recorded pattern occurred, what released it,
what followed it, and what had happened beforehand. We have also
attempted to avoid selectivity as much as possible by filming
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whenever an interaction was expected to occur, for example, when
people moved or turned toward one another, the filmer not knowing
in advance whether the interaction would be friendly or aggressive.
The uncut original is stored in an archive. Film publications are
made from duplicates. An Archive of Human Ethology of the Max
Planck Society was established in 1970. The publications
accompanying the films appear in the journal Homo.6
Our cross-cultural films have revealed a large number of universal
motor patterns. Their universality alone certainly does not allow us to
deduce that these patterns are innate in man.7 Similar experiences in
the early life of a child could shape behavior in different cultures
along similar lines. Darwin proposed that head-shaking, which
accompanies a "no" in our culture, derived from the child's turning
away his head when refusing the breast after satiation. This could
well explain why head-shaking occurs in so many different cultures
as a signal expressing "no" (but see below: b. Cultural convention and
innate motor patterns). The actual study of ontogeny, however, must
provide the final answer. Similarity in detail can in addition be the
result of some shared function, thereby merely constituting analogy.
Analogy is less probable, however, if the pattern is complicated and
yet proves in cross-cultural comparisons to be similar in terms of
detail, despite differing ecologies of the peoples compared. Certainly
there are numerous motor patterns to be found in man whose
particular form does not directly derive from a particular function.
This is especially true of many nonverbal patterns of social
expression. That smiling expresses friendly intent, crying and
weeping sorrow, "laughing at" a particular form of aggression, may
be primarily based on convention, comparable to the conventions
that give words their specific meaning. Such a convention could be
the product of cultural evolution. In such a case, however, man's
tendency to "pseudo-speciate" culturally should bring about fast
changes, as the rapid evolution of language clearly demonstrates. If,
on the other hand, we find instead that patterns of socially expressive
behavior remain the same across cultures, that they occur in the same
context, that they are positively and exclusively correlated with
certain other specific patterns, that they are embedded in the same
sequences of other patterns, that they have the same signal value, and
so on, then this is indeed strongly suggestive circumstantial evidence
for the hypothesis that they constitute phylogenetic adaptations.
Systematic study of ontogeny will again provide the final answer, but
even circumstantial evidence provides some preliminary basis for
statements concerning the nature of the pattern.
Since cultures pursue different educational strategies, we
sometimes have the opportunity to note certain persistent patterns of
behavior that are contrary to particular educational efforts. Thus
aggression constitutes a problem for cultures like the Kalahari
Bushmen, who pursue pacific ideals. Although, they fight it by
education, they cannot prevent aggression and rivalry from
occurring in early childhood. They likewise employ special strategies
to achieve a fairly egalitarian group structure, but again
possessiveness and striving for rank are problems with which they
must cope. Were these inclinations merely a result of cultural
imprinting, they would hardly show up in cultures that explicitly
sought to pursue different ideals and attempted to socialize their
children accordingly. Different cultures thus provide the natural
experiments from which we can learn that certain human behavioral
traits show resistance to the shaping efforts of the environment.
I wish to present here a few examples of expressive patterns to
document universals which can be said, with a high degree of
probability, to constitute phylogenetic adaptations. One concerns a
pattern of greeting, which I have called the "eyebrow flash." It
occurs in a very specific context and signals readiness for social
contact. It is most often observed in a greeting encounter. A short
head toss, whereby the head is raised and quickly jerked backward,
initiates the eyebrow movement, which occurs nearly
simultaneously: the eyebrows are raised for approximately one-sixth
of a second. The pattern is often followed by head-nodding, and a
smile is frequently superimposed upon the whole sequence. I have
discussed the derivation and function of this pattern in detail
elsewhere (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975b). Briely, the expression has
derived from an expression of surprise - in this case friendly surprise
as indicated by the accompanying smile - and thus readiness for
contact. We observe it in greetings, flirting, in emphasizing
agreement, and in other situations expressing contact readiness.
There are also contrasting lines of ritualization in which raised
eyebrows are combined with the threat-stare, indicating contempt.
In this case the eyebrows remain raised during the encounter (see
Table 1).
Cultural differences affect the readiness with which an eyebrow
flash is signalled. Polynesians give eyebrow flashes readily. They
greet strangers with this signal and couple it to a factual "yes." The
Japanese, however, repress it during encounters with adults; it is
considered improper, although small children, are freely addressed
in this way. We in the West seem to hold an intermediate position.
We use the signal in flirting, in greeting very good friends, and
finally in emphasizing agreement. Its basic pattern would be
considered by ethologists as Erhkoordination or "innate motor
pattern."
Another behavioral pattern that occurs as a universal sign of
affection is the kiss. In all cultures studied so far, I have found that
mothers hug and kiss their little children, Papuans as well as
Australian aborigines, Japanese, Balinese, bushmen, Himba,
Yanomami, and many others. The observed cultural variation may
affect the use of this pattern in adult communication. In some
cultures it seems to be taboo, at least in public. As discussed earlier,
the pattern derives from mouth-to-mouth feeding and is linked to
homologous behaviors in nonhuman primates.
Let us now turn to more complicated patterns. It has been argued
that mammalian behavior shows so much variability that one can
hardly speak of any fixed patterns (Schenkel, 1947). Lorenz (1953)
has answered by showing how the superposition of various intensities
of the movements accompanying the intention to fight or to flee in
the dog can generate a variety of different affective expressions
(Figure 11). In a similar way, many human expressive patterns,
which at first glance seem so variable, can be reduced to a number of
"invariants" superimposed upon each other or occurring in
alternation. Let us take the pattern of coyness as an example. We
Table 1. Schematic relationship among the various forms of eyebrow lifting.
From Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975b.
Eyebrow Flashing Evolved from
Friendly Surprise Expressing
a "Yes" to Social Contact -






Opening of the Eye
Accompanying Attention,




Eyebrow Lift as a Question
Expression of Curiosity
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Figure 11. Caoine facial expressions that result from a superposition of
various intensities of fighting and flight intentions, a-c dimension: increasing
readiness to flee; a-g dimension: increasing aggression and the corresponding
superposition. From Lorenz, 1953.
have discussed man's ambivalent reaction toward his fellowman,
already manifesting itself early in infancy as fear of strangers. This
ambivalent reaction is also expressed in the coyness pattern.
A coy girl will look at a person, then lower her eyelids, turn her
head away and, after averting her gaze, return it, either by looking
from the corner of her eyes, her head still turned away, or after
turning back to full face-to-face orientation. In the same situation a
girl may smile while simultaneously activating the antagonistic
muscles suppressing the smile, which results in what might be called
a coy smile. She may hide her mouth behind her hand to hide the
expression, or hide herself behind a friend or any object at hand, and
even clasp the object as if seeking protection. She may perform a
friendly eyebrow flash, but at the same time avoid eye contact by
lowering her eyelids. She may look at the other person, but turn her
chest away, showing her shoulder. And she may even show some
patterns of aggression, like stamping her feet, jokingly hitting a
nearby friend, laughing and biting her own fingers, nails, or lips. In
short, it is evident that two systems are aroused at the same time, a
friendly approach system and the agonistic system which controls the
reactions of aggression and flight. The motor patterns of aggression
and flight, on the one hand, are combined with the patterns of
approach and expressions of readiness for social contact on the other.
They can be combined simultaneously or in alternation. Since many
different patterns of both systems can be combined, a great variety of
expressions can occur.
Nonetheless we have no difficulties at all in interpreting and
classifying the pattern, even when we encounter the situation in a
completely different culture, (Figure 12). This fits in with the
findings of Ekman et al. (1972), who present to people of literate and
illiterate cultures photographs and videotape recordings of staged
expressions. Subjects recognize the expressions of other cultures with
a high degree of accuracy. For further examples of homologous
motor patterns, see Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1976).
bo Cultural convention and innate motor patterns. Movements
accompanying "yes" or "no" are sometimes puzzling. It is well
known that cultural variation exists, but head-shaking is certainly the
most widespread motor sign accompanying a "no." I have filmed this
behavior (amongst others) in several Papuan groups, among the
Yanomami Indians, the Kalahari Bushmen, and the Himba. The
pattern occurs worldwide in a scattered distribution, but is certainly
not the only way to express a "no." Greeks and many other people of
the Mediterranean and Near East area express a "no" by jerking the
head back and closing the eyes, often turning the head sideways and
sometimes lifting one or both hands in a gesture of refusal. This
pattern is observed in many other cultures as an expression of
annoyance, for example, Westerners exhibit the same pattern when
insulted by a proposal and expressing refusal under strong emotional
conditions. As a factual "no," however, its use is quite restricted in
the West.
The Ayoreo Indians of Paraguay have still another way of
expressing "no." They wrinkle their noses, as if sensing some pungent
smell, close their eyes, and often push their lips forward in a pout. As
a factual "no" the pattern is again quite restricted, but if we observe
people's reactions to offensive smells, we find universal eye-closing
and nose-wrinkling. The pattern derives from an attempt to block off
the annoying stimuli.
The Eipo of New Guinea use two motor patterns to express "no."
The factual "no" is a head-shake, but when expressing refusal in a
social encounter they push their lips forward - they pout. And
pouting is again a universal pattern people exhibit when they are
insulted and cut off the contact.
In other words, "no" can certainly be expressed in different ways,
but several patterns can be adapted to this purpose, because they
already express a "no," either in a social context, or in the refusal to
accept a stimulus, or in simply shaking something off.8 The latter has
the least emotional loading and hence is more amenable to expressing
a factual "no" than other patterns which might be interpreted as an
insult. Sometimes, however, cultures pick up such patterns as a
convention. The motor patterns in such cases are universals that
obtain their specific meaning through cultural adaptation.
c. Analogies in terms of underlying principles. Quite a number
of behavioral patterns prove similar on cross-cultural comparison,
although the similarity is not so much one of form as of principle.
Many are brought about by built-in biases on the receptor side, thus
constituting a component of human phylogenetic adaptation. As we
have discussed, animals as well as man are not only equipped with
motor patterns, but also possess detector devices (innate releasing
mechanisms) tuned to certain stimulus situations. The latter act as
signals and release certain behaviors. There is no need for prior
conditioning; the animal has, so to speak an innate "knowledge" of
them.
Some of our innate releasing mechanisms are tuned to signals
coming from other people. Babies, for example, are characterized by
a number of features we perceive as "cute." Some of these are
physical relationships, e.g., a large head in relation to the body,
relatively short extremities, a protruding forehead in relation to a
small face, and relatively large eyes. Furthermore, the cheeks seem
to be signals. It is fairly easy to produce models which are cute, and
exaggeration of one characteristic feature is enough to produce the
effect required. We can see this in numerous Disney cartoons, for
instance, where "cute" animals are produced by exaggerating the
head size in relation to the body. Baby features are universally the
same, and so is the response to "cute" features, which inhibit
aggression. It is therefore not particularly surprising to find that
making appeals via a child occurs in numerous encounter rituals
indicating peaceful intent. When Yanomami Indians are invited to a
feast, they take women and children along. When entering a village,
visiting warriors first dance in a warlike display, prancing and
showing off their bows and arrows. This aggressive display is
counteracted by the contrasting presence of a child dancing and
waving green palm leaves (Figure 18).
Another receptor bias has been identified by the thorough
cross-cultural investigation of Koenig (1975), which has revealed the
universal occurrence of eye-patterns in amulets and other designs
serving to ward off evil. This is consistent with our observation that
eyes are perceived with ambivalence. Many cross-cultural
similarities in fashion, body decoration, and in ritualistic events may,
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Figure 12. Coyness in a Himba girl illustrating successive states of ambivalence in response to a compliment. After establishing eye contact, a smile is signaled
but suppressed; eye contact is cut off and her head is turned away. Following this, eye contact is reestablished from the corners of her eyes (this time with a full
smile). Another cutoff follows and the smile is suppressed again. The sequence ends with eye contact and a coy smile. From a 16-rnm film by the author (50
frames/second).
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Figure 13. Yanomami visitor greeting his hosts by a warlike display dance. In
contrast with this aggressive display, a child waving green leaves accompanies
the warrior. Photograph by the author.
upon closer examination, be found to have a receptor bias as a shared
basis.
do Cross-cultural analyses of complex ritualistic events.
Behavioral events can be structured in a variety of ways. Tinbergen's
(1951) classic study of the sexual behavior of the stickleback revealed
an interdependence of male and female behavior, each triggering in
turn the response of the other. When the female appears, the male
starts his zigzag courting dance. This releases presenting behavior on
her part, which in turns elicits guiding to the nest, which she follows,
and so forth. This chain of events ends with egg laying and
fertilization, which initiates a new chain of parental behavior
patterns, beginning with fanning of the eggs by the male.
External stimuli play a decisive role in structuring these events.
The orderly sequence of behavioral acts is not however, always
brought about in this way. Once released, fixed action patterns are
executed in a stereotyped fashion, the coordination depending on
central processes, often in combination with proprioceptive
feedback, but sometimes without. This holds true even for some
learned motor patterns (Taub and Berman, 1964).
In the more complex behavioral sequences external and internal
stimuli as well as central mechanisms interact in bringing about an
orderly sequence, and they do so according to rules either acquired
during ontogeny or already available as phylogenetic adaptations.
Investigating rituals in man, one does encounter events
conforming to the stimulus-response principle. The responses are
partly innate motor patterns (like facial expressions), partly learned
ones. In addition, rules imposed by culture can structure the whole
sequence of acts. Whether this is also partly due to phylogenetically
acquired programs is an open question. Undoubtedly, innate
releasing mechanisms make us particularly responsive to certain
signals, thus determining the general course of certain events.
In our discussion of basic social-interaction strategies we provided
examples of events structured by rules, which on our hypothesis
constitute innate phylogenetic adaptations, determining the nature
of the response in relation to the external stimulus situation as well as
the general behavioral sequencing pattern. We emphasized the
cultural variability resulting in part from man's capacity to substitute
for innate motor patterns certain cultural ones, including verbal
behaviors, which then serve as functional equivalents, the general
patterning of the strategy remaining essentially the same. The
strategies discussed hitherto have been comparatively simple. We
turn now to more complex events.
Rituals of friendly encounter serve to illustrate how such complex
patterns are structured along cross-culturally similar lines. Complete
rituals of friendly encounter are characterized universally by three
phases (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1971a,b, 1973b, 1979; Ghosh, 1972): the
opening phase (phase of salutation); the phase of interaction; and the
phase of parting. Each of these phases is distinguished by a set of
verbal and nonverbal behaviors correlated with a specific function.
The opening phase is characterized by a combination of aggressive
displays and patterns of appeasement and bonding. The Yanomami
Indian, as described above, enters his hosts' village on the occasion of
a feast and dances in full war gear with aggressive displays.
Functionally, this show is a demonstration and reassurance of his
identity. An encounter situation is a challenge, and man is prone to
accept any sign of weakness as an invitation to establish a dominance
relationship. It is for this reason that man is usually on guard not to
show weakness. By their displays interactants define their position in
relation to one another (Goffman, 1966). Provocative displays are
combined with mitigating signals of appeasement - witness the child
waving green leaves who accompanies the dancing Yanomami
warrior (see Figure 13).
The Yanomami salutation is certainly a culturally specific ritual.
We in the West do not perform war dances on such an occasion. But
consideration of the more general principles expressed does reveal
comparable displays in our way of saluting. A visitor of state, for
example, is greeted by a welcoming cannonade, and in addition is
received by a child with a bouquet of flowers. In the most diverse
salutations we discover the same principle. When two groups of
Medlpa (Papua) meet on the occasion of a mourning ritual, the hosts
rush toward the visitors, the males with raised spears in aggressive
display, followed by women waving green Cordyline plants
(Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1978). So, too, in our culture the handshake - and
squeeze - are partly display and partly challenge, mitigated by
smiling, nodding, and embracing.
Cross-cultural examination of the salutation phase reveals that a
number of behavioral patterns can substitute for one another: innate
motor patterns as well as culturally evolved ones, including verbal
behavior. In discussing strategies of agonistic buffering in children
above, we provided some examples illustrating this interesting fact.
What remains universal in the phase of salutation is the combination
of displays with appeasing and friendly (bonding) appeals. Emphasis
upon one or the other may vary with the rank of the persons
involved, with the intimacy of acquaintanceship, and so on. The
universal appeal via children or women can be explained by
assuming that the signals involved buffer aggression through innate
releasing mechanisms specifically tuned to them. Concerning the
features of the child at least, there are strong indications that this is
indeed the case (Lorenz, 1943; Hiickstedt, 1965; Gardner and
Wallach, 1965). In this context it is interesting to note that the same
principles are involved in the strategies of Barbary macaques and
other monkeys for blocking aggression in conspecifics. When a
subordinate male wishes to approach safely a high-ranking male, he
will borrow a young monkey and present it to the other (Deag and
Crook, 1971).
The interaction phase is characterized by attempts to establish a
close relationship. A variety of patterns of bonding are employed to
achieve this. As in the phase of salutation, a variety of appeals can
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substitute for one another as functional equivalents. The recurring
basic strategies consist of expressing concern for and interest in the
other party. The phrase "how are you?" is certainly a widespread
verbal cliche. Sympathy is expressed in a variety of ways. On
occasions of festive meeting two Yanomami groups mourn their
deceased together. In a more formal way, for example, upon the
occasion of a state visit, a wreath is laid at a war memorial in our
culture. Affection is expressed either by patterns like embracing and
kissing or in a more formal way by entertaining and feeding the
guest. Agreement (conformity) is demonstrated, for example, in the
type of redundant dialogue which Morris (1968) aptly called
"grooming talk." Among the means employed to establish a strong
bond, aggression often plays an important role. Among the
Yanomami guests and hosts sniff drugs, and in a state of intoxication
jointly send spirits to the enemy villages where they are believed to
do harm. Through all these bonding maneuvers the friendly
atmosphere prerequisite to "talking business" is created.
Encounters do not end abruptly, but with a formalized parting
phase. During this phase the bond is reinforced for the future
through the exchange of gifts, either by really presenting objects, or
verbally, in the form of good wishes ("good-bye," "farewell"). In
addition, patterns of appeasement may occur.
The basic strategy of the encounter ritual can already be seen in
small children. I have observed that at the age of one and a half a
child will show off in front of another in a sort of introductory
display, and will combine this with an effort to establish friendly
relations by offering toys or things to eat. This phase is regularly
followed by intensive playful interaction. Unity (conformity) is
expressed in nonverbal acts in which one imitates the other (banging
objects, somersaulting, spinning around, and so on).
6. Discussion
It has been suggested that the legitimate domain of human ethology
is restricted to the primitive, animal-like design features of behavior,
while higher levels of organization cannot be investigated by etholog-
ical methods. This is certainly a misconception (Shafton, 1976). We
have shown here that cultural behavior can also be studied by
applying the methods and theoretical approach of biology. While it
clearly does not constitute the only approach in man's interdiscipli-
nary efforts to understand man, the biological method is likely to
illuminate unique facets of human behavior thus far overlooked.
That we have focused here on the exploration of phylogenetic
adaptations as determinants of human behavior is due to the fact that
this very important factor has been hitherto neglected. Human
ethologists have added the phylogenetic dimension to the historical
one.
As was elaborated in the previous section, phylogenetic adapta-
tions play a decisive structuring role, even in complex ritualistic
events. On the basis of our motivational structure it already follows
that encounter patterns are likely to take a particular course: our
unconditioned fear of strangers is in conflict with our strong urge to
establish friendly bonds. This ambivalence has a significant effect on
our relationships with others. A repertoire of apparently innate
signals is available for display and appeasement. Their dernonstrably
identical interpretation in different cultures supports our contention
that we respond to some of them via innate releasing mechanisms.
Certain basic social interaction strategies are accordingly constrained
in terms of their general structure with strikingly similar expressions
observable cross-culturally, since many complex rituals are actually
elaborations of a limited number of basic strategies. Cultural varia-
bility results from man's unique ability to substitute for innate
patterns of behavior various acquired functional equivalents, includ-
ing verbal behavior, but the general framework of the ritual remains
essentially the same. Patterns of social interaction may even be
verbalized in their entirety: even then they obey the same rules that
structure the corresponding nonverbal strategy. I suggest that there
exists a universal "grammar" of human social behavior whose study
will open promising avenues of cooperation between ethologists and
sociolinguists in a ield that might appropriately be dubbed "etholin-
guistics."
The basic question as to why we behave as we do is, of course, not
restricted to phylogenetically adapted behavior patterns, but must be
addressed to purely cultural patterns, too. The Himba, a cattle-
breeding Bantu population in the Kaokoland south of Angola, are
warriorlike people. This is adaptive for herders, who have to defend
their stock and must occasionally conquer new pastures. Their ability
to strike efficiently depends on a potential for rapid military organi-
zation under a hierarchy of headmen. This potential must be
maintained in peacetime and rituals reinforcing obedience are
accordingly exhibited in everyday life. Every morning the members
of a kraal community bring the milk of their cows to the headman to
be formally tasted. Only after the headman has sipped from or at
least touched the container are others free to consume the milk
(Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1979). It is easy to see how people are continuously
conditioned to submit to authority in this way. At the same time the
particular authority reinforces his control over his subjects. Similar
rituals exist in our own cultures, such as the daily raising and saluting
of the flag by soldiers (and certain schoolchildren). Among the
Himba heroic attitudes are reinforced at social gatherings by singing
songs hailing the deeds of heroic ancestors.
Harris (1977) has elaborated brilliantly upon the adaptive function
such culturally evolved patterns might fulfill and here the interests of
anthropologists and ethologists clearly merge. There is a shared
desire to understand how behaviors contribute to the survival of the
individual (or group). To find the answers ethologists prefer nonpar-
ticipant observation techniques in the natural setting, as described
earlier in this article. We apply comparative and experimental
methods, tracing history and ontogeny, and accepting the methodo-
logical and theoretical insights increasingly emanating from neigh-
boring disciplines, particularly psychology and social anthropology.
The topic of phylogenetic adaptations has been largely ignored
until recently and, as I pointed out at the beginning of this article,
there is still strong reluctance to accept the fact that man is far from
being born as a blank slate. This reluctance is based upon the
erroneous assumption that anything innate to man must then be
accepted as some kind of inevitable fate. I accordingly wish to
emphasize once again that ethologists have never promoted any
"biological determinism" that would imply this. On the contrary,
man's ability for self-control has been stressed again and again. It is
important, however, to realize that man is not equally malleable in
all directions, and those who fail to take into consideration the
existence of a human nature do run the danger of developing
inhuman educational programs that impose unnecessary frustrations
upon man.
Anonymity, for example, has been found to impose a strain on
man. Oblivious of this, certain educational schemes involving the
elimination of the original classroom community are at present being
tried out in central Europe on a large scale. If the gains were clearly
to be greater than the loss, we would have to accept the new ways.
But what is so frightening is that humane aspects are not given much
consideration in reckoning the gain. Educational ideologists
continue to proceed as if humanity were just wax in the hands of its
shapers.
Tiger (1976) has expressed the same concern and provided a
similar explanation for the preponderance of the environmentalistic
ideology. He writes: "I suggest that the ideological leadership of both
the communist and non-communist traditions were content with and
supported a psychology which focused on their rights and options as
manipulators rather than on the proclivities, needs, enthusiasms and
'biological rights' of the manipulated" (p. 262). The environmentalis-
tic ideology can indeed be abused in many ways. If it were true, as is
often assumed, that all our norms of conduct were a product of
education only, an ethnocentric cultural relativism could result.
Against this possible interpretation I find it comforting to be able to
report that we have hitherto failed to find any basic differences in
human behavior attributable to race.9 On the contrary, many of the
expressive behaviors which I have inferred to be innate to man are
the same in groups as different as Kalahari Bushmen, Europeans,
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Papuans, and Yanomami Indians. This common heritage facilitates
communication across the barriers set up by culture. Cultures sepa-
rate people, but our shared biological heritage still supplies a strong
frame of reference for cross-cultural identification (Eibl-Eibesfeldt,
1975a, 1977).
Finally, a few comments as to the relation between ethology and
sociobiology. In his recent book, Wilson (1975) has drawn a puzzling
scheme. It was presented as an admittedly subjective conception of
the future contribution of ethology and physiological psychology on
the one hand and sociobiology and behavioral ecology on the other
hand. It was amusing to note how in the year 2000 the contribution of
ethology and physiological psychology would dwindle in relation to
that of the other two fields! It seems that Wilson is unaware that
sociobiology and behavioral ecology are the basic constituents of
ethology. Ethology has from the beginning been based upon the
theory of selection. By concentrating on the question of how social
structures and behavior contribute to genetic survival, in the sense of
contributing to inclusive fitness, the new field of sociobiology has
certainly justified its own existence as a part of ethology.
Of the stimulating ideas promoted by the new sociobiology, the
hypotheses concerning the way selection operates deserve attention.
Ethologists have for a long time used the phrase "survival of the
species," which is not quite correct (as pointed out above). It is
certainly of considerable value and interest when sociobiologists
calculate energetic investments and resulting genetic survival, show-
ing from the example of self-sacrificial behavior, for instance, that
altruism can pay off if closely related siblings profit from it: genetic
survival is what counts. This basic statement, however, is not so very
new; what is new is the more exact calculation and the resulting new
formulation of the problems involved. As far as human behavior is
concerned, the sociobiological approach will certainly stimulate
discussions concerning whose investment still pays or fails to pay
whom. In a situation of reciprocity, altruistic investments will always
pay off. Co-operation is a proven strategy in the "struggle for
survival," as exemplified by the numerous mutual relationships that
bond even genetically nonrelated animal species (e.g., symbiosis). As
far as nonreciprocal altruism is concerned, animal behavior studies
certainly support Hamilton's (1964) model of kin selection as the
mechanism responsible for the evolution of altruistic behavior. A
recent analysis of aiding in agonistic encounters has revealed, for
example, that pigtail macaques clearly discriminate between rela-
tives and nonrelatives, aiding closer relatives more often than more
distantly related individuals (Massey, 1977).
The statement that "Altruistic behavior can evolve in the absence
of competition between groups by a process called kin selection"
(Wilson, 1976, p. 21) should, however, not be twisted into the
generalization that this is the only way selection operates. Once
closed groups evolve, group selection could take place. This develop-
ment commenced with the evolution of parental behavior and the
individualized bonH (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1972). Closed groups grew
from the family unit, parental behaviors and infantile appeals
forming preadaptations from which the mechanisms of adult bond-
ing derived. In such closed groups all individuals are closely related,
in particular where incest avoidance ensures a constant mixing
within the gene pool of the group. This is so particularly in man. One
cannot overlook man's astonishing ability to identify with his larger
group (band, village, people) to the extent of self-sacrifice. This can
be explained by the fact that human breeding populations have been
fairly small for most of man's history. Extant groups of hunters and
gatherers or neolithic agriculturists as a rule consist of a few hundred
or up to a few thousand people. Therefore breeding populations are
basically comprised of fairly closely related individuals, so that
investment should pay off for any group member and not just for
immediate kin. To reckon only on the 50 percent of his genes that a
person shares with his full sibling, or parent, or child, as one might be
inclined to read Wilson (1976), is to oversimplify matters. What is
meant, I am sure, is that the individuals in question are related to that
percentage for the purposes of calculation, but the majority of a
person's genes are shared with any other member of the group.
History finally teaches that group selection took place in man.
7. Summary
1. Human ethology can be defined as the biology of human behav-
ior, its interests distributed along the same paths that biological
research pursues, namely morphology, ecology, genetics, phylogene-
tics, developmental biology, sociobiology, and physiology. Its meth-
ods and questions are elaborations of those employed in these fields,
but specially adapted to the study of man. Human ethology is based
upon the theory of selection.
2. The supposition that human ethologists consider only the
animallike design features of human behavior as their legitimate
domain is wrong. We also try to understand the evolution and
functional aspects of cultural patterns, in the perspective of their
contribution to overall fitness.
8. In terms of methodology, human ethology begins with the
elaboration of the ethogram by studying and documenting human
behavior in its "natural context," this being a tested approach in
ethology and not only a prerequisite for any comparative morpho-
logy of behavior, but also the starting point for any ecological and
other causal analytical approach.
4. One current focal point of interest in human ethology is the
question concerning the extent to which man's behavior is deter-
mined by his genetic heritage.
5. Since any adaptation is based upon the acquisition of informa-
tion by the adapted system, it is legitimate to ask for the source of the
underlying information and to explore the process of information
acquisition. An interaction must have taken place between the
adapted system and the environmental mold with which its structure
(behavior) fits, unless we are to believe in a pre-stabilized harmony.
6. Acquisition of information can take place during phylogeny,
cultural evolution, and on the basis of individual experience. In both
the latter cases learning is involved.
7. Phylogenetic adaptations determine behavioral events in vari-
ous well-defined ways. They exist as innate motor patterns (fixed
action patterns), innate releasing mechanisms, releasers, innate moti-
vating mechanisms, and innate learning dispositions, innate being a
shorthand description for the fact that the neuronal network and its
connection with sensory and motor organs grow in a process of
self-differentiation according to the blueprint given in the genome of
the species.
8. Deprivation experiments are a way to determine whether or
not a structure owes its adaptedness to phylogenetic processes, since
one can withhold from animals the patterned information relevant to
the adaptation in question, for example, the hearing of the species-
specific song. If the pattern nevertheless occurs, this proves that the
information underlying the patterning / was phylogenetically
acquired, irrespective of whether less specific environmental
influences during ontogeny are needed in order for development to
occur at all.
9. Animal-man comparison should not restrict itself to the study
of homologies because analogies teach us about those laws deriving
from function which, independently of any closer relationship,
govern the expression of a particular pattern. This is true of organs
(wings) as well as of behavior patterns and social structures (ranking,
monogamy). Even culturally and phylogenetically evolved structures
can be usefully compared in this way.
10. Phylogenetic adaptations also determine human behavior to a
significant extent, and in the same ways as in animals. This is
revealed by approaches such as the study of infant behavior, includ-
ing that of the congenitally deaf and blind and others growing up
under conditions of specific deprivation; it has been found, for
example, that the congenitally deaf and blind exhibit a highly
differentiated repertoire of facial expressions.
11. Fear of strangers develops as a basic human response during
infancy and without the need of prior experience with strangers. This
reveals that we react a priori to certain signals from conspecifics with
agonistic behaviors. Personal acquaintance cancels out fear-arousing
effects.
12. Some basic social-interaction strategies develop in nearly iden-
tical fashion in children of all cultures examined so far, e.g., patterns
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of giving and sharing, or of attention seeking. Many adult cultural
rituals appear to be elaborations of these strategies, which seem to be
preprogrammed to a considerable extent by phylogenetic adapta-
tions.
13. Cross-cultural documentation of unstaged social interactions
and rituals reveals universals that are in part to be interpreted as
homologous innate motor patterns. Comparative primate studies
further support this notion.
14. In addition, cross-cultural comparison reveals analogies in
principle that seem to be based upon shared innate releasing mecha-
nisms. Thus, children are universally used in rituals of friendly
encounter. Another example is the apotropaic phallic display, as can
be seen in the Eipo and in expressive figures (see above: Comparative
studies of primate behavior); this can be traced to an infrahuman
primate heritage.
15. Cultural and phylogenetic forms of ritualization exhibit strik-
ing similarities owing to similar selection pressures guiding the
evolution of signals and because both often start from similar
preadaptations. Greeting and courtship rituals provide interesting
examples.
16. Greeting rituals and festivals, despite their apparent cultural
variability, share features of detail as well as a common basic
structure. Within a given framework, however, functionally equiva-
lent cultural patterns can substitute for innate patterns.
17. The discovery that certain verbal and nonverbal behaviors can
substitute as functional equivalents for one another bridges the gap
between these behaviors and opens the way for the study of a
grammar of human social behavior, encompassing both modes. Basic
social-interaction strategies indeed follow the same rules, regardless
of whether verbalized or acted out nonverbally.
18. The biological unity of mankind, as expressed by a shared
phylogenetic heritage determining our conduct to an important
extent, is to be considered as a very positive feature because it
provides the basis for a shared and emotionally felt concern as well as
for a common understanding which transcends cultural barriers.
19. Proponents of a rigid environmentalism should be aware of
the dangers that may arise from the neglect of human nature.
Educational programs based upon exclusively environmentalist ideo-
logies run the risk of being inhuman by imposing unnecessary
frustrations, and strict cultural relativism may lead to ethnocentric
political strategies.
NOTES
1. This is not quite correctly expressed. In animals, where traditions play a
minor role, homologies, as a rule, point to shared genetic ancestry. In man,
however, homologies of tradition have to be distinguished from homologies of
phylogeny. The best-known examples of the former are provided by studies of
language (for details, see Wickler, 1967a).
2. In view of the readiness with which learning theorists have generalized
and extended principles from the study of rodents to humans, it is rather
surprising that ethologists are so often criticized for cross-specific comparison.
3. One used to speak of the "survival of the species" in this context. But
whether selection operates at the group level is at present a much debated issue.
Individual selection seems to be an important principle in evolution (Hamilton,
1964; Wilson, 1975; Dawkins, 1976), but certainly not the sole one, as will be
discussed later. Furthermore, species change and do not survive as such.
4. The German term is in my opinion better than the English translation,
which implies a rigidity rarely encountered. Most fixed action patterns can be
performed with varying intensity; speed of performance can vary, too. The
sequence and phase distance of muscle contractions, however, remain basically
the same.
5. There exists an extensive literature dealing with this phenomenon (see
review in Sroufe, 1.977). Some recent critiques of the concept (in particular
Rheingold and Eckerman, 1973) point to inconsistencies in the reported age of
onset and the percentage of infants showing fear. The authors question the
validity of the concept, since crying and withdrawal in clear fright are less
common than smiling and other expressions of contact readiness. The discussion
by Sroufe (1977), however, demonstrates that "wariness of strangers" remains a
viable concept withstanding existing criticism. Context and procedure strongly
influence the response, which also varies individually, but negative reactions to
strangers are evident even if expressed only by movements of withdrawal
intention. That positive responses can also be observed is no contradiction. This
ambivalence will be discussed further in the text.
6. Sorenson (1967, 1976) and Sorenson and Gajdusek (1966) have indepen-
dently emphasized the value of filming everyday social interactions. They have
presented thorough documentation on the Fore, and in 1974 Sorenson founded
the National Anthropological Film Center at the Smithsonian Institution. At
about the same time D. Freeman established a film archive on human ethology
in Canberra.
7. This must be emphasized, since it is occasionally assumed that ethologists
invariably conclude from the universality of a pattern that it must be innate.
8. The explanation given by Darwin (1859) cannot be supported by present
data. It seems that the pattern derives from shaking something off, a motor
pattern widespread in mammals and birds.
9. It is outside the scope of this review to deal with the IQ discussion.
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by David P. Barash
Departments of Psychology & Zoology, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
98195
Human ethology and human sociohiology. Professor Eibl-Eibesfeldt's excellent
review makes it clear that human ethology has been making and will doubtless
continue to make real contributions to our understanding of human behavior.
However, I believe that rather than constituting the biology of human behavior,
ethology's contribution will be more narrowly limited to methodologic innovation
(in particular, detailed, non-participant observation) and the heuristic value of
such terms as releaser, IRM, fixed action pattern, etc. Lorenzian ethology was of
great value in emphasizing the role of innate factors in influencing behavior, and
thus, in counterbalancing the American swing toward behaviorism during the first
half of the twentieth century. But is has not provided the firm, conceptual
underpinnings likely to carry the field from a description and ordering of behavior
to a profound understanding of it. By contrast, the direct application of evolution-
ary biology to behavior - human as well as infra-human - offers just this possibili-
ty. The current amalgam of ethology, ecology, and evolutionary genetics has
come to be called sociobiology (Wilson, op. cit, 1975; Barash, 1977) and
although we could argue interminably over whether ethology is a subset of
sociobiology or vice versa, it seems clear to me that the exciting frontier of
behavioral biology lies at this intersection of behavior and natural selection.
Borrowing from anthropologists Tiger and Fox (1972), E-E suggests that
human ethology will reveal the "biogrammar" that underlies our behavior. His
metaphor is somewhat mistaken: human ethology will help compile the lexicon of
human behavior, but the grammar itself - the deep structural rules that underlie
the organization of behavioral "sentences" - comes from natural selection and
its direct application to behavior; accordingly, it is likely to be most clearly
revealed by sociobiology. Insofar as particular releasers, fixed action patterns,
and IRM's occur in the human behavioral repertoire, we may than ask why they
are organized in this way rather than another. Thus, why are certain behaviors
more inflexible than others, why do they emerge when and as they do, and why
does our biogrammar predispose us to organize these building blocks into the
recognizably pan-human behavior that characterizes all of Homo sapiens?
E-E's emphasis on "phylogenetic adaptation" appropriately highlights etholo-
gy's static rather than dynamic use of evolution. I agree with him that human
ethology will help reveal a "structuring role" for behavior, but the discipline has
been discouragingly unsuccessful in telling us why one structure is preferred over
another. Thus, the author speaks of the value of human ethology in elucidating
"social interaction strategies" while conspicuously omitting any discussion of
"strategies for what?" My Random House dictionary defines strategy as a "plan,
method or series of maneuvers for obtaining a specific goal or result." A
sociobiologic perspective suggests that the goal is the maximization of inclusive
fitness and that all behavior - including those details which are the focus of
human ethology - serves as tactics directed toward that ultimate, strategic end.
Thus, for example, the adaptive value of fear-of-strangers may possibly be
inferred from its time of emergence: at six to eight months an infant is typically
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beginning to crawl and likely to encounter individuals less benevolently inclined
than its mother. Similarly, Triver's (1971) discussion of reciprocity provides us with
an analytic handle on sharing and gift-giving. Ethologic accounts of this phenome-
non are important and, in fact, necessary; but without the conceptual power
provided by sociobiology, such research comes perilously close to intellectual
stamp-collecting. On the other hand, by combining the data of human ethology,
anthropology, psychology, and sociology with sociobiology's growing insights
into evolution as a mechanism, a real science of human behavior may well be in
sight (Barash, in press; Wilson, 1978; van den Berghe, 1978; Chagnon and Irons,
1978; Alexander, 1977; van den Berghe and Barash, 1977).
Finally, I must also take issue with some of E-E's concluding statements
regarding sociobiology itself. For example, we simply do not know whether group
selection took place during the evolution of Homo sapiens. It is a possibility
(Alexander, 1971), and mathematical models have suggested various conditions
under which group selection (Levins, 1970; Boorman and Levitt, 1973) or a
variant of it (D. S. Wilson, 1977; Wade, 1977; Bell, 1978) could occur. However,
the theoretical arguments against group selection remain cogent (Williams, 1966,
1971, Wiens, 1966) and the received wisdom, at present, is that individual
selection is likely to have been more important in shaping our nature, both
physical and behavioral.
In summary, my criticisms should not be taken as a negative view of human
ethology or E-E's review of it. This is a valuable summary of a useful tool in our
efforts to understand ourselves. Like most tools, however, human ethology will be
most constructive when wielded with an eye toward the overall, evolutionary
blueprint for behavior.
by Jerome H. Barkow
Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Dalhousie University, Halifax,
N.S., Canada B3H 1T2
Human ethology: Empirical wealth, theoretical dearth. E-E's work is interest-
ing for his empirical rather than his theoretical contributions. Most researchers
have by now lost interest in the nature /nurture false dichotomy, and few still find
useful the hydraulic model of classical ethology. E-E, even while declaring natural
selection to be the theoretical context of his work, remains capable of discussing
the child's tendency to initiate social relationships by offering objects, without
referring to Triver's (1971) idea of reciprocal altruism. But just as E-E's keen eye
(and camera) for motoric stereotypies across species and cultures in this case
provide data relevant to Triver's theory, so does his corpus as a whole provide
scarce data for the development of a general evolutionary theory of Homo
sapiens and his cultures. It is true that E-E's conception of human ethology
neglects feeling states and verbal and symbolic behavior in favor of the physical
movements that are the primary data for the animal ethology from which his
approach derives, but this limitation does not destroy the usefulness of the data
he does collect.
For example, E-E documents the similarities between the rituals observed by
ethologists and those observed by cultural anthropologists, similarities that
should be taken into account by theorists concerned with the relationship of
biological to cultural evolution (e.g., Barkow, forthcoming; Campbell, 1975;
Cloak, 1975; Durham, 1976; Richerson and Boyd, 1978). His observations
appear to support those, like Campbell (1975) and Cloak (1975), who would
argue that both types of evolution are based on a similar blind-variation +
selective-retention process, challenging those who would stress the importance
of human rationality in cultural evolution (e.g., Boehm, 1978). From this theoretical
perspective, the next question E-E and others concerned with ritual might ask
would be what the unit of selection is: the gene (or group of coordinated genes)
for animal rituals, perhaps, but then what is the unit of human ritual itself?
Other theoretical questions are raised by E-E's suggestion that cultural rituals
seem at times to be highly elaborated versions of the behaviors of small children.
Assuming that this observation is supported by future research, one wonders just
how much of the cross-cultural similarity in human adult behavior can be
explained by it. Could it be that many cross-cultural differences in adult behavior
arise from different cultures having patterned action in terms of different aspects
of the child's repertory? At a more mundane level, what is the relationship
between inclusive fitness and such behaviors as the young child's turning his head
away in rejection? How would we demonstrate such a relationship empirically?
The Human Ethology Newsletter^ often includes efforts to define that discipline,
efforts similar to those of E-E. But the need to define and redefine academic
disciplines seems more a requirement of university curriculum committees than of
active scholars and scientists, particularly those working in the context of
evolutionary theory. The latter framework derives much of its power from its
breadth, and the recent efforts to include within it the behavior of our own species
are to be applauded. Let us get on with that work, and be distracted neither by
definers of disciplines nor by environmental and genetic reductionists.
NOTE
i. Those interested in receiving the Human Ethology Newsletter should
write to Dr. Cheryl Travis, Department of Psychology, The University of
Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37916.
by Byrton Benedict
Department of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley, Calif. 94720
The dangers of analogy in human ethology. Chimps and children, gulls and
Greeks, boobies and Balinese - the ethologists go on their merry way, comparing
bits of human cultural behavior with bits of the genetically programmed behavior
of sticklebacks, swamp sparrows, and chaffinches. Of course, it all depends on
the questions one wants to ask. Humans are animals and they share certain
anatomical features with other animals, more with those to whom they are closely
related, like chimpanzees, than with those distantly related, like sticklebacks.
Anatomy implies function and function implies behavior, but though the analogical
game is fun (Washburn, 1978), it can seriously mislead if we fail to look at the
whole context of which a particular item of behavior is a part. Thus E-E compares
the presentation of a twig by a cormorant returning to his nest with gift-giving in
man. Yet, if we are going to play analogies, the presentation of the twig by the
cormorant simply inhibits attack and is comparable to other greeting or appease-
ment rituals found in many species of birds. Gift-giving in man, however, is
concerned with the creation, continuance, or termination of obligations (Mauss,
1925). It has direction and purpose. It can appease, insult, bind, or terminate
subsequent actions. It not only differs in form from culture to culture, but within the
same culture in various social contexts. It depends on the use of language. It is
embedded in a wide variety of institutions. Everything that is significant about it
derives from its social context, not from an isolated piece of behavior.
Another danger of analogy is the comparison of species-specific behavior in
nonhuman animals with culture-specific behavior in humans. Thus E-E compares
the phallic displays of vervet monkeys with those of the Eipo of New Guinea; but
very many cultures do not use such displays, and even where they are used, they
do not have similar meanings. Again the social context in which phallic displays
are used by human groups is glossed over.
The problem is compounded when E-E starts comparing human artifacts with
features of the anatomy of nonhuman animals. Thus the lifting of a booby's beak
is compared with a Masai thrusting his spear into the ground and with a
twenty-one gun salute with guns averted. But boobies carry their beaks with them
always and even Masai do not always carry spears. Spears are manufactured by
some men in some societies, they are not a universal human feature. As for
twenty-one gun salutes, they involve an elaborate institutional system redolent
with many kinds of symbolism. The behavior which goes with spears or twenty-
one gun salutes is not reducible to the behavior exhibited by a sky-pointing
booby. Human social behavior depends on language, and this implies tradition,
knowledge, belief, law morals, art, and so on. Booby sky-pointing does not
depend on any of these. Ethologists can remind us (for they are writing for
humans) that we are animals, and this is useful for its sets the biological and
behavioral limits in which humans operate; but beyond this they can do little until
they start to study humans as language-using animals [see also "Cognition and
Consciousness in Nonhuman Species" BBS 1(4) 1978].
by Ned Block
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, Mass. 02139
A confusion about innateness. E-E argues that "what is innate to man is not a,,
negligible quantity, but of fundamental importance, in particular with respect to
social behavior." But what does he mean by "innate?" He tells us quite explicitly.
He says that every adaptation involves the acquisition of information, and that
when a system has acquired information, "it is legitimate to ask for the source of
the . . . information." Sources of information for biological systems can be divided
into two categories: (1) "acquisition of information can take place during
phylogeny," in which case the information (and the behavioral capacities it
underlies) are innate, or (2) information can be acquired during "cultural evolution
and on the basis of individual experience," in which case "learning is involved." In
sum, a characteristic is innate just in case "the acquired information is stored in
the genome of the species and decoded during ontogeny."
So far, I make no complaints.1 Conceptual problems lurk in every corner, but
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perhaps empirical investigation and theory construction can skirt them, at least
for the time being. The confusion I want to talk about occurs later. After
presenting evidence for innateness of various human characteristics, including
aggression, E-E says:
" . . . aggression constitutes a problem for cultures like the Kalahari bushmen,
who pursue pacific ideals. Although they fight it by education, they cannot
prevent aggression and rivalry from occuring in early childhood. They likewise
employ special strategies to achieve a fairly egalitarian group structure, but again
possessiveness and striving for rank are problems with which they must cope.
Were these inclinations merely a result of cultural imprinting, they would hardly
show up in cultures that explicitly sought to pursue different ideals and attempted
to socialize their children accordingly. Different cultures thus provide the natural
experiments from which we can learn that certain human behavioral traits show
resistance to the shaping effects of the environment."
In context, it is clear what E-E wants to say is that the reason that aggression is
resistant to change is that it is innate. Later in the discussion, he repeatedly
makes remarks such as:
"Proponents of a rigid environmentalism should be aware of the dangers that
may arise from the neglect of human nature. Educational programs based upon
exclusively environmentalist ideologies run the risk of being inhuman by imposing
unnecessary frustrations. . . ."
Though it is never stated explicitly, the upshot of E-E's remarks is as follows:
(1) many aspects of human mentality and behavior patterns are innate; (2) what is
innate is resistant to change, and changeable only at a cost; and therefore (3)
makers of social and educational policy ignore evidence of innateness at their
peril.
The confusion I am after lies in (2). Innateness per se has nothing to do with
"resistance to the shaping effects of the environment." An innate characteristic
need not be resistant to change, and innateness provides no evidence for such
resistance. Suppose, for example, that I have the information that plants with a
certain appearance are likely to be edible. Where did this information come from?
One possibility is that this information is learned in one way or another. For
example, I may have had experience with many varieties of plants, and have
always found this type to be good eating. Or I may have had no experience with
this type of plant, but rather absorbed the belief from my cultural environment.
However, it may also be that the information is innate, a product of the history of
my species, and coded in my genes. But notice that the inateness hypothesis and
the learning hypothesis do not differ in predictions about the plasticity of my belief
or my behavior. If the belief is acquired through learning but is deeply entrenched
in the ritual, myth, and symbolism of my culture, I may find it nearly impossible to
accept evidence that the plant is not edible. On the other hand, the belief may be
innate, yet easily eradicated by a few unpleasant experiences with such plants. I
repeat: the source of the information in the genes or in the environment does not
by itself determine the "fixity" of the belief.
The missing idea in E-E's discussion, as in so many discussions of genetic
determination (see Lewontin, 1976 and Block and Dworkin, 1974) is the idea of a
"norm of reaction." The norm of reaction for a behavioral variable (or any other
characteristic) can be defined as the function that maps environmental and
genotypic variables into the behavioral variable. For example, a plant of one
genotype may do well at high altitudes and poorly at low altitudes, while another
genotype may react to the environment in just the opposite manner. This idea is
illustrated in Figure 1.
The earlier example concerning plant edibility is easily expressible in terms of
the norm of reaction. If the belief is innate, then the norm of reaction may reflect
this fact by mapping environments that lack evidence about edibility into (pheno-
typic) belief in the edibility of the plant (see Figure 2). If the information about
edibility is genetically coded, then we can have knowledge without evidence -
though, of course, something analogous to the acquisition of evidence would
have occurred during phylogeny. But while the norm of reaction may thus reflect
innateness, it may also reflect malleability. For it may also map environments that
provide evidence of nonedibility into actual belief in the nonedibility of the plant.
This situation is also represented by the hypothetical norm of reaction in Figure 2.
Further, as Figure 2 also indicates, a very small change in environment can cause
a very large change in actual characteristics of organisms, even when the
characteristic undergoing change is innate. Of course, for human characteristics
- including those known to be substantially innate - we have little knowledge of
the norms of reaction or of the relevant environmental parameters, and thus little
theoretical knowledge relevant to malleability.
Note that I am not challenging E-E's claim that aggression is hard to eradicate.













and also innate,2 the latter need not be the cause of the former. Consider, for
example, E-E's discussion of aggression among the Bushmen. Assuming that
adult Bushmen do exhibit aggression - If they do not, we have a malleability
success story - the fact that they are not wholly pacific may be a crucial
determinant of the next generation's aggression. For the norm of reaction for
aggression may be such that any child raised in the context of genuinely pacific
adults becomes genuinely pacific throughout his life. For example, the genetic
program may amount to "Be aggressive unless adults around you are not
aggressive, in which case, imitate them." So aggression could be innate, yet
vanish without a trace in certain environments. It could have a norm of reaction
analogous to that in Figure 2.
This point leads naturally to a comment on the notion of potential that bedevils
the thinking of biologists about genetic determination. (E-E says that "what is
inherited is a 'prospective potential.' " ) It is tempting to believe that if a
phenotypic disposition is innate in an organism with a certain genome, then an
organism with that genome must inevitably have that disposition, even when the
environment is such as to prevent the disposition from being realized. In
environments in which the disposition is not realized, it is thought of as
"potent ia l . " Thus, if human aggression is innate, many biologists would say that it
must be present in any possible human society, // only in potential. But the
innateness of aggression may consist only in a genetic instruction to develop
aggression during childhood in certain circumstances; and pacificity could be
simultaneously innate as well, in that the same gentically coded instruction may
specify developing pacificity during other circumstances (see Figure 3). Yet it may
not be possible for a pacific adult to become an aggressive adult or vice versa, if
the environment has an effect only in childhood. So, in the sense of "potent ia l " I
am criticizing, pacificity and agression could both be potential in every human,
even though no human who exemplified the one could switch over to the other.
Such a sense of "potent ia l " would seem more misleading than leading.













STRENGTH OF EVIDENCE THAT PLANT IS EDIBLE
Figure 2 (Block).
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Aggressive
Peaceful t y p i c a l genotype
ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES AFFECTING AGGRESSION
Figure 3 (Block).
utterly unchangeable. He explicitly denies this. His position, rather, is that what is
innate inevitably resists change, and can be "suppressed" only at a cost. But, as
Figure 2 illustrates, information can be innate, appearing in a belief in the absence
of an environmental source, yet vanish totally in environments that present
contrary information. So what is innate need not resist change, and if changed,
need not cause "frustration."
Objection: your point is a purely theoretical one of no practical import. For while
you are right that what is innate need not resist change, the fact is that what is
innate does resist change.
Reply: I know of no evidence for such a claim; E-E certainly presents none in his
article. Some innate characteristics resist change, others do not. Down's
syndrome idiocy resists environmental intervention; phenylpyruvic idiocy does not.
But both are gentically caused. Another example: if suspended in mid-air with no
visible means of support, newborn kittens and babies seem to expect and fear
that they will fall (as is indicated by "visual cliff" experiments). This result
suggests an innate expectation of falling in response to certain configurations of
visual stimuli. But astronauts report that such visually stimulated expectation and
fear disappear quickly in no-gravity situations. Further, with acquired characteris-
tics as with innate ones, some resist change while others do not. What is
relevant to malleability is not innateness per se but rather the mechanisms of
genetic determination, and the available means of environmental manipulation.
Of course, lack of gravity is not an environment common in the course of
evolution, and this is part of what makes it useful for my purposes. It is of the
nature of innate information to be realized in a range of circumstances common in
our evolutionary history. But this fact provides no objection to what I have been
saying. For purposes of social and educational policy, what we are typically
interested in is the effect of uncommon environments. The social and educational
policy issues in which considerations of innateness are typically brought to bear
are cases in which what is in question is whether we can change the environment
so as to change human attitudes or patterns of behavior. That is why innateness
is a red herring as far as issues of social policy are concerned. The claim that
aggression is innate, or that sex-role attitudes are innate is at best irrelevant. For
even if true, its only policy implication is that in circumstances relevantly similar to
those common in our evolutionary history, these characteristics occur. And
without a specification of what relevant similarity comes to, this information adds
nothing to what we already know. What we want to know for practical purposes is
what sorts of departures from the hunter-gatherer environments in which human
evolution took place can make a difference. To be told that such and such
characteristics are innate is of no help.
The irrelevance of considerations of innateness to social policy is strikingly
revealed in E-E's discussion of anonymity. He says:
"Anonymity, for example, has been found to impose a strain on man. Oblivious
of this, certain educational schemes involving the elimination of the original
classroom community are at present being tried out in central Europe on a large
scale . . . Educational ideologists continue to proceed as if humanity were just
wax in the hands of its shapers."
Note, however, that what is relevant to social policy here is not innateness, but
rather the observation that anonymity imposes a strain.
Given our boundless ignorance about the nature of aggression, sex-role
attitudes, and so forth, and the environmental variables relevant to these
characteristics, the best way to find out whether they can be changed is to try to
change them. Comments by ethologists and others to the effect that such
characteristics are innate and therefore resist change serve only to mislead us.3
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NOTES
1. Not that I don't have any complaints. For example, I have some qualms
about the notion of genetic coding of information. Note that any pebble on the
beach can be a gene for some logically possible creature. Of course, any
sequence of scribbles is meaningful writing according to some logically possible
system of orthography, but this point does not quiet my qualms, since the
information required to decode writing lies in the decoder, while the informa-
tion required to decode the genetic code is itself coded in the genes. Another
qualm has to do with the extension of E-E's "information in the genes " account
of innateness from states that have prepositional content (such as belief) to states
that have no propositional content, such as aggression. To the extent that
aggression depends on information, all sorts of other characteristics - including
peacefulness — may involve the same information.
2. As mentioned in the last two sentences of note 1, it is not clear that talk of
innateness of aggression makes sense, on E-E's analysis of innateness. Perhaps
one can broaden the "information in the genes" account, making it a
"programmed in the genes" or "caused by the genes" account. If we can make
sense of the idea that aggression is caused by or programmed in the genes, then
we can make sense of the idea that aggression is innate. Since causation is a
notoriously pragmatic notion, identifying innateness with genetic causation
would make innateness a pragmatic notion as well.
3. I want to warn briefly against an enormously widespread confusion that
E-E does not fall prey to, the confusion of innate with heritable. A characteris-
tic is heritable if variation in it is caused by genetic variation. If identical twins,
randomly placed in environments in the populaion, tend to have similar
heights, that is evidence for the heritability of height. To see the difference
between heritability and innateness, note that the number of legs is innate, but
probably has low heritability, since probably its variation is mainly due to the
distribution of environmental accidents. Heritability of number of legs is a
matter of genetic causation of differences in number of legs in a population.
Innateness, by contrast, is a matter of genetic determination of the number of
legs itself. Heritability is a population statistic (like birth rate), while innateness
is not.
by Robert C. Belies
Department of Psychology, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash. 98195
The functional significance of behavior. I find it odd that E-E invests so much of,
his effort here in trying to convince us that there really is a phylogenic component
to human behavior. I find it curious that the nature/nurture question, which is now
so widely dismissed by behavioral scientists (because everything is now known to
depend upon both), might be revived just because some behavioral scientists
have gotten interested in human behavior. I find it peculiar to encounter anew all
the old arguments about the universality of traits, their appearance in neonates,
and the evidence from deprivation experiments. Perhaps my disappointment with
this aspect of the paper merely reflects my own bias that, of course, there are
phylogenic components, and important ones, too, in human behavior. Perhaps it
is only because I have no doubts about that point that I wish the paper had gotten
on more with the proper business of ethology.
The proper business, or at least the customary business, of ethology, as I
understand it, is not to demonstrate once again that there is a phylogenic origin to
some bit of behavior, but rather to show what the functional significance of the
behavior is. Part of its significance can be revealed by an analysis of its
motivational status, that is, by showing to what system the behavior belongs.
What is the coy girl doing when she is being coy? Is she avoiding excessive social
stimulation, (i.e., too much contact)? Or is she asking for more? Is she turning the
other person off, or turning him on? Is the other person, the one who evokes the
coyness, necessarily a male? For that matter, is coyness found only in girls? At a
more general, or more molar or distal level, I wonder if coyness is a sexual thing,
or only a social thing. Is the coy girl controlling a potential sexual relationship or
only dealing with another human? Is this what E-E is calling a social interaction
strategy? I wish he had elaborated that concept, because I suspect it may provide
a very useful tool for looking at human behavior at an intermediate level of
analysis. Then there is the ultimate functional question of how coyness contrib-
utes to fitness. If girls are coy because that is an "instinctive" reaction to male
attention, then coy girls must have (or at one time must have had) some
advantage over straight-talking, look-you-in-the-eye girls. They must select better
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mates with more resources, or be more attractive to such potential mates, or form
more permanent pair-bonds, or something. How does coyness confer such an
advantage? In short, what is the functional significance of coyness?
If some distinctive behavior actually has a phylogenic origin, then we may
suppose that it has (or has had) some functional significance, and that it has
benefited those who had it. But if we find some distinctive behavior that has a
cultural origin, then it may or may not be functionally important; it could be just a
cultural ritual that does neither good nor harm to anyone. It is hazardous indeed to
suppose that a particular ritual reflects some continuing adaptation to the cultural
niche, or that it confers any advantage upon those who practice it. E-E describes
a ritual dance performed by young couples in New Guinea, which is said to play a
role in mate selection. Do young people there really select mates on the basis of
this dance? Or do they pair off the same way every one else does it, on the basis
of propinquity and availability?
Or consider the eyebrow flash. The author had convinced me with his earlier
writings that the eyebrow flash is as characteristic a human behavioral trait as
having hairy eyebrows is a morphological trait. Now he tells me that the Japanese
learn to suppress it. I am stunned. I now have to wonder about all the
non-Japanese cultures; is it possible that we all learned it? I worry about the
Japanese; how could they forego such a beautiful, expressive gesture? And why
don't they see it as beautiful and expressive? Worse yet, are they likely to
become extinct because they no longer have whatever advantage the eyebrow
flash conferred upon all the rest of us (it must have been advantageous or we
would not all have it, right)? But how can 100 million Japanese become extinct?
For that matter, how could there be 100 million Japanese if they have such a
handicap? The answer must lie in different selection pressures. The unique
Japanese response must be an optimal adaptation to a unique environment (or
there would not be 100 million of them), just as having the eyebrow flash must
have been optimal for everyone else in the common environment that shaped
everyone else. What was that unique environmental pressure that made nonflash-
ing so successful? What does the eyebrow flash have to do with fitness, anyway?
What are we talking about? Let us get on with the business of ethology.
by Gerald Borgia
Department of Biology, University of Chicago, Chicago, ill. 60637
Levels of selection and human ethology. The first part of this commentary
focuses on the last section of E-E's paper in which he describes his views on the
relation of the various levels at which natural selection might operate and the
study of human behavior. Although this represents a very small part of the
material presented, this information is critical to my subsequent evaluation of the
overview of human ethology he presents.
E-E correctly rejects the "survival of the species" notion which "ethologists
have for a long time used" and he nominally embraces the inclusive fitness model
as a means for explaining "altruistic" behavior. There is, however, some
confusion in his presentation of this model, and, together with his inordinate
reliance on models of group selection, he provides a rather curious view of
patterns of benefit transfer in which "investment should pay off to any group
member and not just immediate kin." What he views as man's tendency toward
self-sacrifice, and a problem in the common interpretation of the inclusive fitness
model, are the reasons he cites for this tendency toward group-wide altruism. But
there are other means of explaining apparent self-sacrifice that are more likely
and involve individuals maximizing inclusive fitness without relying on differential
group extinction. This is significant because Williams (1966) provided cogent
arguments concerning the unlikelihood of group selection as a source of
adaptation when it conflicts with individual interests. Moreover, individual competi-
tion for mates, wealth, and status dominate social interactions in most human
groups (Murdock, 1949). Such behavior implies much less within-group harmony
than intimated by E-E and could be expected had group selection molded
patterns of social interaction.
Although E-E accepts the inclusive fitness model, there appears to be a basic
misunderstanding about how it operates. He cites a study which gives it strong
support (Massey, op. cit. 1977) but then argues that "To reckon only on the 50
percent of genes that a person shares with his full sibling, or parent, or child . . . is
to oversimplify matters . . . the majority of a person's genes are shared with any
other member of the group." There is a flaw in this argument which comes from
the suggestion that the absolute level of genetic overlap between individuals
should be used as the criterion of optimality for distributing benefits, rather than
the relationship as calculated by identity in terms of descent. Hamilton (op. cit.
1964) pointed out that ordering benefit-giving priority according to identity by
descent gives the most evolutionary stable pattern for beneficent behavior.
Alleles specifying different patterns of beneficence are assumed to be in
competition. Those that follow the pattern Hamilton specified gain most, on the
average, from the combined effects of likewise beneficent copies of themselves
while not wasting aid on potential competitors, and therefore become dominant in
natural populations. (Seemingly indiscriminate beneficence within breeding units
might also evolve were alleles able to recognize and direct benefits toward
identical copies in other individuals, but such a pattern seems unlikely; see
Hamilton, 1964; Alexander and Borgia, 1978.)
These considerations suggest that, contrary to E-E's suggestion, individuals
commonly discriminate in aid-giving within social groups, and group selection
cannot be considered the dominant force in shaping patterns of behavioral
adaptation in human populations.
Consistent application of E-E's view that all members of a group exchange
benefits without regard to differences in relationship leads to some curious
predictions about intragroup behavior. For instance, one is disposed to assume
that aggression within groups is initiated because of anticipated advantage to the
aggressor which ultimately allows him to gain control of some scarce resource.
However, strict adherence to the notion that human behavior is a product of
group selection causes us to surmise that this behavior occurs for an entirely
different reason. We might guess, for instance, that aggression functions to
equalize the distribution of resources among group members. The lack of
discussion of the functional significance of many supposed adaptations, together
with ambiguity caused by E-E's assumptions about levels of selection, prevent the
reader from correctly understanding his intent, particularly where there are
several possible explanations for a behavior. Such problems intensify if one
attempts to test some of the proposed models.
E-E uses common ethological terms such as appeasement, canalized aggres-
sion, and agonistic buffering, which were in use before the concept of inclusive
fitness was generally applied to behavioral models. These were defined in terms
of species or group level adaptation, and may hence refer to functions that were
of putative benefit to the group or even to mechanisms whose existence would
not be predicted if selection were considered only at lower levels. The use of
these terms leads to ambiguity in the discussion of the adaptive basis of
behavior.
For example, when E-E says that smiling or gaze aversion "blocks aggres-
sion," does he mean that expression of these facial gestures by a girl toward a
boy who had previously hit her makes that boy incapable of hitting her again? We
have to consider how this gesture might cause the boy not to strike her. Does he
refrain from attack because the gesture communicates (1) that she is not a threat
and has nothing he wants; (2) that she will report the attack to a higher authority
and he will be punished; or (3) that she has been harmed and he has been
programmed to avoid harming other group members? Unless we know why the
boy refrains from hitting her, the term "blocks aggression" is meaningless,
assuming that we are concerned with determining the evolutionary consequences
of this act. Perhaps the only way to remove such ambiguity from behavioral
analysis is to drop, or at least carefully redefine, much of the common ethological
jargon.
E-E shows some concern about Wilson's (op. cit. 1975) claim that ethology will
be incorporated as part of a new science to be called sociobiology. What we
label the study of behavior seems relatively unimportant compared to the need to
produce a discipline that develops testable predictive models of behavior. The
continued use of ethology as a label for the study of behavior will depend on how
successfully those who call themselves ethologists apply advances in selection
theory to the study of behavior.
by William R. Charlesworth
Institute of Child Development, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn. 55455
"It's true, but we don't know why:" Problems in validating human ethologi-
cal hypotheses. E-E's paper represents in summary form a great portion of his
total effort in the field of human ethology: the themes, arguments, illustrations, and
photos will be familiar to those who have kept up with his work over the past ten
years. During this time, E-E has logged at least 15,000 hours in the field filming
human behavior in many different cultures, and he has spent at least twice that
much time analyzing films. This vast and singular effort qualifies for serious
consideration his claim as to the universality of certain behavior patterns.
In my opinion, there is no question that E-E has identified universal human
behaviors. I recognize them on film and in vivo, and am confident that because of
such universal behaviors people manage, despite great cultural and linguistic
differences, to get along with each other at tourist resorts, in United Nations
assemblies, and in close quarters on transcontinental trains. Actually, it is odd
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that behavioral scientists have not documented universal human behaviors
earlier. For thousands of years people have been adapting to each other
regardless of geographic and cultural differences. This should be a strong
enough hint that humans all over share a basic grammar of behavior and behavior
recognition. E-E's documents should dispel any doubt as to the existence of this
grammar (or at least of some important words in the lexicon of behaviors
regulated by this grammar). Of course, many may wish for more rigor in subject
sampling (a larger, stratified/random sample?), inclusion of all noninstances of
universal behavior, more information on the meaning of the social event for the
persons involved, blind scoring of the filmed behavior, and generally more
evidence that E-E uses objective, systematic methods for collecting and analyzing
his records of behavior. It is to be hoped that, these desiderata will be satisfied in
the future. In the meantime, E-E has mustered enough evidence to support his
claim of behavioral universals. Why or how these universals have come to exist,
though, is a different matter.
E-E's research strength is in documentation and discovery, and for this he
should be given ample credit. He should not be given credit, however, for
validating his hypothesis concerning the functional value of universal behaviors
and the origin of the causal mechanisms underlying them. His hypothesis can be
seen as twofold: (1) the causal mechanisms underlying behavioral universals
involve brain structures whose construction during ontogenesis is more or less
tightly controlled by genetic programs; and (2) the genetic programs are products
of phylogenetic adaptations that evolved because the behaviors controlled by the
programs were of positive functional value to all surviving species' members. Both
parts of this hypothesis are plausible and make more sense than the hypothesis
that geographically or culturally isolated peoples independently invent and pass
on behavior patterns that enable them, by happy coincidence, to communicate
with total strangers. However, neither E-E's hypothesis nor the alternative can be
tested by documenting behaviors on film, discovering that the behaviors occur
early in ontogenesis or in perceptually handicapped individuals, and then making
inferences about their functions and origins. Actually, I see no way at present to
test either E-E's hypothesis or the alternative in any rigorous manner. To do so
one would have to carry out tightly controlled genetic/developmental/ecologic
studies that are currently impossible or unethical to carry out with humans.
Unfortunately, E-E gives the impression throughout his paper that his hypothe-
sis has substantial empirical support. Actually it does not. For example, in
discussing function he claims that certain behavior patterns, such as eyebrow
raising or the complex courtship ritual of the "Tanim Hed," serve particular vital
functions. But what kind of evidence is there for this claim? Establishing the
function of behavior is primarily an experimental task, and not an easy one at that,
especially when complicated subjects such as humans are involved. It is an
impossible task when only descriptions and "correlations" are involved. In most,
if not all, of the examples E-E cites there is no experimental evidence for function,
at least not in the sense of the term "experimental" as used by most biologists
and psychologists.
E-E gets into further difficulty when he discusses the origin of universal
behaviors within or across species. For example, he accounts for similarities in
behavior between sky-pointing bobies, spear-wielding Massai, and twenty-one
gun saluters by noting that they are "due rather to similar selective pressures that
have shaped behavior during phylogenetic and cultural evolution alike, or else to
a common heritage resulting from a shared ancestor." This is a very strong claim,
which is not substantiated. Selection pressures are usually very difficult to identify
with any certainty (especially in times long past) and establishing similarities
between phylogenetic pressures and cultural pressures seems impossible
because the underlying mechanisms (one physical, the other symbolic) are so
different. And, as we know from zoology, establishing homologies is no easy
matter, especially when behavior is involved.
E-E's difficulties magnify when he claims that similar patterns of maternal care
and infantile appeals in birds and man "are derived from parental behavior," or
that kissing derives from mouth-to-mouth feeding. Developmental derivations of
behavior are virtually impossible to demonstrate with any certainty in humans
because of the complicated causal networks involved. These networks contain
numerous uncontrollable neurophysiological and muscle maturational factors
which interact with numerous, usually unspecified, environmental and psychologi-
cal factors - all operating over relatively long periods of time, which further
complicates matters. For example, developmental psychologists are only begin-
ning to chart systematically the ontogenetic pathways of such important human
behavioral phenomena as infant attachment [see Rajecki et al.: "Toward a
General Theory of Infantile Attachment" BBS 1(3) 1978], object and event
concepts, and aggressive and prosocial behaviors, and have only minimal
knowledge as to what maturational, environmental, and experiential mechanisms
are implicated in their appearance and changes at different ages [see Brainerd:
"The Stage Question in Cognitive-Developmental Theory" BBS 1(2) 1978].
One concluding point. What is conspicuously missing in E-E's reports is
evidence of variability in the behavioral patterns he has observed. It is to be
hoped that he will, in the near future, give us some idea of the frequency of
behavioral variations or nonuniversal patterns that people in different cultures (or
even within the same culture) engage in when confronted with the same social
situation. Variations are the main source of evolutionary change, whether
phylogenetic or cultural, and it would be surprising indeed if they did not turn up in
such extensive studies of unstaged social behavior as E-E's. It should be quickly
pointed out that differences by themselves support neither a phylogenetic nor a
cultural explanation of their origin. Variances and invariances can be due
predominantly to nature or predominantly to nurture. Now that E-E has estab-
lished an important truth about the existence of behavioral universals, one hopes
that ethologists will begin to put more emphasis upon studying the interaction of
both nature and nurture during ontogenesis. This will help us understand better
why behavioral universals exist.
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Cerebral building blocks and behavioral mechanisms. Genetic heritage and
instincts are obviously important elements in the organization of cerebral mecha-
nisms of behavior, but the age-old debate of nature versus nurture, its dichotomy
of percentages (50-50?), and the possible existence of a unique human nature
are losing scientific interest. The present trend is to be more specific in the study
of the origin, properties, and consequences of the multifactor building blocks that
intervene in the organization of the cerebral mechanisms of each behavioral
category. These elements are different in visual perception, food intake, aggres-
sion, and other aspects of behavior. Generalizations may be misleading. Phy-
logeny is an important but not an exclusive factor.
One of the merits of the work of E-E is his careful analysis of specific patterns
of behavior: kiss-feeding may be the instinctive origin of a tender human kiss and
may be investigated in birds, apes, and man. Aggressive behavior may have
comparable rituals throughout the animal kingdom. Innate releasing mechanisms
can be studied in socially isolated monkeys, and there is preprogramming of
some types of behavior by early imprinting. These facts do not validate extensive
generalizations as to the importance of instincts as bases of human behavior,
however, and the example of phallic displays is a case in point. Observations on
such displays in monkeys and apes as a sign of domination, and similar practices
in some primitive tribes, are of limited value in analyzing behavior in civilized
societies. Similar comments apply to the study of fear of strangers, attention
seeking, giving and sharing, which are all very interesting, but represent only a
small part of the normal behavioral repertoire. The study of primitive societies is
central for anthropological research and may provide excellent data for the
understanding of specific aspects of behavior, but it should be parallelled by
complementary and extensive research concerning many other behavioral char-
acteristics typical of civilized societies. Precisely the aspects that characterize our
present age but often escape anthropological interest are the scientific, technical,
and industrial development of human activities which provide nature with human
purpose and constitute decisive determinants in the evolution of our surroundings.
Nature is being changed as man creates artificial environments. It is for this
reason that the concept of "human ethology" is controversial.
The biology of animal behavior is usually investigated in the following situations,
(a) Ethological studies are performed in the field where the natural spontaneity of
behavior is preserved. The handicap is that observations may be interrupted by
unforeseen circumstances, experimental planning is limited, and recording of
biological data is rather difficult, (b) Laboratory studies are conducted in
well-controlled environments; experiments may be carefully designed; and
animals are continuously accessible for recording, stimulation, and other manipu-
lations. The artificiality of the laboratory situation may distort animal behavior and
great caution is necessary in the interpretation of results, (c) To bridge ethological
and laboratory research, the use of intermediate, designed environments has
been proposed and the same groups of animals have been investigated in the
laboratory as well as in a seminatural setting (Delgado et al., 1978).
The interest in studying "the biology of human behavior" is evident, but to
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name this discipline human ethology" with its methodology and theory derived
from the parent discipline" may not be correct. The distinction between the
natural setting and artificial surroundings, characteristic of ethological and
laboratory research respectively, is clear cut in most animal studies but cannot be
applied to man.
Nature provides elements of uniformity and ecological dependence for animal
life while the artificiality of civilization - from temporary nomadic settlements to
huge metropolises - cannot be equated with "natural" ethological environments.
Genetic heritage and instincts should not be confused with "natural settings."
In the study of the building blocks responsible for the organization of behavioral
mechanisms, there are essential aspects which deserve greater attention and
which may be exemplified by the human acquisition of motor skills. These skills
are not instinctive or dormant somewhere in the brain, only waiting to be unveiled.
The newborn brain does not have the anatomical support, functional mecha-
nisms, or experiential background for skillful mobility. Each of these three
elements is essential for motor skills to appear. The crucial fact is that the
anatomical and functional development of the brain proceeds by genetic determi-
nation but under the guidance of sensory experience. Learning leaves material
traces in the neuronal tissue, influencing synaptic anatomy, enzymatic activity,
functional selectivity of pathways, and the chemical composition of the neurons.
Initial learning will modify brain structures and transmitting systems, making
possible further and more complex learning. At birth, the brain is so immature that
its learning capacity is very limited. Mechanisms for skilled performance must be
constructed inside the brain. The cerebral areas which organize hand movements
may have the potential to learn the ideokinetic formulas necessary for playing
musical instruments, but these abilities do not exist in the naive brain, nor will they
be acquired without training. Motor coordination and skillful performance do not
emerge from the brain but must be absorbed through the experience provided by
sensory inputs entering the central nervous system, together with trial and error
learning. The information received which alters neuronal function through feed-
back and correlational processes will later be expressed by the functioning brain.
In a similar way, the speech areas are undeveloped at birth and it is impossible
for a newborn infant to learn to talk in a few days. Languages are not dormant
somewhere in the brain. Many months of training are necessary for a baby to
learn, very slowly at first, to parrot some words and then to comprehend their
meanings and to start constructing phrases. Early sensory experience is decisive
for the physiological organization of speech areas.
An essential aspect in learning is that the outside world enters through the
senses, in the form of individual experience of a referential system, and becomes
a material and functional part of the maturing brain. The central nervous system
cannot functional properly independently of its essential extracerebral constitu-
ents. Symbols and information can be considered the transmaterial entities
necessary for the anatomical and functional structuring of the functioning brain
[See Puccetti & Dykes: "Sensory Cortex and the Mind-Brain Problem" BBS 1(3)
1978].
The flow of sensory information from the environment to the individual brain
requires both material vehicles and transmaterial, coded symbols. Matter is a
nonspecific element in sensory reception, while the coded symbols are specific
messages whose exact meaning may be conveyed by different material vehicles
such as light, sound, and shapes. The meaning is in itself independent of the
eventual material carrier. The message has no gravitational field or inertia; it
cannot be smashed to release energy; nor has it any of the accepted properties
of matter. The meaning of a message has no intrinsic existence because in the
absence of decoding mechanisms, symbols have no significance, although their
material vehicles may persist.
Symbols may be shared by man and animals. Cats and monkeys can learn that
a red light means punishment and a green light represents reward. Development
of personality is primarily the experiential accumulation of symbols and frames of
reference for decoding sensory information. Neurological processes are
influenced by the transmaterial symbols of sensory perception, directing the
material structure of neurons. In these neurological processes, there is interaction
between transmaterial symbolism and material structuring of memory traces. The
usefulness of the concept of "transmaterial" is that we must deal with it as a
research tool when we explore intracerebral mechanisms. (For extensive discus-
sion of this subject, see Delgado, 1979.)
In summary:
1. Understanding of the biology of human behavior requires a combined study
of genetic heritage, anatomical substrate, functional mechanisms, and experien-
tial information.
2. Human ethology is not comparable to animal ethology because of the
importance of manmade qualities of the human environment.
3. Anatomical and functional development of the brain proceeds by genetic
determination but under the guidance of sensory experience. Skills are not
"unveiled": their mechanisms must be constructed inside the brain.
4. Sensory reception requires material vehicles plus transmaterial information
which will influence the material formation of neuronal structures. Experimental
study of the multiplicity of extracerebral elements which impinge on the neuronal
organization of specific,patterns of behavior is possible and desirable.
by Gordon E. Finley
Department of Psychology, Florida International University, Miami, Fla. 33199
Cross-cultural methodology and ethological universals. For the cross-
cultural psychologist, E-E has written an exciting and refreshing review. Certainly,
every discipline evolves its own particular set of professional blinders and, almost
be definition, for the cross-cultural psychologist this is the neglect of the biological
determinants of behavior in favor of the cultural. As recently defined, "Cross-
cultural research refers to empirical studies carried out among members of
various cultural groups who have had different experiences that lead to predict-
able and significant differences in behavior" (Brislin, 1976, p. 215). Thus, E-E's
hypothesis that "phylogenetic adaptations preprogram human behavior to a
significant extent" ought to rekindle a lively debate. Further, viewing a variety of
common behaviors (for example, greeting rituals, courtship behavior, fear of
strangers, and aggression) in phylogenetic perspective certainly questions the
omnipotence of culture in the shaping of human behavior.
However, an evaluation of E-E's position on universals is made difficult by the
data base and by the data-gathering strategies with which it appears to have
been obtained. My office dictionary defines "universal" as "a mode of behavior
existing in all cultures . . . a culture trait characteristic of all normal adult members
of a particular society" (italics added) (Webster, 1972). In the present review, one
reads of extremely exciting and insightful examples. But E-E writes of universal
phylogenetic adaptations. How many examples make a universal? Are similarities
in detail sufficient evidence for universals [cf. Corballis & Morgan: "On the
Biological Basis of Laterally" BBS 1(2) 1978]?
Ultimately, if the behaviors in question are truly under genetic control, then one
would need only a few confirming examples to demonstrate the point and, after
that, data gathering would be redundant, boring, and uninformative. But if the
behavior is only partially, or not at all, under genetic control, then more systematic
data gathering would be most informative.
Relevant here are four issues of sampling and selectivity. First, cultures.
Selecting sample cultures to represent different stages of cultural evolution is a
very reasonable strategy. But why vanishing cultures? What about surviving
cultures and highly technological cultures? Second, behavior. Of all the behaviors
engaged in by man, why were the present ones selected for study? Are there
behaviors that the ethological approach cannot account for? And what is the
background of behavioral differences in light of which we should evaluate the
reported similarities? Third, individuals. Are comparable samples of subjects
taken across cultures? Are there inter- or intra-individual differences? If so, what
determines when, where, how frequently, and under what conditions the behav-
iors occur? Do we have a count? Fourth, units of analysis. Are not unstaged
social interactions very difficult units to make equivalent across cultures?
Historically, cross-cultural psychology began with the reports of missionaries,
traders, and adventurers who documented and described their experiences in
interesting and exotic lands. Likewise, some of the earliest empirical work in
developmental psychology consisted of baby biographies. The methodological
implications of Kessen's critique of the baby biography literature may well be
relevant for the early cross-cultural work as well as for the current ethological
position: "Darwin, like almost every baby biographer after him, not only saw
children, he also saw a living expression of his theoretical position" (Kessen,
1965, pp. 117-118). What data-gathering strategies are sufficient to establish a
universal?
For the reader interrested in exploring methodological issues in cross-cultural
psychology, good discussions can be found in a recent special issue of the
International Journal of Psychology (Triandis, 1976) devoted to methodological
problems of comparative research and in two forthcoming volumes of the
Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology (Triandis and Berry, 1979). Finally, three
much-discussed topics in cross-cultural psychology likely to be of interest to the
ethologist are the competence/performance (Cole and Bruner, 1971) etic/emic
(Brislin, 1976) dichotomies and the plausible rival hypothesis interpretive proce-
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dure (Campbell, 1969 [see also Rosenthal & Rubin: "Interpersonal Expectancy
Effects" BBS 1(3) 1978]).
by Peter J. Fraser
Depertment of Zoology, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen AB9 2TN, Scotland
Analogy and dimensions of behaviour. It seems strange at first sight that the
value of studying analogous behaviour requires great emphasis. However,
adaptive value has frequently been put forward from superficial evidence to the
total exclusion of useful comparison with analogous systems. The sabre-toothed
tiger has often captured the imagination of the public as a ferocious predator
attacking huge thick-skinned prey. A careful search for analogous canine
adaptations in living mammals where function can be deduced from observation
would quickly show the sabre teeth to be adaptations for digging, as in walruses.
A behavioural pattern has less substance than a structural part. Perhaps
difficulties in presenting behavioural patterns in a wide range of animals to a wide
audience have prevented ready acceptance of analogies.
It is hard to argue against similarity of function for optokinetic or semicircular-
canal induced eye movements in crabs, rabbits, or primates, including humans.
Most people would agree that the eye movement behaviour of crabs is analogous
to that of rabbits or humans. The eyes, the muscles that control them, and the
semicircular canal systems of rabbits and primates are considered homologous.
Are the eye movement behaviours homologous? Close examination of connec-
tion has shown that semicircular canal pathways are connected to different
homologous muscles. The eyes of rabbits and primates are set at different angles
with respect to the skull. Both rabbit and primate compensate for rotation in a
plane by moving their eyes in that plane in a direction opposite to their rotation,
but because homologous muscles in rabbits and primates move the eyes in
different planes there has been a rearrangement of connection between a given
(homologous) canal and given (homologous) muscles. The behaviour is thus
fixed, but the homologous muscles are now used in different feedback loops (see
papers in Kornhuber, 1974). Do we say that the behaviours are homologous and
the pathways plastic? I am sure that if we demand homologous parts and
pathways (as we must) as a necessary condition for complete homology of
behaviour, then we shall be left with few examples. Thus similarities between
behavioural patterns in very closely related groups may well turn out to be
analogies rather than homologies, and this may open the door for a complete
acceptance of the value of examining analogous behaviours. Few would dispute
the value of studying eye movements in Crustacea and rabbits and primates. The
case for a hypothesized function for a behaviour is greatly strengthened if it can
be seen to have been arrived at in several independent ways. We can then
distinguish parts that are necessary and parts that are there simply because of
the history of evolution.
How fixed is a fixed action pattern? The terms "fixed action pattern" and
"innate releasing mechanism" are easily applied to the optokinetic reflex in
Crustacea and mammals. The reflex in these animals is so constant that it is often
used to study the underlying sensory systems. Yet if you force a mammal to wear
reversing prisms [See Gyr et al.: "Motor-Sensory Feedback and Geometry of
Visual Space" BBS, this issue] or magnifying lenses, this quickly alters the gain of
the system to compensate (Melvill Jones, 1977). The effect thus tends to be
constant but the behaviour (as measured by the output) different. It is not possible
to use a single output of a negative feedback loop to describe the loop. The
weakness of the idea of a fixed action pattern is this use of merely the output to
define the behaviour. Behaviours are often described as unitary where they
clearly have a multicomponent basis.
E-E quotes von Hoist as having described the "neurogenic motivation"
underlying swimming in fish. What is meant by swimming? In common with all
locomotion (and many other behaviours), all output parameters are vector
quantities having direction as well as magnitude. We must ask in what direction
the spinal eels swim. It must be recognized that swimming is a three-dimensional
behaviour, whereas a single neural pathway is one-dimensional (from a simple
consideration of vector coding in the nervous system, there must at least be three
separate neurogenic networks underlying swimming; see Fraser, 1978a).
Ethologists have found it convenient to regard fixed action patterns and
orientation as separate. This may be true where the fixed action pattern has
signal value only, but where it is expressed as a vector parameter (e.g.,
swimming) the orientation must be considered part of the fixed action pattern,
and we can recognize different dimensions for the control of behaviour. Thus,
escape on the part of a worm is one-dimensional, involving two fixed action
patterns mediated by appropriate groups of giant fibres defining the two
directions of escape in a straight line. Crab swimming is a three-dimensional
behaviour controlled by at least six pathways defining positive and negative
directions of torque and force in three orthogonal planes (Fraser, 1978b). In all
behaviour other than simple one-dimensional control without feedback, the
behaviour cannot merely be described by the output. In the absence of complete
detailed descriptions of behavioural output, control pathways and inputs, the
behavioural scientist must use function to describe a behaviour, and hence must
use analogous behaviour.
It seems to me that the basic uncertainties of the fixed action pattern concept
partly outlined above, along with a cultural fear of deterministic behaviour, have
prevented analogous behaviour from being accepted as a valid parameter to
assess human behaviour.
by Michael T. Ghiselln
University of California Bodega Marine Laboratory, Bodega Bay, Calif. 94923
Has human ethology rediscovered Darwinism? As I have said before (Ghiselin,
1973), "The history of the assimilation of Darwinism has been the history of failure
to assimilate Darwinism." Although E-E's contribution to some extent helps supply
the deficiency, his approach would benefit from being still more Darwinian in
substance. The same may be said of virtually all efforts to study behavior from an
evolutionary point of view. It is hard to say whether evolutionary biology has
suffered more from its "friends" or its "enemies." E-E delivers a few jabs at the
opposition, but delivers not telling blows with respect to the emotional, philosophi-
cal, and ideological controversies. As with so much polemical literature, espe-
cially in this area, disagreements about fundamentals are handled as if they could
be resolved with a modest amount of empirical data. Herein I can only touch upon
some of the issues, but more extensive discussion has been provided elsewhere
(Ghiselin, 1969, 1974a). Various matters will have to be passed over in silence,
simply because there is not room enough to do justice to them. The relationships
between germ and soma, phenotypic plasticity, modes of selection in social
contexts, the logic of analogy and of comparison, how insect nervous systems
differ from those of vertebrates, schemata, and presuppositions about cerebral
localization should be treated in depth or not at all.
E-E seems to take it for granted that his own approach is ideologically pure and
methodologically above reproach. I will attempt to show that this is far from true
(although, as I have said, I shall be obliged to leave out a great deal). As with the
generality of schools, movements, and bandwagons, ethology has its myths and
dogmas that are but rarely subjected to penetrating critical scrutiny. Much
scientific controversy is misdirected because the participants fail to address such
metascientific issues when they are the real basis of disagreement. Were the
philosophy of ethology more openly and candidly discussed, the whole enterprise
would be viewed with much greater scepticism. Most readers of E-E's article will
probably not recognize the peculiar neo-Kantianism implicit in his use of the term
"a priori." As I have pointed out (Ghiselin, 1974a), modern philosophy has
rejected synthetic a priori judgment in the Kantian sense, and substituting natural
selection for sensory experience will not salvage the doctrine or its implications.
Again (Ghiselin, 1969), the allegation that ethologists begin (or must or should or
even can begin) their work with unbiased observation would hardly be taken
seriously by a knowledgeable epistemologist - or, for that matter, by a well-
trained, professional scholar in any other behavioral science. There is no
substitute for rigorous hypothetico-deductive methodology, and no hope for
so-called Baconian induction.
Another myth is that "Ethology has from the beginning been based upon the
theory of selection." To be sure, a growing awareness of evolutionary theory
characterizes ethology as well as many other behavioral sciences. But the
historical documents unequivocally attest to the fact that ethology arose out of
anti-selectionist, idealistic morphology, and has long suffered from virtually total
disassociation from the mainstream of selectionist thought. A phylogenetic
interpretation has merely been superimposed upon typological systematics, as
was true of much traditional morphology. (Typologists believe in Platonic Ideas,
Aristotelian essences, and the like - see Ghiselin, 1969 and references therein.)
For the most part the sole use of natural selection has been as a substitute for
God in explaining adaptation. The result has been an incredible amount of naive
teleology (Ghiselin, 1974a).
E-E's paper shows that although he is beginning to undergo metamorphosis
into a Darwinian, the transformation is far from complete. Vestiges of typological
attitudes are evident in his discussion of the "universality" of behavioral traits. To
have features "essentially the same" is necessary, for an Aristotelian at least, if
they are to be part of "human nature" (another term of dubious metaphysical
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status). However, modern philosophy has largely managed to liberate itself from
such notions as "essential similarity" and "nature" in the Aristotelian sense, and
has developed much more effective ways of dealing with attributes and groups.
And modern systematic biology embraces population-thinking, so that there is no
reason why any intrinsic trait, inherited or not, should be present in all organisms
or populations that form any species. Organisms as well as the populations of
which species are composed differ in genetic makeup. What they share is a
gene-pool It follows from the fact that species are not classes, but individuals in
the logical sense of composite wholes (Ghiselin, 1974b), that they do not have
defining properties, much less essences. Diversity and polymorphism are only to
be expected in a Darwinian universe wherein variation is a necessary condition for
change. Whether variation be genetic or not, it should be as rampant in behavior
as it is in anatomy. To be sure, phenotypic variation, including the effects of
nutrition and learning, often renders the genetic component inconspicuous and
hard to detect, and it would be rash to pontificate one way or another on just how
much each contributes. E-E takes comfort in his negative results with respect to
finding any "basic differences in human behavior attributable to race." Now, even
though my great-grandfather fought for the Confederacy, I consider myself
anything but a racist. Nonetheless, concealing the facts about human diversity, or
ignoring them, will not help us to understand human biology. It is hard to say what
E-E means by "basic" (all things to all men no doubt), but the assertion seems to
reflect the sort of typological attitude toward classification that racists themselves
find so attractive. By all analogy, human populations ought to be polymorphic and
variable in everything influenced by chromosomes. It would be astonishing, for
example, were phenylketonuria and color-blindness to have exactly the same
frequency in every human deme. From what we know of blood-group frequencies,
we can very reasonably expect to find geographic variation and dines in quite a
variety of behavioral traits. Racist ideology should be answered with good
philosophy, not bad science.
E-E dismisses the ethologists' use of the expression "survival of the species"
as "not quite correct." This is a remarkably cavalier way to admit that they have
not understood the first thing about selection theory, namely that it explains
evolution as the result of reproductive competition between the parts of species.
The unreflective assumption that species can undergo adaptation has led
numerous biologists, especially ethologists, to misinterpret the function of many
important biological features. It is truly remarkable how little attention has been
paid to the fact, so well documented by Darwin, that evolutionary mechanisms
profoundly influence the properties of organisms and that a knowledge of
selection theory is useful for investigating these properties. E-E's remarks on
familial selection and related topics treat a profound and difficult matter as if it
could be dismissed in a few words. But virtually the whole literature on "sociobi-
ology" displays equal superficiality. Instead of merely tossing out a few specula-
tions, a responsible scholar will think matters through carefully and relate his
hypotheses to data indicative of their validity Unfortunately, it is not generally
known how one tests hypotheses in evolutionary psychology.
It is pleasing to see that E-E realizes that evolution is not always adaptive, but
he certainly does not go far enough. It would help if all students of behavior were
better acquainted with the causes of what Haeckel called "dysteleology," such
as historical accidents, pleiotropy, and sexual selection. Some readers may be
interested in the semantic difficulties of "adaptation" (Ghiselin, 1966). The term is
equivocal, and much of the literature on adaptation suffers from verbal confu-
sion.
When we turn to the empirical aspects of the paper, all seems quite
reasonable. Yet one might contend that well-nigh everything of significance,
including the methods and the results, was clearly and explicitly expounded by
Darwin (1872) in the definitive work on evolutionary psychology. The curious
reader might well compare The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals
with E-E's work. The parallels could hardly be more striking. Darwin discusses the
congenially deaf and blind, cross-cultural comparisons, and many other topics
that E-E treats as if they were new (see also Ekman, 1973). Darwin's principles of
emotional expression can serve as a basis for a "grammar" of communication,
and much else besides. His experimental design and comparative approach have
rendered his work the standard of excellence in the study of behavior. Selection
theory, in this as in his many other works on evolutionary psychology, served to
reveal the causes of behavior. Both its effects and its mechanisms could be
understood by studying the two together As Darwin (1874) emphasized in the
last part of The Descent of Man, behavior must be regarded as a major cause of
evolutionary change. A peacock's tail tells us something about the aesthetic
tastes of peahens, in a situation where a peculiar mode of selection has long
operated. However, if one does not study evolution and behavior from a unitary
point of view, one will misinterpret both. The failure of those who came after
Darwin to grasp this point is perhaps the main reason why it is taking them over a
century to catch up with him. He did not just anticipate modern work, he laid the
foundations for what will come next.
These are not hostile criticisms. On the contrary, everything I have said backs
up E-E's fundamental thesis that evolutionary biology can teach us a great deal
about human behavior. My only objection is that we need more attention to the
subtleties of evolutionary mechanisms if our approach is to realize its full potential.
The behavioral sciences can not only use Darwinism, but after a century of
misunderstanding and neglect, they deserve it.
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Classical ethology's conception of ontogenetic development. E-E states his
views on ontogenetic development with such clarity that they invite commentary in
the hope of advancing our understanding of the significance (for developmental
studies) of concepts such as "genetic heritage," "self-differentiation," "pat-
terned information," "phylogenetically acquired," "phylogenetic adaptation,"
"preprogrammed," and "preadaptation."
E-E's views on development are "classical" in that they faithfully represent
those of his teacher Konrad Lorenz, one of the founders of ethology. Not all
ethologists share these particular views. The enormous success of classical
ethology is due in no small part to the popular appeal of its relatively simple and
straightforward theory of ontogenetic development - to wit, there are two
sources of behavioral adaptation: heredity (phylogeny) and learning. (Although I
shall not comment on E-E's behavioral observations, the absence of reference to
Birdwhistell's extensive pioneering work on kinesics or "body language,"
summarized in 1970, seems a serious omission.)
According to E-E, a focal point of interest in human ethology is "the extent to
which man's behavior is determined by his genetic heritage." How could anything
we do be unrelated to our genetic heritage? All of our behavior (and that of every
other species) is related to our genetics - it could not be otherwise. Thus, there is
not one class of behavior that stems from the genome - all behavior stems from
the genome.
So, if we may put genetic considerations aside for the moment, we can
proceed to what I understand to be the nub of the problem. E-E seems to have in
mind a particular route of development for innate behavior: "a process of
self-differentiation according to the blueprint given in the genome of the species."
According to E-E, ethologists are aware that development involves organismic-
environmental interactions, so it is not the absence of environmental input that
characterizes the self-differentiation of innate behavior. Rather, it is that "no
patterned information concerning the adaptation needs to be available to the
growing organism for the adaptive pattern to occur." This is certainly an
hypothesis worthy of developmental experimentation; in fact, my own research
program has been guided by related theoretical considerations.
The question I have asked is: Are there nonobvious experiential precursors
operative in the course of the development of innate behavior? To render the
question less paradoxical, my provisional definition of innate behavior has been
the manifestation of adaptive or species-typical responsiveness to patterned
stimuli (or stimulus objects) that the organism has not previously encountered, at
least not in their present form. It occurred to me that once one identified the
critical perceptual features of the stimulus, it might be that the organism had
encountered these earlier, although in a different form. If such were the case, and
if the later behavior could be shown to be dependent on the earlier exposure, then
these would be instances of nonobvious experiential precursors to the manifesta-
tion of innate behavior. But perhaps we would want now to put the term innate in
quotation marks. I don't know about that since this is not really an possibility that
has been faced very squarely heretofore, although Schneirla (1956) and Lehrman
{op. cit., 1953), among others, have made similar suggestions in their critiques of
the concept of innate behavior. The search for nonobvious experiential precur-
sors to innate behavior has not been popular, but there is some evidence
beginning to accumulate (e.g., Gottlieb, 1976a, 1978, and in press).
The finding of nonobvious precursors does not necessarily do away with the
concept of innateness. Rather, what it does is force us to think in a new way
about the role of experience in the development of species-specific or species-
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typical behavior. As has been documented elsewhere (Gottlieb, 1976b), there is
not only one role of experience during species-typical development, there are at
least three: maintenance, facilitation, and induction. The interesting thing about
these three modes is that (1) they do not fit the definition of traditional (i.e.,
associationistic) learning, and (2) they entail specific patterns of stimulation to
achieve the species-typical behavioral phenotype (e.g., Gottlieb, 1976a). Who
would have thought, for example, that an already developed species-specific
auditory perception would require a highly specific patterned experience to keep
it functional? Or, even more unexpected, that a maintenance experience can
antedate the behavior to be maintained (ibid.)?
The search for nonobvious experiential precursors to unlearned behavior is in
line with evolutionary considerations. Natural selection works on behavioral
phenotypes; it is completely indifferent to the particular pathway taken by the
phenotype during the course of development. Since all forms (pathways) of
development involve genetic activity, natural selection does not (need not) favor
one developmental pathway over another for the ontogenesis of unlearned
behavior. Natural selection involves a selection for the entire developmental
manifold, including both the organic and normally occurring stimulative features of
ontogeny. Thus, nonobvious experiential precursors of a patterned kind may be
much more widespread than heretofore realized. Only developmental investiga-
tions of unlearned behavior can answer that question.
E-E's conception of phylogenetic adaptation is not incompatible with the
operation of nonobvious experiential precursors in species-typical behavioral
development. All the evidence to date favors "patterned information" and
development constraints - there is no evidence for "blank slates" in the develop-
ment of perception, even among the lower vertebrates (e.g., Wiens, 1970), much
less in birds of mammals. One does feel that the classical ethologists' two-factor
conception of ontogenetic development is too simplified to foster our understand-
ing of the development of species-typical behavior and, thus, to direct the
practice of development analysis
by Jack P* Hailman
Department of Zoology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. 53706
The ethology behind human ethology. E-E's essay is a rebuttal of Pierre
Charron's assertion (a century before Alexander Pope) that "The true science
and study of mankind is man." Human ethology is somewhat like Mark Twain's
weather in that many talk about it but few do anything. Happily, E-E is an
exception.
When E-E says that "the formal application of ethological methods to the study
of man began about fifteen years ago," he means his application. His methods
are not fundamentally different from those of Darwin (1872), who set out (1) "In
the first place, to observe infants"; (2) to study the insane; (3) to stimulate
behavior electrically, to photograph it, and "to show several of the best plates,
without a word of explanation, to above twenty educated persons" as judges; (4)
to investigate "the great masters in painting and sculpture"; (5) to compare "all
the races of mankind"; and finally, (6) to attend, as closely as he could, to "some
of the commoner animals." In fact, Darwin also studied actors and the facial
musculature mediating expressions, and used other methods he failed to list
formally as separate approaches.
My other major comment is that the ethology E-E applies to man is not The
Ethology, but rather traditional Austro-German ethology, the framework of which
most of the field has long since outgrown. I will comment first on three issues of
evolutionary ethology (function, homology, and comparisons) and then on three
issues of developmental ethology (innateness, inheritance, and deprivation).
The "function" of behavior. E-E first asserts that from observing behavior one
can draw "conclusions as to function," but later, more cautiously, he states that
one can only infer "a fairly good guess as to adaptive function in most cases." As
I have pointed out elsewhere (Hailman, 1971), E-E's guesses take on the aura of
established conclusions. The adaptive significance of behavior can be estab-
lished only by research on populations, not by observing individual animals (e.g.,
Hailman, 1976a; 1977a, pp. 11-13). A further mischief is engendered by the
belief that each behavioral trait has an assignable "function" (see Hailman,
1977b). We are in danger of forgetting that natural selection works on whole
animals or groups of them rather than on individual traits or genes. Because the
animal is an adaptive whole, a particular behavioral pattern may have no discrete,
assignable "function." Furthermore, E-E provides no explicit method for formulat-
ing "functional" guesses.
Homology versus analogy. E-E correctly states that cross-specific behavioral
similarities that are due to similar selective pressures are analogies, whereas
those due to common phyletic descent are homologies. But he fails to make clear
that when one says two traits are homologous (or analogous) he must say
homologous (or analogous) as what? To extend E-E's example concerning the
wings of bats and birds, one can say that they are homologous as forearms
because they are evolved from the forearm of a common ancestor, but they are
merely analogous as wings because the common ancestor did not fly. A set- and
information-theoretic analysis of evolutionary concepts such as homology and
analogy is provided in detail elsewhere (Hailman, 1976b). In any case, E-E
provides no methodology for separating homology from analogy.
The comparative method. The two foregoing problems - how to establish the
functional significance oi behavior (if one exists) through observation and how to
distinguish homology from analogy - converge at the comparative method, which
E-E sees as "a basic source of information." He fails, however, to clarify the
design of the comparative method, and thereby creates problems for those
unfamiliar with it. As I have set forth in greater detail elsewhere (Hailman, 1976a;
1977a, pp. 13-15), the comparative method is in its basic form a contingency
table whose cells are filled with numbers of species (or other population units)
exhibiting some particular trait. The rows of this table may be taken as different
taxonomic groupings of the species, such as gulls, terns, and boobies (to use an
example from birds). The columns are different environmental circumstances,
such as flat ground or steep cliffs as nesting locations. If species with a given trait
accumulate in some particular row - which is to say that the trait correlates with
taxonomy regardless of environmental circumstances - the behavioral similarities
are attributed to common descent: the possessed traits are homologies. On the
other hand, if species with a given trait accumulate in some particular column -
the trait correlates with environmental circumstances regardless of the taxonomic
relatedness of the species - then the behavioral similarities are attributable to
common selective pressures: the traits are analogies. For example, certain
behavioral patterns first discovered by E. Cullen (1957) in the cliff-nesting
kittiwake gull also occur in other cliff-nesting gulls (Hailman, 1965), terns (J. M.
Cullen and Ashmole, 1963), and boobies (Nelson, 1967), but not in their
ground-nesting relatives. On the other hand, different behavioral traits of these
same birds correlate with taxonomic grouping rather than habitat (e.g., Tinber-
gen, 1959). The effectiveness of the comparative approach is proportional to the
completeness with which its design is executed: caveat emptor!
"Innate" and "acquired." The lack of one-to-one correspondence between
the genotype and phenotype of animals is a continual nuisance to evolutionary
reasoning. Austro-German ethology tries to define away the nature/nurture
problem, but the attempt is unsatisfactory. I said (Hailman, 1969) that my results
showed "clearly that behavior cannot meaningfully be separated into unlearned
and learned components." E-E here states that "the argument that a distinction
between innate and acquired components of behavior cannot be made . . . can
no longer be upheld." I originally continued," nor can a certain percentage of the
behavior be attributed to learning," whereas E-E now continues, "the whole
nature/nurture issue should not be considered as a matter of either/or, nor can
the contribution of each be measured quantitatively, in terms of percentages."
E-E previously attacked1 the conclusions of my study on begging in gull chicks
(Hailman, 1967) without challenging the empirical findings or showing that the
conclusions fail to follow from them. He now seems to say that the "innate and
acquired" cannot be separated quantitatively, yet they can still be separated. I
find this reasoning sufficiently opaque that there is no recourse but to approach
the problem through more concrete issues: what is inherited and what can be
learned from "deprivation" experiments?
What is inherited? E-E quotes Eisenberg (op. cit, 1971) as stating "that there
is no behavior . . . in the zygote. . . . What the DNA specifies are chemical
constituents." E-E adds "Ethologists certainly agree." Yet later he is saying that
"prospective potentials" rather than macromolecules are inherited. Suppose his
circumlocution) means the following: given certain rearing conditions, an animal
with a particular genome will develop particular behavioral traits - hardly a
conclusion with which many would argue. The rub comes when E-E, arguing
through selected examples, leaves one with the impression that the rearing
conditions make no difference. He forgets to mention that the development of
species-typical, stereotyped pecking movements in gull chicks depends upon the
experience of simply standing; that the head-rotation becomes incorporated into
the movement through experience; that the response is elicited by increasingly
specific and complex stimuli as perceptual experience accumulates; that the initial
movement differentiates into separate movements of pecking to food and
begging to the parent as a result of experience; and so on (Hailman, 1967). Gull
chicks inherit DNA molecules and other parts of the fertilized egg, and one might
loosely say these provide "prospective potentials" for development of compli-
cated sensory-motor behavior, given certain experiences. But the adaptive whole
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depends as much on these experiences as upon the genes: change either and
the behavior changes. E-E states that genes, not behavior, are inherited, but then
he proceeds as if behavior were inherited. His confusion concerning behavioral
development is nicely exemplified by his subheading: "Gene-environment interac-
tion." As I said (Hailman, 1969) in the passage paraphrased above the E-E,
"Behavioral development is a mosaic created by continuing interaction of the
developing organism and its environment" (emphases added here).
The deprivation experiment. The subject of deprivation has been so tirelessly
argued that I will do little more than recall the issues. Every animal grows up in
some environment, so that "deprivation" or "isolation" are relative terms. The
essence of the experimental logic is to rear animals in two environments, and to
conclude that any trait developing similarly in both is uninfluenced by factors not
common to the two environments. E-E and I have always agreed on the following
(see Hailman, 1967): there probably are behavioral patterns that would develop
similarly regardless of the rearing environment (given that it is generally condu-
cive to life and health). We appear to disagree as to how common such
behavioral patterns are, E-E apparently believing them to be the rule among
patterns are, E-E apparently believing them to be the rule among animals and I
maintaining that very few (if any) unequivocal examples actually occur.
E-E seems to convince by marshalling examples, but the evidence is selective
and misleading. For example, he ignores my gull studies (Hailman, 1967), with
which he is familiar, his own excellent study of the role played by experience in
adaptive opening of nuts by European red squirrels (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1951), and all
other studies of the same genre. He also misleads by implying that bird song
develops normally in songbirds reared in complete deprivation. The truth
extracted from a large literature is: (1) most, if not all, songbirds must hear
something in order for song to develop normally; (2) in many cases they must
hear their own species' song; (3) in most cases this experience must occur at a
definite time during ontogeny (the critical period); and (4) in some cases different
parts of the song must be learned at different times. However, there are (as E-E
asserts) cases in which the species-typical song develops normally in birds
reared in soundproof boxes. What E-E fails to mention is that if one does a more
complete deprivation by deafening birds so that they cannot hear even their own
sounds, then song does not develop normally. E-E has tried to convince us that
many behavioral patterns develop similarly regardless of early experience and
rearing environment, but I remain quite unconvinced.
Conclusions. Although no substantial part of the old Austro-German ethology
has kept pace with modern conceptual frameworks, one must not conclude that
E-E's results are invalid. It is extremely important to know which human behavioral
traits are universal, which are restricted to particular cultures and genetic groups,
and which vary among individuals of a given culture or group. It is not necessary
to invoke outdated instinct concepts to advance understanding of human
behavior, but it will require further thinking about the comparative method and
other issues to adapt the ethological approach to comparisons among human
cultures. E-E has usefully enlarged upon Darwin's pioneering efforts, and to both
of them we owe a great deal.2
NOTES
1. In a plenary talk at the 1970 International Ethological Conference in
Washington, D.C., E-E attacked what he believed to be my conceptions of
behavioral development; I have not seen a published version. His memorable
opening remark was to the effect that "Hailman's view of instinct is like that of
the man who said he didn't believe in ghosts and furthermore wasn't afraid of
them." I take this opportunity to offer whatever comfort I can to those who not
only believe in instincts but also are afraid of them.
2. And I owe thanks to Dr. Jeffrey R. Baylis for critically reading the
manuscript draft and to my wife Liz for proofreading final copy.
by Glenn Hausfater
Section of Neurobiology and Behavior, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y. 14853
An eclectric history of ethological theory and methods. The accompanying
article by Professor Eibl-Eibesfeldt summarizes and reviews several of the
distinctive and defining features of ethological theory and methodology as applied
both to humans and to other animals. Human ethology, in contrast to many other
approaches to the understanding of human behavior, begins with the premise that
some nonnegligible portion of man's behavior is strongly governed by innate
mechanisms and tendencies; in brief, that there is in fact such a thing as "human
nature." Additionally, E-E's article attempts to demonstrate that in both organized
rituals and day-to-day social intercourse, components of behavior - innate and
cultural, nonverbal and verbal - can serve as functional equivalents in a unitary
grammar of human social behavior. Obviously, an attempt is also made to
demonstrate that ethological theory and methods, especially comparative studies
across cultures and species, are appropriate and heuristically valuable in deter-
mining the structure of this grammar as well as the function of discrete
components or acts within overall behavioral sequences. Unfortunately, I believe
that the main problem faced by this or any other attempt to apply ethological
theory and methods to human behavior is, quite simply, that ethological theory is
hopelessly outmoded with respect to many of its main conceptual foundations,
especially as concerns the role of intuition in behavioral research, the organiza-
tion of the nervous system, and the nature and mechanisms of evolution. Below, I
sketch a brief and eclectic history of ethological theory and methodology to
elucidate my views on this subject, and then offer some further comments
concerning the relationship between ethology and sociobiology.
Origins, goals and methods of ethology. The roots of ethological theory and
methodology can be traced, respectively, to the romantic philosophical tradition
of nineteenth-century Europe, especially, Germany, and to classical comparative
anatomy as practiced by professionals reared and educated in this tradition.
Thus, for example, one of the most important aspects of ethological methodolo-
gy, as described by Tinbergen {op. cit, 1951), was the compilation of an
ethogram, a complete listing of the repertoire of behavior of a given species.
Much to my surprise, the concept of the ethogram and its importance to
ethological research was hardly mentioned by E-E.
By way of brief historical review: Just as the nineteenth-century anatomist (e.g.,
Ruge, 1887) completed painstakingly detailed observations and descriptions of
the nerves, muscles, and bones of each animal species, so too did the ethologist,
via the ethogram, attempt to provide names and descriptions for all of the basic
"bits and pieces" of the behavior of a species. The essential feature of these
activities, however, was that both anatomists and ethologists realized the
importance of a detailed understanding of the basic design or structure of a
species, and, moreover, relied solely upon observation and description to reveal
the nature of this structure, presumably characteristically unique for each species.
In such pursuits, however, within-species variability in behavior and morphology
was typically ignored and overlooked; the goal was simply to determine the
characteristic structure of each species, and then to use this information to
determine the phylogenetic relationship of one species to another.
The romantic philosophical tradition exerted another important influence on the
development of ethological theory by imparting to the first ethologists a profound
desire to understand, identify with, and, crudely, "get inside of" the mind of the
animals they studied. This early and fundamentally important goal of the etholog-
ists is clearly evident in the influential and insightful writings of Jakob von Uexkull
(1934), one of the founders of the ethological tradition (see Lorenz, op. cit.,
1935), who, among other things, coined the term Umwelt to describe the
amalgam of an organism's perceptual and physical (or operational) universes.
Thus, I believe that very early in the development of ethology, a basic
methodology arose consisting of three elements: (1) observe the animal, (2)
describe its behavior, and (3) use intelligent empathy to determine the causation
and function of the behavior. The comparative method and experimental analysis
of behavior, as described by E-E, do not to my mind constitute either important or
defining characteristics of ethological methodology; these are merely basic tools
of the trade for many of the behavioral sciences.
Ethology and intuition. The first and second of the above methodological
principles have been adopted by many behavioral scientists. More important with
regard to the article under Commentary, however, is the third principle above, that
is, the explanation of man's behavior through the application of intelligent
empathy by one human toward the activities of another. The heavy reliance on
intelligent empathy and intuition in ethological research, particularly human
ethology, poses enormous difficulties, as one example should suffice to demon-
strate.
As an observer of primates and other mammals, I am led by my intuition and
empathy to suspect that in humans kissing is an elaboration upon such basic
mammalian behavior patterns as oral-oral olfactory inspection and mouth groom-
ing, both of which often involve lip and tongue protrusion, combined with a
marked tendency in the order Primates for face-to-face communication at close
range. E-E, in contrast, derives kissing in humans from ritualized kiss-feeding, a
phenomenon primarily observed in avian courtship displays. Whose application of
empathy, intuition, bias, or opinion is correct? More importantly, how does one go
about systematically eliminating one or more of the plausible alternative hypo-
theses concerning the evolution of this very interesting and enjoyable behavior in
humans?
In sum, ethological methodology, as clearly demonstrated in this article by E-E,
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almost always eventually falls back on intuition and empathy. Yet, unfortunately,
intuition and empathy alone are not sufficient evidence in support of any
hypothesis about behavior or its evolution.
Ethology and the nervous system. With its unique combination of theory and
method, ethology eventually became focused, in some broad sense, on the study
of perceptual processes in animals, especially stimulus filtering and the role of
conspecifics and their displays as keys, releasers, or sign stimuli. Of course,
animals did not always respond with equal rapidity or intensity to the same
stimulus over time, apart from habituation, and thus ethologists turned to the
study of motivation and, thence, to the study of the nervous system over and
above the mechanisms of perceptual filtering at the level of peripheral receptors.
Ethological analysis of the nervous system, however, by and large also relied
upon the tripartite methodology described above, and, in particular, an attempt
was made to infer the structure of the nervous system from observations on the
structure of behavioral sequences. The end result of this endeavor was a
description of the nervous system based upon the notions of action-specific
energies, energy blockage and overflow, and so on (Lorenz, 1939). Needless to
say, such ethological theories of the structure and operation of the nervous
system, as inferred from the structure of behavior, have not largely been
discarded both by ethologists and by neurobiologists, save for the single principle
of hierarchial organization of the nervous system [see Kupfermann & Weiss: "The
Command Neuron Concept" BBS 1(1) 1978].
Ethology and Evolution. Likewise, I believe that the ethologically-based approach
to taxonomy, phylogeny, and evolution has largely been outdated by develop-
ment of the modern synthetic theory of evolution. Classification and evolution
have, to my reading, had two high points in the history of ethology. The first of
these was Lorenz's (1941) monograph on the classification of the Anatidae; the
second, E. Cullen's (1957) study of the behavior of the kittiwake, a specialized
cliff-nesting gull species. Lorenz's study showed that analysis and comparison of
species-specific sequences of behavior, both at the level of fixed action patterns
and at that of entire ethograms, could play a valuable role in taxonomic studies.
However, it should be obvious that in very few cases will behavior alone be
sufficient to establish the taxonomic relationships among a group of species not
already known to be united at some higher taxonomic level. Cullen's widely cited
study served to demonstrate that specific behavior patterns constituted adapta-
tions in the sense of subserving some basic function within the life cycle of a
species and, more importantly, that when the niche of a species underwent
specialization, so too did the structure of behavior.
The most sophisticated and coherent formulation of the ethological concep-
tualization of evolutionary change and phylogeny, however, was presented by
Lorenz in 1965 (op. cit.) and can be summarized as follows. Evolution and
speciation consist of the shuffling of specific sequences of behavior (for example
displays, fixed action patterns, or even maintenance behaviors) across motiva-
tional fields. In the course of this process, some behavior patterns may change
their functional association with a particular motivational state (as in the change
from an aggressive with a particular motivational state (as in the change from an
aggressive behavior in one species to a sexual behavior in another), or they may
merely change in intensity, speed, or other aspects of sequential patterning. The
key elements in this conceptualization of evolutionary change and phylogeny are
first, an emphasis on the importance of understanding the fine structuring of
behavior, and second, the absence of attention to variability in behavior within
species. In essence, taxonomic and comparative studies by ethologists analyzed
and presented evolutionary explanations for the variation in behavior among
species. Ethologists as a group, however, have been substantially less successful
in providing explanations for, or even fully grasping the evolutionary significance
of, within-species variability in behavior. It is, of course, precisely such within-
species variability in behavior and other aspects of biology that forms the center
of emphasis for contemporary population biology and evolutionary theory.
Ethology and sociobiology. Finally, a commentary such as the present one should
not close without some mention of the relationship between ethology and
sociobiology. Briefly, sociobiology is a subdiscipline of biology closely allied to
population biology. As such, sociobiology is grounded in the theory of natural
selection as well as contemporary elaborations of that theory, for example, the
theories of kin selection and reciprocal altruism and the concept of inclusive
fitness. The important point concerning sociobiology, however, is not the particu-
lar theories utilized, but rather the almost complete absence of implied methodo-
logy of research techniques in this discipline (Wilson op. cit. 1975). Thus,
researchers and students with the best of training in sociobiology are often
embarrassingly ignorant of ethological techniques for the observation and
description of behavior, and, more generally, of the importance of these endea-
vors to hypothesis testing in sociobiology or other behavioral sciences. This state
of affairs typically reflects the fact that these individuals, in contrast to ethologists,
are often not interested in behavior in its own right, sometimes not even interested
in the biology of the particular species under study, but are usually completely
captivated by the specific hypotheses to be tested and their relationship to the
main body of sociobiological theory. In sum, the subtleties of animal behavior and
ethological techniques for its analysis are often lost on sociobiologists.
On the other hand, although sometimes tied to outmoded theories of evolution
and nervous system operation, ethologists still remain one of the few groups of
biologists to recognize that behavior possesses structure and that analysis of this
structure constitutes an activity of interest and importance in its own right, as well
as being of critical importance for understanding the process of organic evolution.
Ethologists have thus contributed to contemporary behavioral biology both a
conceptual framework for behavioral analysis and a wealth of observational
techniques and details, not the least of which is the importance of direct
observation and description of the behavior of animals in their natural environ-
ments. Sociobiology might therefore be viewed as a discipline that has important
and testable evolutionary theories of behavior, but no methodology with which to
do so. In contrast, ethology is a discipline in possession of techniques for testing
such evolutionary hypotheses about behavior, but otherwise lacking sound
evolutionary or neurobiological theories in need of testing. In sum, I believe that
ethology stands to provide the methodological and technical foundations required
for testing a wide range of important sociobiological theories. As such, I do not
foresee one field devouring the other; perhaps "marriage" provides a better
description of the process.
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The problem of human ethology from the perspective of an experimental
psychologist. When viewed in the context of evolutionary theory there can be
little doubt that many aspects of man's behavior are preprogrammed, in the
sense that they are a product of his phylogenetic heritage. As elaborated by E-E,
human ethology (the biology of human behavior) seeks to identify those geneti-
cally determined (i.e., innate) components of man's behavior that reflect this
heritage, and to specify their adaptive significance. The fruits of this approach are
perhaps nowhere better exemplified than in the numerous interesting examples
presented here, and one can only agree with the author's comment that" the
biological approach is likely to illuminate unique facets of human behavior thus far
overlooked."
What then is the problem that human ethology poses for the experimental
psychologist? In essence, it is the problem that experimental psychology has
faced from its inception, namely, that of identifying the factors responsible for
behavior, including the behavior that human ethology describes. To assert that a
given behavior is genetically based, to specify its phylogenetic precursors, and to
identify its possible adaptive significance, can set a given behavior into perspec-
tive for the experimental psychologist, but it cannot "explain" the behavior in the
sense of identifying its basic components and their possible interactions.
In 1943 Clark Hull warned psychologists against what he described as a
doctrine of despair: "Emergentism." According to Hull:
"Emergentism, as applied to organismic behavior, is the name for the view that in
the process of evolution there had "emerged" a form of behavior which is
ultimately unanalyzable into logically more primitive elements - behavior which
cannot possibly be deduced from any logically prior principles whatever." (C. L.
Hull, 1943, p. 26.)
Though they do not say so directly, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the
human ethologists, at least as exemplified here, have adopted Emergentism as a
working principle. Consider E-E's comment that fear of strangers " . . . is a
universal trait for which learning theory could hardly account." Undoubtedly this
statement is intended to emphasize the point that fear of strangers cannot be
attributed to any explicit training by the mother or even to a set of aversive
experiences with strangers. But the statement also implies that learning plays no
role at all, and hence that learning theory has nothing to offer by way of
explanation. As will be shown, such an implication is not only premature, it is
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wrong, [see also Rajecki, Lamb & Obmascher: "Toward a General Theory of
Infantile Attachment" BBS 1 (3) 1978].
According to learning theory, any comprehensive analysis of a given behavior
must seek to identify those factors, whether innate or acquired, that are
responsible for its occurrence at a given time and in a given setting. In general, the
method of choice is to bring the behavior into the laboratory and systematically to
vary one or the other of the factors thought to contribute to it. In this way, one can
determine whether these factors, acting either singly or in combination, are critical
for the behavior under investigation.
When fear of strangers is brought into the laboratory and examined from the
perspective that learning theory provides, several interesting facts emerge. In
particular, it becomes clear that, while fear of strangers has an important innate
component (as E-E suggests), it also has an acquired (i.e., learned) component,
and the learned component is as crucial to its occurrence as the innate one.
It is by now well known that a newly hatched duckling will immediately
approach, follow, and otherwise react affirmatively to any of a wide variety of
moving objects during the first 24 hours after it leaves its shell. Beginning
sometime on Day 2, however, the duckling starts to react fearfully to moving
objects that are novel, and by Day 5 it will persistently attempt to flee from such
objects. In short, the duckling exhibits the fear of strangers phenomenon that E-E
describes. A variety of experiments have been carried out in an effort to identify
the factors responsible for this effect and a number of hypotheses have been
tested.
It has, for example, been hypothesized that a three-or-four-day-old duckling's
fear of a novel object is predicated on the occurrence of a mismatch between the
visual stimulation provided by that object and the "neuronal model" that the
subject has formed of the stimulation to which it was initially exposed (Bateson,
1966, 1971; Dimond, 1970; Salzen, 1970). According to this "perceptual" or
"exposure learning" hypothesis, rather than representing a rigidly prepro-
grammed reaction that necessarily occurs at a particular time in ontogenetic
development, a duckling's fear of strangers is dependent upon the subject's prior
opportunity to form a neuronal model of a given source of visual stimulation.
Evidence in support of this proposition is provided by a number of investigations
(Sluckin and Salzen, 1961; Moltz & Stettner, 1961; Asdourian, 1967). These
studies reveal that if a subject's exposure to visual stimulation is severely
restricted from the time it hatches, it will immediately approach and follow an
appropriate moving object even though the initial exposure to the object occurs
well after the period when fear reactions would ordinarily be seen.
These data make it clear that adequate experience with appropriate stimula-
tion (i.e., the kind of experience required to form a neuronal model) is a necessary
condition for fear of strangers to emerge. They do not imply that this experience
is also a sufficient condition for this event, however. In an experiment specifically
designed to examine this issue, Schaffer (1966) asked whether the onset of the
human infant's fear of strangers coincided with the point at which infants began to
give evidence that they could recognize strangers. This work indicated that
younger infants can readily discriminate their parents from strangers and yet not
be fearful of strangers. Similarly, it has been found (Hoffman and Ratner, 1973a)
that even when ducklings less than a day old show that they can discriminate
between a novel and a familiar moving object, they still react affirmatively to the
novel one. Both studies make it clear that the formation of a neuronal model (as
revealed by the capacity to discriminate) is not itself a sufficient condition for fear
of strangers to emerge; some maturation is also required.
Schneirla and Rosenblatt (1961) have postulated that age-related changes in
behavior are grounded not only in the growth-dependent process of maturation
but also in the opportunity for learning and experience. Clearly, fear for strangers
is no exception to this principle. When it is studied in the laboratory, we discover
that while fear of strangers may, as E-E asserts, be a universal trait, it can
nonetheless be analyzed into more primitive elements, and one of these elements
is learning.
At the beginning of this commentary it was suggested that when viewed from
the perspective of an experimental psychologist, human ethology does not go far
enough. It serves the important function of identifying behaviors that might
otherwise be overlooked, and it puts those behaviors into perspective fey-
describing the settings in which they occur and indicating their possible phylogen-
etic precursors. However, until those behaviors are subjected to the kind of close
scrutiny that is usually only possible in the laboratory, it is unlikely that they will be
well understood. In this regard, it seems important to suggest again what has
been suggested before (Hoffman and Ratner, 1973b), namely, that the experi-
mental approach and the controlled laboratory procedures it entails complement
and amplify the naturalistic observations obtained through an ethological
approach. There is no sense in advocating one approach over the other because
it is obvious that only when the two approaches are taken together is it possible
to view a given behavior in the context in which it occurs, and also to isolate its
component parts and begin to understand its underlying mechanisms.
by Oa¥fd L- Hull
Philosophy Department, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, Wis.
53201
Universality and species specificity. Ethologists are frequently criticized for the
facility with which they claim that certain behaviors are "innate." To the contrary, I
think that in certain respects their standards of evidence are unrealistically high,
certainly higher than those used by geneticists when the latter treat ordinary
morphological traits. In his paper E-E expresses a belief shared by both
ethologists and their critics that some significant correlation exists between how
"innate" a behavior is and its distribution in the species under study. For some
reason, university and species specificity are critically important in the ethological
literature, certainly more important than they are in the literature of population
genetics. According to ethologists, a behavior is universal if all the organisms in a
particular species exhibit it under appropriate circumstances; it is species specific
if only the organisms in a particular species exhibit it. To be sure, the distribution
of traits, including behavioral traits, is important as evidence for inferring taxo-
nomic relationships. What I wish to discuss in this commentary is its relevance to
the issue of "innateness."
As I understand the ethological use of the term "innate," it implies that a
behavior is innate only if it is strongly genetically determined (that is, has a narrow
reaction norm), is elicited by only minimal environmental cues, and has been
selected for in the evolution of the species (Cassidy, 1979). The purpose of
cross-cultural study in ethology is to show that a behavior is consistently exhibited
in the face of considerable variation in the cultural experiences of the subjects;
but as E-E notes, ethologists do not "invariably conclude from the universality of a
pattern that it must be innate." After all, even though cultures vary in many
respects, they might just happen to share the relevant experiential features.
"Similar experiences in the early life of a child could shape a behavior in different
cultures along similar lines." Deprivation experiments are designed to reduce the
likelihood that such fortuitous experiential similarities are actually responsible for
the behavioral universal. As ethologists themselves have emphasized, an orga-
nism cannot be deprived of all environmental input. It need not even be deprived
of all contact with conspecifics. Such extreme deprivation can produce all sorts of
bizarre behavior. The only environmental factors that must be filtered out for
highly structured behaviors are those that might supply the structure.
Ethologists do not reason from the universal distribution of a behavior in a
species to its being "innate." Absence of the universal distribution of significant
experiential input is also required. Until recently, evolutionary biologists assumed
that any trait universally distributed in a species must, with rarest exception, be an
adaptation. Either it is contributing to the survival of the organisms that possess it
and the perpetuation of their genes, or else it did so in the past. Hence, on the
selectionists' view of evolution, the inference from universality to innateness, the
necessary caveats duly noted, is justified. Recently, however, certain evolutionary
biologists have argued that a high percentage of the traits that are universally
distributed in a species were never selected for, but became fixed through such
processes as drift. If the neutralists are right, then the inferences ethologists make
from universality are not justified. Universally distributed behaviors may be
strongly genetically determined, but they need not be adaptations. As things
currently stand, however, the evidence seems to favor the selectionists over the
neutralists.
Ethologists also seem to reason from a behavior's not being univeral to its not
being "innate." The assumption seems to be that all adaptively significant
behaviors must be universally distributed in a species. Until recently, evolutionary
biologists thought that any trait that conferred a selective advantage on the
organisms processing it would rapidly become fixed in a species. Thus, most loci
should be homozygous for particular traits. To their surprise, they discovered
considerable genetic heterogeneity. According to current estimates, 30-35
percent of all loci in any population taken at random are polymorphic (Lewontin,
1974). It is also true that much of this genetic heterogeneity may be masked at the
phenotypic level (Wilson, 1978), but even so, species are both polymorphic and
polytypic. In consequence, traits that vary in a population can be just as
"genetically determined" as those that do not. More than that, according to
certain evolutionary models, such variability can actually be selected for. For
example, both blood type and eye color are about as genetically determined as
any traits can be and yet they are not universals. Hence, it is possible for a highly
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variable trait to be "innate." In order to refute claims that a behavior is innate,
critics must do more than simply discover an exception. A behavior may vary in a
species because the relevant genes vary.
One can avoid facing up to the difficulties posed by genetic heterogeneity by
redefining the offending traits to make them universal. For example, which protein
is found in the blood is variable, but the presence of some protein or other is
universal. Hence, the real trait is the presence of some blood protein or other.
This evasion works for blood type, but not for eye color. People who have brown
eyes possess a pigment in the iris of their eyes which reflects brown light. People
with blue eyes have no pigment whatsoever. But at least they have eyes. Maybe
eye pigmentation is not a trait, but possession of eyes is. I fail to see the point of
such finagling.
The message of the preceding for ethologists is that a behavior need not be
universal to be innate. E-E concludes that the "results of primate sociology make
it appear probable that many of the universal features of human behavior
(ranking, territoriality, incest avoidance) are rooted in our primate heritage." If
current views about the evolutionary process are correct, variable features of our
behavior can be just as rooted in our primate heritage as those that are
universal.
Ethologists also pay considerable attention to species specificity. One expla-
nation for this emphasis is the role that certain sorts of behavior play in
reproductively isolating one species from another. If the only thing keeping two
species from mating with each other is a difference in courtship behavior, that
difference better be species specific. However, two points need to be made
explicitly. First, not all behaviors function as isolating mechanisms. Those
behaviors that do not, need to be no more species specific than any other trait.
They can be commonly distributed between species and variable within species.
As Emlin and Oring (1977, p. 222) note, "Until recently, many field biologists have
worked under a preconception that species specificity was a characteristic not
only of courtship behavior but of mating systems as well. We are now coming to
realize that variability in social organization, including mating systems, is wide-
spread." Second, no special connection exists between species specificity and
innateness. Just as all possible combinations of universality and innateness are
common, all possible combinations of species specificity and innateness are just
as common (for further discussion, see Mayr, 1976).
Perhaps ethologists and their critics have stated elsewhere what they take to
be the relation between universality and innateness and between species
specificity and innateness. If not, it would be a great help to everyone concerned
if they did.
by Carrol! E. izard
Department of Psychology, University of Delaware, Newark, Del. 19711
Human ethology and the ontogeny of emotional expressions. Ethology has
made significant contributions to the life sciences. The strength and meaningful-
ness of these additions to our knowledge have stood the test of time. Above all,
perhaps, they have given us a fresh perspective on the relationships among living
things and between life and the inanimate surround. The case for human
ethology, though already replete with fascinating observations and insights,
cannot yet claim so solid a foundation or such a unique place among the human
sciences. — This is not to imply that ethology itself is unique, for it overlaps with
comparative psychology (Schneirla, 1972; Yarczower and Hazlett, 1977).
The territory marked off as human ethology by E-E - biology of behavior - cuts
across the domain of a number of other disciplines. There are parallels between
the work of contemporary human ethologists and that of cultural anthropologists
(e.g., Davis, Gardner, and Gardner, 1941; Warner and Lunt, 1941; Mead, 1950;
Benedict, 1946), and even closer parallels with ecological psychology (e.g.,
Barker, 1968; Barker and Schoggin, 1973). E-E's territorial claim ignores several
other disciplines or specialties that contribute to our knowledge of the biological
foundations of behavior. The work of developmental psychologists, psychophy-
siologists, and neuroscientists also contributes to the biology of behavior.
In addition to this overly broad definition of human ethology, E-E's paper
exhibits uncritical acceptance and misinterpretation of controversial research
findings from other disciplines, overgeneralizations, and errors of fact. Some of
these problems are illustrated in the treatment of studies relating to the ontogeny
of emotional expression. In the first place, a discussion of "emotions" in
prelinguistic infants should be in terms of emotional expressions, since emotional
experience is an untestable inference at this age. For example, Bower's report of
surprise in two-week-olds lacks the only kind of critical data that could substan-
tiate it - evidence that he observed the universal facial expression of surprise.
The surprise expression is relatively rare even in older infants and difficult to elicit
with regularity. E-E assumes, with Bower, {op. cit, 1977), that the infant's
increased heart rate on failure to grasp an "apparent object" indicates the
presence of an "innate expectation of tactile consequences." An equally
plausible explanation is that the novelty of the experimental procedure elicited the
emotion of interest. Further, while there is robust evidence for the innateness of
fear and of the encoding and decoding of its expression, the uncritical accep-
tance of Bower's highly controversial claim that it has been observed in two- to
eleven-week-old infants weakens this statement on human ethology. The weight
of the evidence suggests that, on the average, fear does not emerge until the
second half-year of life and a case has been made for the adaptiveness of this
delay in the ontogeny of this highly toxic emotion (Izard, 1977, 1978).
The arguments based on Meltzoff and Moore's (op. cit, 1977) finding of
"imitation" in the twelve- to twentyone-day-old infants are a mixed bag. That the
infant's reactions to the experimenter's facial expressions represent innate
responses is probably correct, but recent research from Kagan's laboratory
raises serious doubt as to whether they are evidence of imitation (Kagan, 1976).
E-E's assumptions and arguments based on the concept of "stranger fear" in
eight- to ten-month-old infants are on shaky grounds. He does not take into
account the variability in the quality of the response due to context, and he does
not consider the behavioral criteria for classifying the response as fear. He is
clearly incorrect in placing the emergence of social discrimination (distinguishing
familiar from unfamiliar persons) and the stranger response at the same age. The
former occurs much earlier (Schaffer, 1966).
The assumption that "stranger fear" in the infant is continuous with "stranger
fear" in the adult is unwarranted for four reasons: (a) the emotional quality of the
infant's stranger response is variable and not totally dependent on the stranger
as stimulus; (b) although under certain conditions an eight- to ten-month-old
responds negatively to strangers, it has not been determined whether the
emotional expression is fear, sadness, anger, shyness, or a blend; (c) in some
infants the negative stranger response diminishes in the months immediately after
onset (Emde, Gaensbauer, and Harmon, 1976) and in the second year of life it is
most frequently called shyness (Kagan, 1976); (d) in adults, strangers may elicit a
variety of emotional responses including interest and contempt. As E-E suggests,
fear may have played some role in the evolution of "individualized social groups,"
but interest, joy, and sadness or grief were probably more important (Averill,
1968; Jolly, 1966).
I expect that the key concept of phylogenetic adaptation as applied to human
beings will prove to be heuristic. However, E-E's current list of behavioral
adaptations has been hastily drawn. Some of the behaviors he discusses may not
meet the criteria for such a classification, and in the case of some of the others
(for instance, stranger response) he has given erroneous descriptions and
misinterpreted their role in ontogeny and phylogeny.
Given the fact that E-E, a distinguished ethologist, has written this position
paper on human ethology, its most serious shortcoming is the virtual neglect of
what may prove the richest nesting place of phylogenetic adaptation - emotion-
related facial behaviors. The universal facial expressions of emotion are perhaps
the only satisfactorily documented phylogenetic adaptions in human beings. Many
of the behaviors which E-E discusses can be interpreted as components or
derivatives of these facial patterns. (He recognizes this in the case of the eyebrow
flash, but he sees it as a derivative of surprise rather than the emotion of interest,
which has more important functions in the encounters that elicit eyebrow flashes.)
Although he discusses facial expressions, he demonstrates no appreciation of
their relation to intrapersonal and social motivation or their role in human evolution
and adaptation. Surely the evolution of social interaction strategies is based in
part on expressive signals that covary with the conscious state (if not the intent)
of the expressor. Deficiency in concepts related to individual motivation may
account for human ethology's lack of theory and focus.
by Peter H. Kiopfer
Zoology Department, Duke University, Durham, N.C. 27706
What the ethologist's eye tells the ethologist's brain. When McCulloch and
coworkers (Lettvin et al., 1959) entitled a paper "What the frog's eye tells its
brain," he articulated a principle that no scientist dare ignore. Perceptions
represent not new "facts" but inputs selected, altered, and integrated by
peripheral receptors, such as the eye. Central/peripheral mechanisms operating
at the level of the CNS influence the bias of the receptors, too, and therein lies the
truth of the adage, "we see what we want to see." E-E and another observer may
confront the same grey-lag goose and elicit an inappropriate nuptial display. E-E,
however, may "see" the discharge of an Action Specific Energy that activates the
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Fixed Action Pattern of the display. The other observer may not. Is the other
observer less acute? Or has E-E's bias merely generated a different perception?
When the function (i.e., adaptiveness) of the behavior is the subject of
discourse, the subjective interpretations are even more evident. Early in his paper
E-E suggests that the twenty-one gun salute is a ritual whose function is to
demonstrate peaceful intentions, analogous to the Massai's thrusting his spear
into the ground. Later this salute becomes a welcoming cannonade that is
analogous to the aggressive display of the Yanomani warrior. Surely, even now,
the emerging study of human ethology has the means of transcend such
subjective and contradictory interpretations.
We ethologists must realize that we come to our task describing and, at some
level, "explaining" behavior with eyes little different, fundamentally, from those of
frogs. Nor does the interposition of a movie camera alter matters. After all, film
speed and grain, field depth and shutter speed have been designed to accord
with our preexisting perceptual preferences. The camera, as used by E-E, cannot
extend our limits of perception, it can only help to refine our analysis of what we
see. The question is, How adequate is E-E's analysis? How justified his dogma-
tism? Dogmatism in the description we allow our observations to spawn is not
becoming. More important, it may not be fruitful.
Thus, when we observe an animal we find ourselves monitoring it with biased
sensors whose bias may well be acquired and cultivated. In other words, we
generate an hypothesis or set of expectations for which we instruct our sensors
to search especially zealously. If what they sense fails to match expectations, we
may have grounds to reject our hypothesis. Our progress, if progress there is in
science, is marked only by the corpses of rejected hypotheses.
The great merit of Lorenz's and Tinbergen's original ideas on the organization
and "causation" of behavior lay in the explicitness of the hypotheses they
generated. The waning of their subsequent influence has been due to their
followers' failure to attempt to reject those hypotheses. They have sought rather
to rigidify and preserve them. The unhappy consequence is articles that are a
veritable stew of personal observations, recorded data, explicit assumptions, and
unacknowledged prejudices.
Consider, for example, the eyebrow flash. It is deemed an Erbkoordination
primarily because of its prevalence across cultures. The evidence for this
conclusion is anecdotal, and, in my judgment, unconvincing. We are given no
series of slow-motion sequences that have been analyzed according to accepted
quantitative procedures, no electromyographic data, no measures of response
latency to standard stimuli, and most important of all, no measures of variability
and variance. Ethology has finally become too rigorous to rely on the natural
history approach of an earlier century. We can rightly expect replicable measure-
ments in place of casual observations and intuition. However, let us grant E-E's
observations on the eyebrow flash. He uses these observations to justify the
conclusion that the flash is a phylogenetic adaptation which, in turn, means that it
is due to an Innate Releasing Mechanism. Once we recognize that the eyebrow
flashing is due to an IRM and is an adaption, of course it follows that we can
expect it to be homologous across cultures!
Aside from the evident circularity in this line of reasoning, it ignores the fact that
cross-cultural studies are in fact (and contra E-E) not methodologically equivalent
to the work in comparative anatomy. The comparative method requires informa-
tion on degree of relationship that is independent of the structures being
compared. Ideally, it is represented by a 2 X 2 factorial design, in which the
structures of species A and species B (the species being of known relationship)
are compared under the conditions of two different environments. Under some
conditions, this may allow a conclusion as to whether features held in common by
the two species are to be regarded as homologous or analogous. At best,
however, this is an uncertain procedure, for a great deal depends on the level of
analysis. Two structures can sometimes be regarded as both analogous and
homologous, depending on whether they are viewed at the molecular, cellular, or
organ level (Klopfer, 1976). Furthermore, listing a few cultures which employ a
common motor pattern is no basis for establishing that the pattern in question is a
genetically programmed Erbkoordination. Finally, even when we do identify a true
Erbkoordination, such as a knee-jerk reflex, there is an enormous developmental
and conceptual distance between such relatively stereotyped responses and the
complex behavior patterns which are truly the focus of ethological interest -
"nonverbal and verbal communication, aggression, mechanisms of bonding, and
aspects of social structure . . ." (E-E).
All that has been written over the past years about the intricate interplay of
genetic and environmental factors, about the concepts of phenotypic plasticity,
norms of reaction, genetic assimilation, and cultural variability seems to have
swept by E-E, or so this particular paper, at least, suggests. The methods of
quantitative analysis of behavioral patterns seem to have escaped him as well. He
acknowledges the work but appears to ignore its implications. Human ethology,
he claims, inquires into the selective processes that have shaped behavior, yet he
apparently fails to realize that the nature of the selective benefit the eyebrow flash
bestows is only grist for speculation. E-E does not, in fact, cite a single study of
selection. Nor is the application of ethological methods to human behavior as
novel as he suggests. Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson used these
methods - including prism lenses - in the twenties, considerably antedating the
fifteen years' span cited by E-E. Furthermore, it has been argued that "homolo-
gy" and "analogy" can be useful only if operationally defined. Nowhere has E-E
clearly and carefully distinguished these terms. And, finally, there is the problem of
genetic influence on behavior. When an isolated bird develops normal song and
there is "no indication" as to how the sensory stimuli impinging upon it have
shaped its behavior, does it follow that therefore the behavior must be fully
encoded in the gene?
Obviously, these last are minor cavils and it should be emphasized that E-E
does a service in urging the application of ethological methods to human
behavior. He sorely needs, however, to refine those methods and the concepts
that underlie them.
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"It just depends on what one wants to know": Eibl-Eibesfeldt's Human
Ethology. E-E has compiled a substantial list of controversial issues for etholo-
gists and students of human behavior to ponder. I regard his present contribution
as a timely step toward a much needed synthesis of concepts, methods, and data
that may ultimately pinpoint the various vectors and coordinates of ethology in the
protean world of the "sciences of man." Also, I most strongly agree that the
naturalistic approaches and comparative methods of ethology, of which E-E is a
major proponent, have already made and will continue to make significant
contributions to the study of human behavior. Yet I take exception to the
defensive posture espoused by E-E in this paper, and to his undue emphasis on
concepts and data that are framed in terms of the old nature/nurture controversy.
In the comments that follow I hope to substantiate my general sense of unease
with this article, which is aptly captured in the quotation that I took from it and
elevated (admittedly quibbling) to the status of my title.
In my opinion, this article harks back to the times when the general scientific
accreditation of ethology was still very much in question (Lehrman, op. cit. 1953;
Kennedy, 1954). A mutually enriching accommodation has taken place between
the concepts and procedures of European ethology and American comparative
psychology during the quarter of a century that has elapsed since that time. After
an initial stage of predominant concern with innate and genetically programmed
aspects of behavior, human ethology too "is now moving to a position where it
begins to map the interplay between our genetic blueprint and phenotypic
flexibility, and to spot the pressures which overstretch even our exceptional
adjustability" (Tinbergen, 1976, p. 520). In the light of these new developments in
ethology, E-E's compendium of concepts, procedures, and data appears to be
too restrictive, and his arguments outdated. I have in mind especially his focus on
phylogenetically adapted behaviors defined in terms of fixed action patterns,
innate releasing mechanisms, central motor generators, and the like. But pursuing
this theme any further would do no more than restate the statement I have just
quoted from Tinbergen. Instead, I take on the task of commenting on E-E's
systematics for human ethology, and on the related concepts of biological
determination and innateness of behavior.
The idea of systematics applies to E-E's description of human ethology in two
ways: (1) in regard to his placement of ethology within a hierarchical system of
biology and its subdisciplines; and (2) in regard to the comparative structure of
concepts and data that he offers for characterizing the ethological investigation
of human behavior. Although I consider the question as to whether or not the
study of behavior necessitates reduction to the terms of biology still very much
open, I accept the utility of a primarily biological approach and shall restrict my
comments to E-E's comparative systematics.
E-E's comparative systematics is built from behavioral elements that are
amenable to nonparticipant, naturalistic observation. It is anchored in the
traditional concepts of ethology concerning the phylogenetic adaptedness of
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behavior. Its procedures are comparative evaluation and systematic ordering of
naturalistic data according to behavioral alternatives of rigidly stereotyped versus
plastic and variable, innate versus acquired, and phylogenetically preadapted
versus culturally determined. Experimentation plays a role in this system primarily
in order to illustrate a concept or anchor an observation in a concept. Thus, the
deprivation experiment is described as illustrating the innateness of stereotyped
motor patterns, and the imprinting experiment as an illustration of phylogenetic
preadaptedness in learning. There does not seem to be much room in this system
for another, more broadly used experimentation: to test (verify or reject)
paradigmatic assumptions about causation and systematic relationships by
controlled manipulation of interactive variables.
The emphasis in E-E's system is placed almost entirely on inferences and
illustrations. Yet, let there be no mistake about it, the comparative procedure
espoused by E-E is a powerful one. Darwin's use of it is the best witness, and so
is the enormous contribution ethologists have made through introducing the
method into the general structure of behavioral sciences. But there are some
elementary steps in comparative systematics which, I think, are not observed by
E-E.
Firstly, the comparative evaluation and systematic ordering of naturalistic data
must be based on an a priori assumption concerning relationships that the system
is proposed to demonstrate and test. Secondly, it must rely on a set of concepts
that are capable of weighing the goodness of fit of data with the assumed
relationships. Thirdly, it demands a tight logical coherence between concepts
such that the lack of fit of data in one area would reflect on the entire system (i.e.,
it would reject the system or pinpoint a faulty concept within it). And finally, the
identification of a faulty concept demands paradigm testing by controlled experi-
mental manipulation of the relevant empirical material and variables. A quick
survey of related steps in Darwin's work will illustrate these points.
Darwin's a priori assumption was inherent in the already prevalent ideas of
evolution (Darlington, 1959). A set of concepts relating to his new insight of
natural selection formed the basis for assessing the fit of his observations. His
concepts were so tightly knit that the lack of fit of data in a single area
undermined the entire system, forcing Darwin to engage in rearguard actions and
to fall back on explanations that contradicted his very concept of natural
selection. This is best exemplified by his argument that the various social instincts
of man evolved as a result of "natural selection aided by inherited habits"
(Darwin, 1871). It was Mendel's paradigm-testing experimentation that pinpointed
the faulty concept, the concept of blending inheritance, and thus saved Darwin's
theory of evolution via natural selection.
E-E's system of human ethology falls short of this model on several counts. It
does not specify clearly the assumptions it proposes to demonstrate and test. It
does not stress the coherence and logical continuity of concepts. And it does not
seem to have much use for the paradigm-testing experiment that would verify or
reject, as opposed to illustrating, a particular concept.
The proposal that phylogenetic adaptation influences the ontogenetic expres-
sion of behavior has already been accepted by all. The question that remains
open is "How?" The experiential deprivation and imprinting experiments cited by
E-E may demonstrate that certain responses are present in certain organisms
without prior experience of eliciting stimuli, or that some responses are learned
more readily than others. But these experiments tell us little about how an
individual's genotype may influence the complex manifestations of its behavioral
phenotype. Likewise, cross-cultural uniformity or lack of it in the expression of a
particular behavior pattern tells us nothing about its phylogenetic adaptedness, or
about the phylogenetic adaptedness of the complex behaviors within which such
a pattern may occur. To answer the question of how phylogeny may influence the
ontogeny of behavior one must turn to behavior-genetic experimentation: to
identifying units of information in the DNA code and testing their influences in the
manifestations of a behavior in particular environments and conditions of devel-
opment.
In focusing on the question "whether biological heritage has determined human
behavior to any significant degree" and proposing that it be settled by demon-
strating innate elements in human behavior, E-E has in fact placed his arguments
on the antiquated scale of the nature/nurture controversy, despite his protesta-
tions to the contrary. The nine lives of this controversy draw sustenance from a
continued fascination with two equally unserviceable ideas: (1) that man's
enormous capacity for learning and cultural evolution makes no difference with
respect to his basically animal nature and biological limitations; and (2) that man
has already freed himself from his biological heritage, and is ready to move into a
world of unlimited behavioral and cultural progress. Issues so deeply rooted in
man's image of himself will not be settled by science alone. But we can and must
demand from ourselves the utmost care in guarding against the perpetuation of
misleading interpretations and hasty inferences from incomplete data.
E-E is certainly aware of these issues. He states: "I wish to emphasize that the
whole nature/nurture issue should not be considered as a matter of either/or, nor
can the contribution of each be measured quantitatively in terms of percentages.
It is a matter of how both contribute to the development of certain characteris-
tics." But he quickly forgets his own dictum when, after stating that "what is
innate to man is not a negligible quantity, but of fundamental importance," he
proceeds to characterize such highly complex, culturally determined behaviors as
gift giving and rituals in terms of innate and learned elements.
We are told that the pattern of "eyebrow flash" would be considered by
ethologists as an Erbkoordination - an innate motor pattern. Then we are
presented with a chart of functional differences, which reveals that even this
simple behavior is quite variable, has a great variety of expressive functions, and
is embedded in complex forms of social interaction. No, we simply cannot have it
both ways! Behavior is either the joint product of an individual's genotype and
environment, or it is a concatenation of innate and learned elements where the
purely genetic and the purely environmental are discernible. But this is the point at
which the issue "it just depends on what one wants to know" comes to the fore.
It should be apparent from what I have said so far that I do not regard the
breakdown of behavior into innate and learned elements, or the crosscultural
comparison of simple motor patterns, as particularly revealing of how our
phylogenetic heritage may have influenced our behaviors in ontogeny. It may
accordingly come as a surprise that I agree with E-E on several points, including
the point that the endlessly reiterated fact of joint determination of behavior by
heredity and environment contributes nothing to solving problems of phylogenetic
adaptation. Am I then in conflict with the gist of my preceding paragraph? I do not
think so. My work has long since convinced me that a concept may sidestep
certain implications of a demonstrated fact, if by doing so it contributes to
understanding some aspects of the fact, possibly even those which were initially
sidestepped. In other words, I regard the nature/nurture tangle, including the
related contradictions in the paper presently under scrutiny, as being due entirely
to a lack of proper attention to the inherent mutuality of a concept and the
question its creator tries to answer.
Whether we approach a behavior as genetically or environmentally determined,
or as a joint product of gene and environment interactions, is entirely a function of
what we want to know about that behavior. The question of genetic determina-
tion, of "innateness" in E-E's terminology, is certainly approachable with the
axiom that, given total uniformity of the environments (past and present),
individual variations of a behavioral phenotype may be regarded as genetic in
origin. And vice versa, the question of environmental determination is approach-
able with the axiom that, given total uniformity of genotypes, all nonrandom
variations of a phenotype may be regarded as being due to environmental
influences. These axioms give access to particular genetic and environmental
determinants in the phenotypic manifestation of a behavior. They are especially
relevant to studies of the neurochemical or bioelectrical mediation of genetic and
environmental influences in a behavior. However, the questions to be answered
by experiments derived from these axioms may be restricted to small fractions of
the total genotypic or environmental influences in the manifestation of the studied
behavior.
Let us assume, for the sake of an example, that the phenotypic expression of a
behavior is influenced by 100 genes at 50 loci, and that each of 48 loci is
represented by two identical allelomorphs throughout the population. The behav-
ioral-phenotypic variations of this population would, in a uniform environment,
reflect on the activities of only 4 genes at 2 loci. This may say precious little about
the role of phylogenetic adaptedness or the totality of genetic influences in the
behavioral phenotype. For questions addressed to the latter, our best bet may
well be the deprivation experiment championed by E-E, or its simplified variant in
which the behaviors of experientially naive neonates are studied (Kovach, 1979).
In such experiments the stimulus information that elicits the behavior, and all other
environmental information that may conceivably contribute to the development of
the behavior, are excluded from experiences prior to testing. Under such
conditions, the above example of phenotypic variation would reflect the activities
of 4 genes, plus their interactions with the uniform background genotype of 96
genes, without contamination from prior experience with eliciting stimuli. This
would certainly represent a further step toward the answer to our question of
phylogenetic adaptedness.
It is in such a light that the ethological concepts of "innate behavior" and
"genetically blueprinted behavior" are useful. But they should not be treated as
independent behavioral constructs. Rather, they should be regarded as concepts
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of considerable utility in relation to what one may want specifically to know about
a behavior.
By way of further qualification, I agree with E-E that the comparative study of
analogous behaviors equals in importance the study of behavioral homology. The
large store of information ethologists have accumulated on the ways different
species manage comparable environmental demands has a lot to teach us about
the management of our own behaviors. There is far more similarity than difference
in the ecological demands and behavioral adaptations of animals and man,
especially when it comes to comparing ourselves with our primate relatives. But
here, too, as correctly emphasized by E-E, the task is to search for questions and
concepts that may be translated and tested in the context of human behavior.
by H- P. LIpp
Institute of Anatomy, University of Lausanne, CH-1011 Lausanne, Switzerland
Brain complexity enhances speed of behavioral evolution. I wish to comment
on two issues raised by E-E. They concern the phylogenetic acquisition of
neuronal structures governing "innate" behavior, and the usefulness of compara-
tive primate studies for the detection of common primate "inheritance" in man.
I am in sympathy with ethological thinking and am thus in favor of E-E's
conception that even very complex behavioral patterns may have a prepro-
grammed genetic base. I doubt, however, the value of comparative studies in
subhuman primates as far as the detection of preprogrammed behavior in man is
concerned.
Both opinions are derived from a neurobiological concept of behavioral
evolution which differs somewhat from a widespread notion among ethologists
and ethologically oriented scientists. There is a common belief that phylogeneti-
cally acquired (and thus genetically preprogrammed) behavioral patterns survive
resiliency as archetypal neuronal programs through long evolutionary periods, at
least among members of the same order (see also point 14 on phallic display in
E-E's summary). In man such programs are thought to influence human behavior,
either overtly or covertly.
I have reasons to believe that the neuronal structures governing "innate"
behavior have varying degrees of phylogenetic stability, and the more complex
the neuronal structures involved, the more quickly new behavioral programs
evolve and disappear. Thus, if any arguments are based on "common inheri-
tance" of ancestral traits, at least three questions should be elucidated, if not
answered: (1) How are new behavioral patterns phylogenetically acquired? (2)
How stable are they during evolution? and (3) How resistant are they to
ontogenetic modification? I propose first a simplified concept of CNS and
behavior, and then possible answers to questions (1) and (2).
Jerison's "miniature nervous systems" in ethological terms. Jerison's concept
(1976) of cerebral evolution based on the progressing combination of "miniature
nervous systems" can, without undue strain, be translated into ethological terms.
Peripheral sensory organs and peripheral sensory analysis appear rather similar
across mammalian species. The same seems true for the organization of basic
motor and vegetative patterns (for example, extensor tonus and penile erection).
The underlying neuronal systems (not necessarily simply wired) may thus be
conceived as the modal units of behavioral evolution [see Kupfermann & Weiss:
"The Command Neuron Concept" BBS 1(1) 1978]. Varying interconnections
between such modules formed by specific neuronal populations could create a
variety of sensory and motor "subroutines" which might well be equivalent to
innate releasing mechanisms (IRMs) or fixed action patterns (FAPs). Central
neuronal populations may match and coordinate selected modules and "subrou-
tines," according to environmental and physiological parameters. Such neuronal
populations are commonly referred to as "motivational" systems. There is fair
evidence that such systems really exist. Electrical stimulation of the hypothalamus
elicits species-typical patterns which show high contextual variability in patterning
as well as modifiability by sensory and motivational factors (for example, see Lipp
and Hunsperger, 1978): it seems unlikely that such a crude nonspecific stimulus
could produce all the observed effects. There is, in addition, some evidence that
such specific coordination systems maintain a tonic activity, which counterbal-
ances the activity of other systems (Fonberg, 1967), as has been postulated by
von Hoist and St. Paul (1960). Neuroanatomically, they seem to occupy most
parts of the limbic system (in its broadest sense), and are functionally linked to
striatal and extrapyramidal neuronal circuitry. Evidently these systems possess
extensive neuronal connections.
How are new behavioral patterns acquired during evolution? I shall argue that
this concept of a limited number of central coordinating systems "playing" on
various sensory, motor, and vegetative modules and "subroutines" implies the
following conclusion: The key-mechanisms for the evolution of behavior are those
that govern the correct development of fiber connections between neuronal
populations forming the various modules and coordination systems. It is clear that
the ontogenetic development of the brain depends not only on fiber growth, but
also on many other factors such as cell proliferation, cell death, and synapse
formation (see Van der Loos, 1976), but these factors will be omitted for
simplicity. Clearly, a variety of new patterns and new releasing mechanisms could
be created by connecting basic modules in different ways. Changing fiber
connections between the coordination systems could give rise to new associa-
tions of species-specific patterns and releasing stimuli.
Suppose, for example, that a hypothetical ancestral mammal is already
equipped with neuronal networks mediating food intake (scanning, locomotion,
food intake, all accompanied by pleasurable feelings) and defensive aggression
(snapping elicited by painful stimuli). If, during ontogenetic development, a
number of collateral fibers sprouted from the medial forebrain bundle into the
adjacent intermediate zone of the hypothalamus, this could create a pattern of
scanning, locomotion, and reinforced snapping. The new pattern combination
could serve as an evolutionary base for predatory or territorial behavior. The
fiber-sprouting could simply be caused by mutagenic failure of cholinergic fibers
to reach their preprogrammed region (for such possibilities, see Reis et al.,
1978).
Which innate patterns are stable during evolution? The tremendous complexity
and precision of neuronal connections within a mammalian brain might suggest a
highly rigid genetic pregrogramming in order to avoid mismatches (Sperry, op.
cit, 1971). However, Jacobson (1978, pp. 348-350), recognizes differences in
developmental rigidity. Determination is extremely rigid in systems with little
tolerance for mutagenic malfunction, but less precise in systems capable of
compensating for such malfunction. I suggest that basic modules of behavioral
organization will have a highly rigid genetic determination, since they are essential
for the proper functioning of the more complex systems. Mutations concerning
the development of basic modules are thus not likely to survive in the gene pool of
a population, and this may explain their relative uniformity across mammalian
species. Mutations affecting the "wiring-programs" building up FAPs and IRMs
may not immediately threaten the life of an individual, but they may severely
handicap reproduction. Thus these genetic programs should be fairly rigid within
a particular species, at least for those FAPs and IRMs that are subject to selective
pressures.
Probably the least rigid genetic determination ("macro-heterogeneity" sensu
Jacobson) will be found in the "wiring-genes" which program the formation of
neuronal connections within and between motivational systems. Owing to their
complex interconnections, motivational systems undoubtedly have great power
for compensating malfunctions (as is indicated by countless lesion studies).
Affected animals may in most cases reproduce, and it is likely, therefore, that a
great number of mutated "wiring-genes" responsible for motivational structures
will survive in the gene pool of a population. This is supported by the observation
that wild animal populations show considerable variation of emotional traits.
Further confirmation stems from behavioral genetics: many inbred (nonpathologi-
cal) mouse strains show behavioral and physiological characteristics related to
limbic structures (Cardo, 1978). Even strong selection for learning abilities in rats
results in strains with profound motivational differences (Lipp, forthcoming).
Thus, it is possible to conclude that the more complex the brain of a
mammalian species, the more likely it is that new wiring patterns within and
between central coordinating systems will emerge. Selective pressure will shape
new genetically preprogrammed sets of behavioral patterns, with their accompa-
nying emotional attributes and IRMs, and these will spread through a population
during a short evolutionary period. Should the selective pressure vanish, the new
patterns would be likely to disappear again within a short evolutionary time span.
The phylogenetically more stable "subroutines," and especially the basic
modules, would persist, perhaps becoming integrated in to newly formed complex
systems. The more complex these systems, the greater the individual variability
and modifiability.
by Ashley Montagu
Department of Anthropology, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. 08540
"Instincts," infants, adults, and behavior. Let me begin first by saying that by
"human" I understand the functioning of all those traits that distinctively charac-
terize the members of the species Homo sapiens. I take this to mean that all
species-specific human behavior must be learned from other humans. This does
not mean that, as E-E elsewhere has me say, except for a few reflexes of the
newborn, "nothing" is inborn in man (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1972). Such a statement
would, of course, be utter nonsense. If nothing were inborn in man he would be
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nothing, indeed, nonexistent. Truth will not be advanced by misquotation or
misrepresentation.
I will pass over E-E's comments on believers in the tabula rasa myth, for I know
of no such believers in the behavioral sciences. If E-E knows of any, I wish he
would name them.
Can we not agree upon the basic simple fact that all humans are morphologi-
cally and behaviorally the product of the interaction between genes and environ-
ment; that heredity is not what is laid down in the genes, but constitutes the
resultant of the interaction between genes and their environments?
If we can agree upon these elementary points then, surely, it becomes
generally incorrect to speak of genes as "determining" anything. I do not think it
can be too often emphasized that what genes do is to influence, not determine,
the physiological, morphological, and behavioral development of traits.
Whether empirically demonstrable or not, it is clear that there must exist
genetically based potentialities for many forms of human behavior. I do not know
what the character of those potentialities is, nor do I think that anyone else does.
It is for that reason that I am wary of such terms as "instincts," "innate,"
"blueprints," "programs," "biograms," "wiring," "circuits," "energies," and the
like. High walls may not a prison make but stereotypic terms do. And, as Goethe
remarked, where an idea is wanting a word can always be found to take its place.
Apart from the ambiguity and fogginess of such terms they all, more or less, beg
the question; as such they constellate ahead of the evidence, and constitute
impediments to clear thinking and much-needed inquiry. Even such terms as
"disposition" or "predisposition" are of doubtful utility since they may be too
loosely employed. I prefer "potentialities," a term which seems to me to be
relatively neutral, that is to say, not assuming or implying more than we know.
"Instinct," which implies preprogramming, a fixed action pattern, I find difficult
to accept for any form of human behavior, with the possible exception of a few
transitory infant reactions. E-E states that he will show that it is "basically
incorrect to claim that "human behavior is entirely instinctless," or that "if human
beings ever had any remnants of instincts to begin with, they would have lost
them."
But E-E does nothing of the sort. All the examples he cites of "instinctive" or
"innate" behavior are drawn from observations on infants. But in all the instances
cited, can E-E be quite certain that there has not been some prenatal learning?
We do have evidence that the human fetus is capable of learning (Spelt, 1948).
Whatever their genetic substrates, the reactions cited by E-E do not in many
individuals persist into later life unless they are encouraged to do so. Will E-E
supply examples of instinctive behavior that stereotypically occur in all humans?
As for fear of strangers, I do not believe that this is a universal trait. The manner
in which Australian aborigines, Eskimos, Polynesians, American Indians, and
other peoples welcomed whites when they first met them is a matter of history.
The most notable record of such an encounter is perhaps the famous Columbus
Letter in which Columbus gives an account of the hospitality with which he and his
men were received by the aborigines, "a loving uncovetous people, so docile in
all things that there is no better people or country. . . . They loved their neighbors
as themselves . . ." (Newhall, 1953, p. 8).
I question the statement that "Stranger avoidance has led man to live through
most of his history in small, fairly close groups, where all know one another," or
that "this is an innate disposition of fundamental importance." Throughout the
millions of years of human evolution during which humans lived as gatherer-
hunters, the optimum supportable population size was between thirty and fifty
people to a band. To judge from existing gatherer-hunter groups, anything larger
than this puts an economic and social strain on the members of the group. Such
bands are not "fairly closed groups," as E-E should know, for he has worked
among the Kalahari Bushmen who maintain friendly relations with other Bushmen
bands, marry into them, and make quite long visits with them (Heinz and Lee,
1979). I do not believe that there is any evidence that human beings, except
possibly some infants, have an unconditioned innate fear of strangers.
May I, in conclusion, say that I share with E-E the hope that, even if the
academic millennium of total harmony is never reached, we may soon achieve a
closer approximation to that understanding we seek concerning the nature of
human nature.
by Steven A» Peterson
Division of Social Sciences, Alfred University, Alfred, N.Y. 14802
On human ethology: some methodological comments. In his target article E-E
makes several noteworthy contributions. First and foremost, he delineates clearly
the application of classical ethology to the study of man. This is hardly an
innovation, of course, since others have trod the same ground before. However,
this essay contains a concise summary of that approach, with examples of data
supportive of the thesis that one can profitably look at man's behavior from an
ethological perspective. Second, the author includes in the work some empirical
support for his arguments, although one might disagree with the interpretations
given. This is a delightful change from the ancedotal approach which one often
encounters. Third, one can only admire the effort to obtain solid cross-cultural
data on behavior. The use of photography is potentially valuable, although we
note some difficulties below. Finally, the author acknowledges "man's ability for
self-control," a statement that one occasionally finds omitted from ventures in
human ethology. These contributions stated, let us now turn to a consideration of
some difficulties with the analysis.
(1) There is a sampling problem inherent in the work. E-E often refers to
"universals" in human behavior. However, it is not clear on what basis these
universals are derived. Filming a limited number of societies (the nature of the
total sample, by the way, should be clearly specified, at least in a footnote)
cannot really support assertions about universality. There appear to be relatively
few societies filmed. I do not wish to imply that because of this there are no
universals - merely that there are no data presented to bolster this assertion.
Much work in human ethology is based on contentions of universality. However,
investigators seldom invest serious effort into actually demonstrating this. If one
wishes to determine, through photography, the existence of basic continuities
across cultures at different levels of sociocultural integration, one should at least
employ a probability sampling method.
(2) There may be an ethical issue involved in the author's use of photography.
He notes that one element in his method is "filming people, without their
knowledge." I do not consider this a major point, but I think that it should be
addressed.
(3) The author seems to confuse hypothesis-generation with empirical testing
of hypotheses. There are many conclusions throughout the paper that a particular
human behavior reflects an "innate" propensity.1 These do not seem to be
directly tested, however. Eyebrow flashes and kisses may, in fact, be genetically
influenced patterns of behavior, examples of Erbkoordination. However, E-E
demonstrates only that such interpretations are plausible hypotheses. There is no
direct test of these propositions. There is a broader issue here, namely, what are
the criteria for acceptable explanation of behavior in human ethology? De minimis,
it would seem that four basic questions would have to be answered: (i) What is
the phylogeny of the behavior? (ii) What is the ontogeny of the behavior? (iii) What
is the survival value of the behavior? (iv) What are the mechanisms underlying the
behavior? (Cf. Tinbergen, 1963. For a discussion of an application to human
political ethology, see Peterson, 1978). The first criterion is extremely hard to
meet, although one can derive information from cross-species comparison and
the human fossil record. However, this can only yield inferences, although these
may be fairly strong. The ontogeny of behavior and the mechanisms underlying it
are more amenable to study. Survival value, on the other hand, seems bound to
remain inferential (although, once more, inferences may be strong). E-E, in this
essay, does not really address all of these issues with respect to such posited
universals as eyebrow flashing or kissing.
(4) Closely related to the preceding, there is no strong evidence that the
homologies that E-E detects are really homologies. Often, as with kissing, they
remain assertions. These assertions may be reasonable and correct, but we are
given no strong reason for believing them.
(5) One basic method in E-E's agenda for human ethology is cross-species
comparison. This is a perfectly legitimate enterprise, but one that is fraught with
more peril than the author acknowledges. For example, valid comparison
demands valid data from the different species being compared. Although
ethological studies are impressive, there remain some problems that should be
noted, such as sampling (how adequate are the animals or groups of animals as
representative of the species-as-a-whole?), measurement (is the ethologist
actually measuring what he thinks is being measured?), and recording (are all
significant, appropriate, and relevant data being recorded?). Furthermore, estab-
lishing generalizations about human behavior across cultures is more trouble-
some than is often recognized. Again, we face the three problems just mentioned:
sampling, measurement, and recording. Once we have answered these ques-
tions, we must then demonstrate clearly that the behaviors across species are
really comparable. The basic question is this: What are the criteria for compa-
rability (cf. Peterson, 1978; Peterson and Somit, 1978)? The issues in this
paragraph may seem tedious and trivial, but if our explanations based upon
comparison are to be adequate, they must be satisfactorily addressed.
(6) Finally, we must acknowledge the ubiquitous question of culture's role.
This comment is one that I make with some hesitation, because E-E does note the
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issue and because it seems to represent in many minds a knee-jerk response to
efforts at biological analyses of man. I think, however, that E-E may devote too
little attention to culture as a part of human ethology. The determination of what is
"innate" in man is rendered quite troublesome because of man's development of
language and culture. Some social scientists even speak of a "social construction
of reality" as a result of these two intertwined notions (see, for instance, Berger
and Luckmann, 1966). Campbell argues that cultural behavior may have become
emancipated from genetic control (Campbell, 1975; see also Dawkins, op. cit,
1976). We do not deny the fact that human cultural abilities are related to human
biology. Nonetheless, the proposed program for a human ethology must address
seriously such contentions as are raised by Campbell and others. Despite this
critical comment, I think that E-E warrants some credit, since he faces the issue
more clearly than others (see, for example, Wilson's disappointingly limp On
human nature, 1978, a work which makes one suspect that there may be some
merit in critics' suggestions that the author should have remained content
studying insects).
Summary. In fine, we believe that E-E's essay performs a useful service for the
scholarly community interested in human ethology. He summarizes the classical
ethological approach toward human behavior, adduces some types of empirical
support consistent with that approach (which, at a minimum, makes clearer to the
reader the nature of that perspective), essays a data-based approach to deriving
cross-cultural generalizations, and correctly notes the role of the culture and
learning in Homo sapiens. On the other hand, we find certain points which warrant
critical comment. These include the sampling issue, a possible ethical issue in
unobtrusively photographing natural behavior in human societies, a confusion
between hypothesis-testing and hypothesis-generation, lack of evidence for
posited homologies between man and other animals, basic difficulties with the
comparative method and, perhaps, and underestimation of man's "social
construction of reality" through the medium of language and culture. Hopefully,
the type of dialogue reported in this BBS treatment - article, commentaries, and
response - will advance the biological study of man.
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NOTES
I might add, parenthetically, that E-E forcefully addresses the generally
accepted "interactionist" developmental approach. This serves to remind the
reader that the nature/nurture dispute continues to remain at issue, although in
ever more subtle incarnations. For the standard developmental arguments, see
Lehrman, op cit., 1953, 1970.
by Glendon Schubert*
Nederlands Instituut voor Voortgezet Wetenschappelijk Ondersoek op het Gebied
van de Mens- en Maatschappijwetenschappen, Meyboomlaan 1, Wassennar
2242PR, Holland; and University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822 (on
leave)
Classical Ethology: concepts and implications for human ethology. If
Friedrich Engels had written an article on "Marxism - Concepts and Implications
for the Social Sciences," which somehow (like Mendel's records of his experi-
ments) came to light only after decades of cryptic storage and was then
published in some journal of open peer commentary like Current Anthropology,
the effect would surely be sensational. Historians of ideas would have a field day,
together, of course, with radicals from various of the social sciences (for whom
the event would take on the significance of the Second Coming). On the other
hand, it would have no effect whatsoever upon the current rulers of such
countries as the U.S.S.R., the People's Republic of China, and Cuba; or their
respective subject peoples. But social scientists who are neither historians nor
ideologues would find more perplexing the task of commenting, from the
perspectives of contemporary theory and methodology, upon Engles's prescrip-
tions. A social-scientist/human-ethologist, confronted with the paper that E-E has
written, finds himself in a somewhat similar position.
E-E is internationally known and respected for his prolific writing, both
professional and popular, concerning nonverbal communication among primitive
and sensorily deprived humans as well as the expression of emotions in
contemporary human societies. He is the leading student and associate of
Konard Lorenz, the founding father of classical ethology; and he is the author of a
leading undergraduate textbook on ethology, published in English by an American
publisher. One turns to his article expecting to learn much from what he has to say
about the theory and promise, for the life sciences, of ethological approaches to
the study of human behavior. But the reader soon discovers that this article has
little new to say; much that it does say seems appropriately directed to some
other and less professional audience; and many of its figures have been
published and discussed many times before (e.g., Table 1 and Figs 9-11, 13:
Hass, 1972; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1972, 1975b op. cit.)
The first part of my commentary will examine E-E's assertions, and discuss the
extent to which this article rehashes both ideas and data that have long since
passed into the public domain, at least for the readership of this journal. The
remaining three parts of my commentary will discuss: the relationship between
ethology and experimental psychology; that between ethology and sociobiology;
and in conclusion that between ethology and ethnology.
Stonewalling straw men. Virtually all of the introductory sections of the article
fall in the straw man category, together with much that follows. It is most unlikely,
for example, that "Whether the concepts of phylogeny, selection, and inheritance
are applicable to human behavior . . . is still a matter of considerable controver-
sy" for readers interested in the behavioral and brain sciences, which the Editor
has associated with the fields of "psychology, neuroscience, behavioral biology,
or cognitive science." Perhaps E-E could provoke a debate at this level of
distraction among readers of Current Anthropology, American Sociological
Review, or Psychology Today; and there is indication that he is confused about
his intended readership, because the title of his article directs his remarks to "The
Sciences of Man" -which this journal's first Editorial (BBS 1(1) p. 1), material,
and Call for Papers have explicitly identified with CA rather than BBS. Anyhow,
E-E's article is replete with similar rhetoric, such as the claim that "one of [human
ethology's] principal questions is whether biological heritage has determined
human behavior to any significant degree"; whereas, one ought to presume that
the relevant questions for the behavioral and brain sciences, as distinguished
from at least substantial parts of the sciences of man, and not whether, but rather
how, why, and by means of what processes of developmental interaction. The
same point is repeated in the Summary (sec. 7.4), although some might question
whether "genetic" determinism is synonymous with "biological." But even if the
author were right about his audience, he seems to underestimate the extent of
sophistication about evolutionary theory - even in such relatively retarded life
sciences as political science (White, 1972; Masters, 1975; Somit, 1976) - that
has emerged in phase with the preceding decade and a half which E-E concedes
to the "formal" study of human ethology.
It is surprising to encounter, in the discussion of environmentalistic ideology (as
restated in the concluding Summary, sec. 7.19) the argument that "strict cultural
relativism may lead to ethnocentric political strategies." It is the conviction of
many scientists of man that it was the proponents of biological determinism in the
form of racial eugenics who, well within the memory of many still-living survivors,
became conspicuous for both the promotion and the execution of ethnocentric
political strategies; although, of course, the same sort of thing can be said about
American treatment of blacks, tribal genocide among blacks in half of the
countries of Africa today, and so on throughout the world and (so far as we know)
throughout human history in recent millenia (see Harris op. cit, 1977). To the
extent that we understand such matters scientifically, it is because of - not in
spite of - cultural relativism. The usual understanding is that cultural relativism has
debunked ethnocentric political strategies, not fomented them.
There must be very few human ethologists today who would deem it necessary
either to rebut Ashley Montagu or to defend - to say nothing of building directly
upon - Lorenz (see Blurton-Jones, 1976; Travis et al., 1977). Montagu continues
to maintain the beneficence of innate human nonagression just as Ardrey
continues to argue the opposite; but much of their debate is at the level of public
rather than of scientific interest. A focus upon the critique of Wilson by his
colleagues Lewontin and Herrnstein, or of Trivers by Sahlins, might not be any
more enlightening [see Sahlins, 1976; Caplan, 1978; Gregory & Silvers, 1978]; but
at least it would better illustrate the cutting edge of debate concerning the
. interactive effects of phylogeny and environment in the course of human
development. An example of contemporary discussion is provided by the "forum"
of the current issue of Human Ethology Newsletter, which includes three such
articles, all on the sociobiology of human sexuality, by Daly and Wilson (1978),
Travis (1978), and Barkow (1978). The announced topics for the next two issues
are: methodology for studying human adaptation (January 1979); and the
relevance of modern hunter-gatherers to the evolution of human behavior,
particularly from the points of view of theory and methodology (March 1979). But
in E-E's article here, sociobiology appears only as the last three paragraphs of his
"Discussion"; it is such an afterthought that it is neither anticipated by any of the
preceding data, nor does it get summarized: sec. 7.20 is conspicuous by its
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absence, and so are considerations of or references to most of the contempo-
rary protagonists and antagonists of sociobiology. The more one reads E-E's
article, the more the conviction grows that probably its principal difficulty is that
the time is now out of joint; its publication comes at least a decade too late.
In order to examine that hypothesis on a less intuitive basis, I undertook to
compare the bibliography of E-E's article with an alternative and putatively
representative collection of contemporary research in human ethology. The
current issue of Human Ethology Newsletter (No. 23, October 1978, p. 2) refers to
"Human Ethology Abstracts" of which two of three parts have been published so
far. The first part was readily accessible, so I used that. E-E is listed in the same
column of the same page of the Newsletter as a member of the executive board
of the International Society for Human Ethology, as the organization publishing the
newsletter recently had decided to redesignate itself.
The 134 references of Eibl's article are apportioned, roughly by decades, as
follows: 78 for 1968-78, 34 earlier during the sixties, 10 during the fifties, 4 during
the thirties, and a couple of others before that. The year 1968 is the mean for
citations during the past half century, so the works cited are about a decade old
on the average, even though a majority of them are less than that. A virtually
identical total of 133 of the annotated "Human Ethology Abstracts" (Travis et al.,
1977) are works published during the decade 1968-77; four others fall in the
preceding decade, and nineteen are references to undated manuscripts. The
average age of these references is five rather than ten years, so they are
somewhat more contemporary as research literature.
The scope of human ethology is twice defined by E-E to be congruent with
"biological research," to wit: "morphology, ecology, genetics, phylogenetics,
developmental biology, sociobiology, and physiology." The Abstracts classify
items under rather different concepts: general human ethology (theory and
methods, general reference, group formation and mating strategies, sex differ-
ences); agression and altruism (aggression, altruism, and cooperation); children
and infants (neonate behavior, attachment and separation, attention and cogni-
tion, general behavior, play and peer interaction); communication (vocalization
and language, the face, gesture, and posture); and social spacing (personal
space, social distance, environmental design). Even though "biology" concep-
tualizes human behavior rather differently than does "human ethology," there
appears to be no obvious reason why both systems could not be used to classify
similar sets of "references on human ethology." But that is clearly not what
happened: of the 157 items listed by the Abstracts, only five appear among the
134 references to E-E's article; and of those five, two are to works authored
either by E-E himself (op. cit,, 1974), or else by persons associated with his own
research institute (Pitcairn and Schleidt, op. cit, 1976). The other three works,
appearing in both bibliographies, include: Wilson (op. cit, 1975), Blurton-Jones
(op. cit., 1972), and McGrew (op. cit., 1972). This is hardly impressive evidence
that the two bibliographies purport to deal with the same subject.1 I shall now turn
to the very good reasons why they do in fact deal with quite different subjects.
Ethology and experimental psychology. One difficulty lies in the disciplinary
chauvinism supporting the educational systems out of which classical ethology
developed (see Presthus, 1977; H. T. Wilson, 1977) and which still tends to
characterize the thinking of its remaining spokesmen. Classical ethology was
(and to a large extent still is) a naturalistic activity pursued by persons trained as
zoologists, who do their own experimental work and engage in relatively little
collaboration with experimental psychologists. In the United States, to the
contrary, such organizations as the Animal Behavior Society (ABS) and the
American Society for Primatologists are much more equally divided between
zoologists and comparative psychologists (among other supporting disciplinary
components) and the representatives of both groups are accustomed to a
symbiotic relationship very different from what is found in continental Western
Europe. The United Kingdom is somewhere in between, as symbolized by the
subtitle of Hinde's textbook (1970); and it has been more to the U.K. than to the
U.S. that continental ethology has turned. Human ethologists are organized
neither on the continent nor in the U.K.; but they have been for at least five years
in the U.S., piggybacking the annual meetings of ABS.
Probably it is innocence of what American human ethology involves that
explains the prominence E-E gives to such putative goals as "to bridge the gulf
between ethologists and opposing [sic] groups of behavioral scientists." But this
article frequently manifests a barely repressed fear of experimental psychologist
strangers (such as Tobach and Eisenberg); as Charlie Brown says, "We have
met the enemy and he is us."
Rapprochement is not likely to be facilitated by the persistence of classical
ethologists in the use of theory, methods, and concepts that are idiosyncratic and
that have long since been given up or greatly modified (and always in the direction
of indeterrninancy and flexibility) by an intervening generation of students of
animal behavior. The Lorenzian hydraulic model of animal motivation discussed
by E-E, for example, is treated as a relic in modern textbooks on animal behavior
(Hinde 1970, pp. 201-202; Beer, 1973, p. 34; Alcock, 1975, pp. 189-191;
Mortenson, 1975, pp. 41-42, describes it as the "flush-toilet model," and
portrays a figure of it [see Figure 1] and Dawkirs, 1976, p. 8, includes it in his
assertion of "the general, deserved destruction of simplistic energy models").
Concepts of fixed action patterns, innate releasing mechanisms, drives, and
releasers are too rooted in Newtonian mechanics (see Landau, 1965) to be useful
in guiding contemporary research (Hinde, 1970, pp. 21, 121-213; Beer, 1973, pp.
37-38: "The hierarchy theory . . . was the culmination of the development of
theory at the heart of classical ethology. . . . Later thought and study questioned
and tested the assumptions and implications of the theory, and in so doing carried
ethology from its classical period into a period in which theoretical unity gave way
to differentiation in theoretical interests and in research"; Mortenson, 1975, pp.
41-43). At least this is true in the study of mammals; and it is worth remembering
that the animals with which both Lorenz and Tinbergen (as well as most of their
students) worked primarily were either fish or birds, whereas the thrust of interest
in recent animal research in the U.S. has been in mammals, for which the early
ethologica! research apparatus was not designed. Even at the level of stickleback
courtship discussed by E-E, it is by no means evident that it makes the slightest
difference whether it is stated that the male's zigzag course through the water
("courting dance") releases or that it stimulates presenting behavior on the part
of the female conspecific - except that "stimulates" articulates with a very much
larger corpus of research on human behavior, while "releases" does not.
Imprinting, perhaps the best-known concept of classical ethology, is now
understood to be very much more complex and subject to many more qualifica-
tions than could have been realized at the time Lorenz reported his early
observations [see Rajecki et al. Toward a General Theory of Infantile Attachment
BBS 1(3) 1978]. It is one thing to find "imprinted" goslings waddling after Lorenz,
or even jackdaws trying to feed him warm minced worms; it is quite another to
hypothesize that a prenatal human imprints on the mother's heartbeat. Everything
that we know about the phylogeny of humans ought to impel us to anticipate a
great deal more flexibility in perception and response alike than has evolved in the
behavior repertoires of either geese or jackdaws. The latter, incidentally, are
animals whose social behavior I have investigated at first hand (see Roell, 1978).
Many of these differences in human flexibility are discussed in a paper by
Blurton-Jones (1976) which is also on the subject of the implications of ethology
for social science, but in which Lorenz is neither mentioned nor cited.
E-E's emphasis upon animal "drives" is the wrong way to establish ties for or
with human ethology; it would be much easier to link up with more of the life
sciences if the concept of "needs" were substituted. It then immediately
becomes necessary to reconsider E-E's remark that "The formal application of
ethological methods to the study of man began about fifteen years ago." That
statement may hold for Lorenzian ethology; but there are certainly many
instances of earlier beginnings in human ethology. Tomkins (1962) was reporting
at international congresses his theory of human facial nonverbal communication,
a decade before then; Bowlby (1958) was discussing ethological approaches to
attachment behavior; and various amateur primatologists (Marais, 1934) and
humanist precursors (Day, 1920) were much earlier in discussing animal models
of human behavior. Most important was Maslow (1954) who, trained as a
primatologist, had formulated his theory of human needs as early as 1943: his
influence has spread beyond psychology to include many social biologists (see
Corning, 1977; Davies, 1977).
Human ethograms. E-E's assertion that "there exists a universal 'grammar' of
human social behavior" suggests a dubious way to conceptualize the basis for a
theory of human (and probably also most other forms of mammalian) social
behavior. How dubious, is exemplified by the basic primate political biogrammar
proposed by Tiger and Fox (1971, p. 32) as a model for for human political
behavior. Grammars constitute systematic analyses of the structure and function-
ing of communication systems, especially natural languages; and however
important communication is to social interaction, and vice versa, they are by no
means the same thing (see Burke, 1945). Dawkins (1976, pp. 43-47, esp. p. 46)
has provided an elegant discussion of grammatical models, with analysis of some
of the problems involved in biogrammars, concluding that: "The problem is this. In
the case of human language the criterion for grammatical correctness is the
judgment of a native speaker of the language. In the case of animal behaviour
'correct' and 'incorrect' have no such meaning."
Sociobiology represents a type of grammar, at least in the guise of the models
of population and behavior genetics applied to humans, and as understood by its
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most vociferous opponents (The Ann Arbor Science for the People Editorial
Collective, 1977). The Hamilton-Trivers-Dawkins grammar of hard-core sociobi-
ology specifies how rational actors will behave if they are to maximize their
individual genetic contributions to the survival basis of their species. But sociobi-
ology also has a more general and omnivorous form, as synthesized by Wilson
[q.v.j, who is said to speak openly and often about the "cannibalization" of other
disciplines (including the social sciences) that are to be subsumed under the
aegis and imprimatur of a dominant (if not rampant) supersociobiology. Such
excesses indeed invite retorts such as E-E's that "the new field of sociobiology
has certainly justified its own existence as a part of ethology." But aside from tit
for tat, E-E's comment is simply wrong and misleading. Evolutionary biologists,
population geneticists, behavioral geneticists, and others who have contributed -
also, pretty much, during the past fifteen years - to the postulation of the
hypotheses associated with hard-core sociobiology certainly have not been a
"part of ethology" in the past; and E-E is the first to suggest that their work should
be so classified in the future. It seems more likely that ethologists, including
human ethologists (Daly and Wilson, 1978; Travis, 1978; Barkow, 1978), may well
be involved for some time to come, together with experimental psychologists,
primatologists, and many other life scientists, in attempts to test empirically the
hypotheses of sociobiology.
By chance (see Aubert, 1959), one of the many ongoing real-world experi-
ments in alternative life styles has recently provided some negative evidence
bearing upon certain of E-E's sociobiological speculations, with particular regard
to Trivers's (1971) most basic hard-core propositions about altruism. Suicide may
indeed be the ultimate form of altruism; and E-E is probably right that typically in
hunter-gatherer bands the populations consisted of "fairly closely related individ-
uals, so that investment [in suicide] should pay off [in terms of genetic 'inclusive
fitness'] for any group member and not just for immediate kin." But in the
largest-scale and best-documented report of mass suicide in recent human
history, the population members, although otherwise conforming to the size scale
and at least some of the other criteria for neolithic horticulturists, were all
unrelated genetically except at the level of nuclear family groups, of which many
were mother-infant combinations. Jonestown indeed testifies to what E-E terms
Figure 1. (Schubert). Lorenz's hydromechanical model for motivation. Tap T:
action-specific energy; Reservoir R: available energy; Valve V: releasing
mechanism; Spring S: higher sensory inhibition; Scale pan Sp: releasing stimu-
lus; Gauge G: intensity of response; Trough Tr: sequence intensity. (From
Lorenz, 1950, p. 255-6; reproduced with permission of Society for Experimen-
tal Biology.)
"man's astonishing ability to identify with his larger group (band, village, people)
to the extent of self-sacrifice." Unfortunately for Trivers's theory, the motives of
the deceased had to be strictly cultural: they died for social and ideological
reasons, not for their genes. From a cultural point of view, they were an
aggregation of poorly adapted and relatively unfit persons who, from a genetic
point of view, took the action best designed to assure the minimization of their
inclusive fitness, both individually and collectively.
Human ethnograms. It may well be that "ethologists prefer nonparticipant
observation techniques in the natural setting," but where in the world are they
going to be able to indulge such preferences? A mirror-lens camera may be
perceived, by primitives unsophisticated about cameras, to be less intrusive than
cameras that are aimed at them (Hass, 1972, chap. 7: "A Voyage of Self-
Exploration," describes how the photos were taken); but a primatologist who
attaches himself to a band of nonhuman primates is engaged in participant
observation, just as surely as Max Gluckman (1955) was a participant in the
council of indunas when he sat in on their deliberations, while explorating legal
ethnography during the colonial era in what is now Zambia.
Still, there is no doubt of the value, at least to ethnologists, of E-E's recurring
global expeditions during the past couple of decades to undertake filming of NVC
(nonverbal communicative) behavior sequences, of the surviving remnants of
various scattered hunter-gatherer bands that have been "side-tracked into a
cultural blind alley" (as Morris, op. cit., 1968, p. 10, has described them). They
are evolutionary losers only in the genetic sense of inclusive fitness; from the
perspectives of group and kin selection, they have usually been very well
adapted, which leads most ethnographers to object vehemently to their charac-
terization by Morris. But the question still remains as to how much more value
such film records have than, say, the surviving prints of Fitzpatrick travelogues, as
contributions to the theory and method of human ethology.
It seems apparent that E-E visited his primitive subjects with various hypo-
theses about nonverbal communication (NVC) in mind; or, as he might prefer to
put it, with mental templates of the fixed action patterns (FAPs) that he hoped to
release for purposes of his photography, the task of which was to record on film
what he perceived to be acceptable examples of the occurrence of such
FAP-NVC behaviors in the subject populations. But the same behaviors may have
been associated with different social contexts; other social situations may have
produced the same behaviors; or the same social situations may not have
produced the target behavior on other occasions. The problem is that even if he
did undertake to film (as Fitzpatrick might well, however inadvertently, have done)
the - no doubt long - stretches of facial and gestural communication when
nothing relevant was being signalled, such data are neither analyzed nor
discussed in his reports of the behavior. Instead of evidence pro and con, we are
offered examples of good behavior - or what amounts to the same thing, good
examples of the behavior. Hence the nominal objects of his observation,
"unstaged social interaction" as he calls it, must be qualified by the phrase
"highly selective" for purposes of recording, or at least those of publication. The
quest for data not inconsistent with an hypothesis may produce data that
exemplify the theory; but they cannot help in the more mundane - but also
scientifically crucial - task of assisting in the endeavor to refute the hypothesis if
possible.
Are the resulting film images better classified as ethograms or as ethnograms?
Certainly the task to which E-E aspires (sec. 7.2) of trying "to understand the
evolution and functional aspects of cultural patterns, in the perspective of their
contribution to overall fitness" is one that is ordinarily undertaken by social
anthropologists, and hence, in the ordinary understanding of the words, consti-
tutes the practice of ethnography rather than ethology.
NOTE
0
 Author's Response will appear in Continuing Commentary.
1. The second part of the "Human Ethology Abstracts " (Travis, 1977) is an
annotated bibliography of 222 items, almost entirely from the seventies, of
which precisely one (Ashley Montagu's Man and Aggression, 1973 ed.) appears
also among E-E's references, cited in an earlier edition (op. cit., 1968).
by Pierre L. van den Berghe
University of Washington, Department of Sociology, Seattle, Wash. 98195
Ethology versus sociobiology: competitive displays. E-E's paper confirms my
conviction that the social sciences are on the threshold of an exciting new era.
Several lines of inquiry, ranging from biochemistry to ethology, have transformed
the exclusive cultural-determinist credo of the social sciences into a veritable
theoretical sieve. The doctrine now holds no more water than the creationist view
46 THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1979), 1
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00060611
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:53:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Commentary/Eibl-Eibesfeldt: Human ethology
of evolution. The only general explanation of behavior that "works" as a scientific
theory is the Neo-Darwinian synthesis, a model based on the interaction of genes
and environment. It is equally clear that, for humans, culture (including symbolic
language) increasingly constitutes an extremely important (but not a//-important)
part of the environment. Culture may be defined as the man-made part of the
environment; its inheritance is Lamarckian, to be sure, but the capacity for it grew
out of a process of Darwinian selection and continues to be linked to it.
A social science divorced from biology is becoming as unthinkable and as
absurd as biology without chemistry. There is simply no intelligent argument
possible any more over whether genes influence human behavior; now it is only a
question of establishing in what ways and with what degree of determinacy. Let us
hope that all the archaic nature/nurture debates are buried for good. We are (or
at least should be) in the business of explaining variations in human behavior as
the result of genetic and cultural selection in response to ecological constraints
(including the ones of our own making). The end result contains a large and
perhaps irreducible element of indeterminacy due to the multiplicity of environ-
mental factors involved, but then so does the evolution of other organisms. We
could no more have predicted whales and bats 100 million years ago than, say,
the French Revolution 500 years ago.
Fundamentally then, there is little to argue about. Instead of displaying to one
another in journals, in an arcane ritual of dominance, we should get down to the
business of studying each other. Yet, we have an Anlage to display: I found the
invitation to comment on the paper under consideration simply irresistible. So
have, I am sure, several of my colleagues. Perhaps one of the most common
ploys in these competitive attempts to become the center of the private attention
structures described by Michael Chance (Chance and Larsen, op. cit., 1976) is to
mimic disagreement, preferably with the alpha male. By publishing the right book
at the right time and place, in the right language, E. O. Wilson (op. cit., 1975) has
captured a share of attention that he himself, I believe, will gladly concede to be
somewhat disproportionate to his (substantial) accomplishments. The label
"sociobiology" seems to be in the process of supplanting that of "ethology," and
the label happily stuck to Wilson. He is, therefore, a prime target for his competing
primates, both in and out of academia, much as Lorenz was just before him.
So the stage is set for competitive displays: Wilson described ethology as an
obsolescent description of the behavior of animals in "natural" settings, a kind of
natural prehistory of sociobiology. Inevitably, E-E, heir apparent to the Lorenzian
mantle, retaliates by saying that sociobiology is a mere branch of ethology. In
actuality, both protagonists define ethology/sociobiology as the biology of
behavior, and both apply to their discipline the uncontested Neo-Darwinian
paradigm of evolution by natural selection. In principle, there is little of substance
to argue over, and it is a matter of total indifference whether the study of behavior
is called "ethology," "sociobiology," "biosociology," "behavioral biology," or,
as Richard Dawkins (1978) jokingly suggested in a recent rejoinder to a review,
"selfish genery." Notwithstanding all this, these cultural substitutes for penile
displays do go on.
Let me, at the outset, confess that my associations have been mostly with
people who have been labeled "sociobiologists" rather than "ethologists." The
differences between these two sets of behavioral biologists have been not so
much on fundamental tenets as in the day-to-day conduct of their trade.
Ethologists and sociobiologists have been talking different languages and engag-
ing in somewhat different styles of research. Most sociobiologists talk English;
they have developed such concepts as inclusive fitness, kin selection, reciprocal
altruism, parental investment, and evolutionary stable strategies; they are often
enamored of elegant mathematical models that they like running through comput-
ers. They devise clever experiments to test their models; they tend to be less
concerned with the ontogeny of behavior and the modalities of the proximate
mechanisms that bring forth the phenotype; and they are often impatient of the
complexity of the real world, unless it has a direct bearing on a neat theoretical
problem.
By contrast, ethologists tend to talk German; they speak of Anlagen, Erbkoor-
dinationen, and similar agglutinative mouthfuls that translate badly into English;
they are more descriptive and concerned with the nitty-gritty details of ontogeny,
signals, rituals, and proximate mechanisms; they insist on a rigorous methodology
of nonparticipant observation of animals in "natural" environments; they are less
concerned with elegant and parsimonious theoretical formulations; and they
positively delight in the all the messy complexity and diversity of the world around
them.
Naturally, most people fall between these two overdrawn caricatures, and
many like neither label, preferring to call themselves ecologists, behaviorists,
population geneticists, developmental psychologists, entomologists, or whatever.
We need more of both types, and all shades in between. However, since E-E
presents himself as an ethologist and represents a fair approximation to one of
the profiles I have just drawn, I shall query some of his statements from an
admittedly sociobiological angle.
First, there is a low blow to Wilson (op. cit, 1976). One would have to be very
simple-minded to read Wilson as restricting inclusive fitness to relatives sharing
50 percent of genes. Again, this is a not-too-subtle attempt at mimicking
disagreement, a crude penile display.
E-E's appeal for a greater use and more systematic collection of photographic
evidence in human ethology is well taken, but there is already more of it than he
suggests. I should like to refer him, for instance, to publications of the Society for
the Anthropology of Visual Communication, such as Erving Goffman (1976). (This
is the "l-read-the-literature-better-than-you" display, the scholarly primate's way
of saying: "I pay attention to our attention structure, therefore I deserve to be at
the center of it.")
E-E states that fear of strangers is maladaptive in the modern urban setting. It
may be in Seewiesen, but not to anyone familiar with the jungle of a modern
megalopolis. (This is the adhominem display.)
The argument about the linkage between the head-shaking signal for "no" in
most cultures and the satiated baby's head turning at the breast is shaky. It is that
kind of loose speculation that both ethologists and sociobiologists are constantly
being taken to task for by social scientists. Let me put in my two bits' worth of
ethology on this point. I have observed hungry human neonates (less than one
month old) swiveling their heads laterally in apparent search for the nipple before
feeding. They certainly looked as if they were saying: "I'll never touch the stuff
again!" (Here we have a good example of the simple "l-am-better-than-you"
display. The use of it is especially effective here because the challenger takes on
his rival in the latter's chosen field of competence: the observation of "unstaged"
or "natural" interaction.)
Joking aside, I would like to conclude with two more substantial points. The first
concerns the ethologist's repeated emphasis on the importance of nonparticipant
observation of unstaged social interactions in natural settings. Even for studying
nonhumans, such a prescription is unnecessarily rigid, and conceptually limiting.
The concept of a nonparticipant observer not only seems to exclude experimen-
tation (which, I am sure, is not E-E's intent), but is also epistemologically naive.
The presence of the observer often markedly affects the situation being
observed. For humans, in whom the phenomenon of consciousness comes in,
this is doubly true [cf. "Cognition and Consciousness in Nonhuman Species" BBS
1 (4) 1978]. What is a "natural" setting for humans? Serengeti National Park? The
New York subway? The Gulag Archipelago? Indeed, a strong argument could be
made for paying special attention to extraordinary groups in order to test
hypotheses. Behavior in such settings as concentration camps, "natural" cata-
strophes, or famine is especially illuminating because these environments are
beyond the normal range. So are extraordinary groups like Utopian communes.
How much has been learned, for instance, about incest from Joseph Shepher's
(1972) study of the "unnatural" child-rearing system of the Kibbutz! Desmond
Morris (1969) went as far as to suggest that the whole of industrial society far
from being a "natural" setting for humans, is in fact a huge zoo of our own
creation. Clearly, there can be even less of a sharp dichotomy between "free"
and "captive" conditions for humans than for other animals.
What is an "unstaged" social interaction? In a fundamental sense, human
consciousness makes many, if not most, of our interactions staged. Indeed, a
major approach to the observation of human behavior has been premised on the
notion that the world is a stage. I am referring, of course, to the work of Goffman
(op. cit, 1963) and of the "ethnornethodology" school. The only tenable position
for a study of human behavior is that our species lives in a wide range of
environments, many profoundly modified by our own actions; that most of our
interactions are to some extent conscious and therefore staged; and that nothing
is gained by regarding some settings as less "natural" and therefore less worthy
of study. Nor is the strategy of nonparticipating observation necessarily the most
fruitful one. Biologists studying other species constantly intervene in the situation
they observe. Why should human ethologists systematically refrain from doing so
(for other than ethical considerations)?
The last issue concerns group selection, a concept for which E-E shows
lingering ambivalence. Developments of the last decade show the increasing
success of the reductionist strategy in seeking the ultimate unit of selection. As
Dawkins (op. cit., 1976) forcefully suggested, even the organism - the usual
conceptual unit of selection in much of the literature - is merely an ephemeral
package of genes, and the ultimate units of selection are the alternate alleles at a
given locus. Still, since the behavior of organisms is much more readily observ-
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able than that of genes, and since organisms are such readily definable and
well-bounded units, it is a convenient shorthand for many purposes to speak of
natural selection at the level of organisms.
Group selection is a little different. Societies do not have skins or exoskeletons.
For highly related colonial invertebrates and eusocial insects, societal boundaries
are fairly unproblematic; but for vertebrates, and most assuredly for humans, the
definitional questions alone make group selection arguments much more prob-
lematic. Still, let us concede that as a heuristic shorthand device it is moderately
useful for certain purposes and at certain gross levels of ecological analysis to
refer to conspecific animal populations as competing against each other, or even
(to push the argument one step further) to speak of different species as
competing against each other. This is group selection in the loose sense, that is,
conceived as a gross shorthand description of the outcome of individual and
genie selection. The case for group selection, in the strict sense of a supraor-
ganic level of selection which conflicts with individual selection, is extremely weak
at best for nonhumans, though it is, I would concede, still an open question for
human societies. E-E fails to make clear whether he means group selection in the
loose or in the strict sense, but, to be on the safe side, the less we speak in
"benefit-of-the-species" terms, the better off we are.
In conclusion, notwithstanding any of the above remarks, I greatly admire E-E's
pioneer efforts in human ethology. Like all who dare venture on unbeaten paths,
he is almost certain to be wrong on a number of specifics, but he powerfully
contributes to revealing exciting prospects. If nothing else, he confounds critics
who describe ethologists as those students of behavior who pretend that people
cannot talk. (The last paragraph is obviously an appeasement display superim-
posed on aggressive displays. The target animal must have high enough rank to
be worth challenging, but his high rank makes it unwise to antagonize him
permanently, hence the final appeasement display.)
by Douglas Wahisten
Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L
3G1
Some logical fallacies in the classical ethological point of view. E-E has
written a concise exposition of the classical ethological view of human behavior.
The ethology of Lorenz and his followers has been incisively criticized by Lehrman
and others, but it appears from E-E's essay that these criticisms have brought
about no major modifications of the thinking of classical ethology.
I would like to discuss certain logical fallacies that are evident in E-E's
interpretations of key experiments and studies, specifically the deprivation
experiment and the study of cross-culturally universal behaviors.
According to both E-E and Lorenz {op. cit., 1965), if an individual is deprived of
an opportunity to learn a species-typical behavior, be it a song or a smile, by
observing conspecifics performing that behavior, and if that individual nonethe-
less performs the species-typical behavior, then the behavior must be "innate,"
"encoded in the genome" or the genetic "blueprint" for a nervous system. I
maintain that it is fallacious to draw any conclusion about the genetic inheritance
of a behavior pattern from an environmental deprivation experiment. The
improper inference made by classical ethologists follows from a dogmatic
restriction of the causes of species-typical behavior to two classes of phenom-
ena: observation learning, or imitation, and genetic coding, presumably in DNA
molecules.
If all possible causes of a behavior pattern can legitimately be dichotomized,
then of course an experiment which yields results that exclude one cause
therefore compels the researcher to affirm the complementary cause, and it does
so with all the authority of simple logical reasoning. If the possible causes cannot
be neatly dichotomized, then no conclusion about the cause of a behavior can be
drawn from an experiment which allows the exclusion of only one cause.
Suppose there is an urn known to contain only black and white marbles. If one
marble is drawn and it is found to be not black, it is therefore white. No further
investigation is necessary to assert this conclusion, because prior investigation
has already established that the entire stock of marbles from which the sample
was drawn consists of only two kinds. However, if the urn contains black, white,
red, green, yellow, and blue marbles, and if it is established only that a marble
drawn from the urn is not black, then there is no way of determining its actual
color without further investigation. It could quite plausibly be either white, red,
green, yellow, or blue.
If we look at the life of an animal, it is obvious that a vast array of mechanisms
are active in its development from conception to the time it first displays some
species-typical behavior. Some well-known mechanisms include the following: (1)
the set of chromosomes, or the "genome," determined at fertilization; (2) the
host of organelles and macromolecules in the cytoplasm of the zygote; (3) the
spatial configuration of the cellular components of the zygote; (4) the external
environment of the zygote with its characteristic temperature, pH, salinity,
osmolarity, and so forth; (5) environmental factors such as nutrients and viruses,
which are absorbed and in some cases assimilated by the organism; (6) the web
of interactions among components within each cell during development; (7) the
numerous interactions among the diverse cells comprising the developing or-
ganism; (8) in birds and mammals, maternal or parental care; (9) exercise by the
organism; and so on. A further mechanism may also be observation of conspecif-
ics performing a species-typical behavior.
If a deprivation experiment is carefully conducted so that two random samples
of animals from a single population are reared in two environments which differ in
only one respect - opportunity to observe a conspecific performing a particular
behavior - and if the animals in the deprived environment nonetheless perform
the species-typical behavior, then one and only one thing can be concluded:
observation of performance by a conspecific is not necessary for normal
performance of the behavior. Such an experimental result does not prove that the
behavior is encoded in the genes (mechanism 1 above). Neither does it prove it to
be encoded in the cytoplasmic organelles (mechanism 2) or any other of
mechanisms 3 through 9 cited above.
This basic point has been made by Jensen (1961), Kuo(1967), Whalen(1971)
and, most lucidly and eloquently, by Lehrman (op. cit., 1953, 1970); yet the
classical ethologists maintain their dogmatic view of the deprivation experiment.
When Lorenz and E-E conclude from this kind of result that the behavior is
"encoded in the genome," they are in effect uncritically accepting the null
hypothesis, which may constitute what is termed a Type II error in statistical
inference. They in effect hypothesize a priori that the behavior is "innate," and
from this null hypothesis they predict that the animals reared in normal and
deprived environments will behave the same way. If there is no significant
difference between the two groups, then they accept the null hypothesis as true.
This is a serious error of logical reasoning.
The only way to draw a valid conclusion about the role of genes in species-
typical behavior is to vary the genes themselves, perhaps through a mutation or
selective breeding, and demonstrate that the behavior varies as a consequence.
Because heredity consists of more than Mendelian genes in chromosomes,
special crossing experiments must be done to dissect the contributions of
Mendelian inheritance from numerous other mechanisms of inheritance (see
Wahisten, 1979) and establish that the behavior is indeed "encoded in the
genome."
Investigations of the songs of isolated birds, the babbling of human neonates,
the smiles of the blind, or the greeting gestures of primitive peoples are relevant
and informative for students of behavior, but none of these studies can provide
proof that behavior is "encoded in the genome" or "innate." The deprivation
experiment is only one of many techniques for the analysis of behavior, and the
knowledge which can be gleaned from its results is narrowly circumscribed.
Consider further the case where experiential deprivation does indeed disrupt
species-typical behavior. This certainly demonstrates the plasticity of the behav-
ior in question, but it does not in any way prove that the "genome" is irrelevant for
performance of the behavior. The chromosomes may play an important role in the
development of a nervous system capable of rapidly acquiring information
through observation.
It seems to me that the classical ethologists have responded to previous
criticisms of their doctrine by adopting an eclectic approach in order to blunt the
effects of further criticism. On the one hand, they stubbornly cling to their original
ideas, while on the other, they incorporate criticisms into their writings in the form
of disclaimers that they really mean what their words appear to mean. This is
apparent in the essay by E-E.
For example, in his abstract he presents a very clear dichotomy of causes of
behavior by asserting that "innate and culturally evolved patterns of behavior can
often substitute as functional equivalents for one another." Then at the end of
section 3 he contradicts himself: "I wish to emphasize that the whole nature/nur-
ture issue should not be considered as a matter of either/or, nor can the
contribution of each be measured quantitatively, in terms of percentages." Now,
what is substitution, if not a matter of "either/or?"
In the section on cross-cultural comparison, E-E begins with this disclaimer:
"The fact of their universal appearance alone does not allow us to deduce that
these patterns are innate in man." There seems to be a two-step process of
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reasoning implicit in this statement. First is the inductive inference that a
behavioral pattern which appears in every one of a sample of cultures is universal,
that is, occurs with probability 1.0. Second is the deduction drawn from the
classical ethological theory that universality means the pattern is innate.
An inductive inference may be made on the basis of "circumstantial" evidence,
and it always has a certain probability of being incorrect because of sampling
error. A deduction from theory, on the other hand, should be made with
mathematical certainty. It is a very inadequate theory that yields deductions which
are only "probable," such that they may or may not follow from the theory.
Consequently, E-E becomes mired when he further states that patterns of
expressive behavior which are virtually the same in all respects in many cultures
provide "strongly suggestive circumstantial evidence for the hypothesis that they
constitute phylogenetic adaptations," and when he speaks of "universals which
can be said, with a high degree of probability, to constitute phylogenetic
adaptations." These phrases clearly show that E-E has no doubts that the
patterns are universal. Rather, he vacillates over the statement: Universal,
therefore innate.
Evidence presented in this essay and other publications by E-E is not sufficient
to convince me that the behavioral patterns in question are in fact universal, but in
any event, the universality of a behavior does not prove its genetic encoding. The
method of cross-cultural comparison has the same drawback as the deprivation
experiment; it provides no direct evidence for genetic determination of the
specific pattern of behavior. At best it provides "circumstantial evidence" in
support of the hypothesis of "innate" behavior. Nevertheless, circumstantial
evidence, unlike direct evidence obtained by manipulating genes themselves,
cannot constitute proof that the hypothesis is true. It is logically fallacious to
assert otherwise.
by S. L. Washbura
Department of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley, Calif. 94720
Ethologists do not study human evolution. As so clearly outlined by E-E,
human ethology has derived its methods and theory from the parent "discipline,"
ethology. When applied to human beings, these methods are inadequate and
lead to trivial research. For example, it has long been recognized that bipedal
locomotion is the fundamental behavioral adaptation which led to the separation
of apes and humans some millions of years ago. The hands were freed, making
possible the evolution of manipulative skills. Large brains evolved long after the
making of complex stone tools. Although claiming to be concerned with evolution,
the article under Commentary does not give a single reference to the known
events of human evolution. Over the last dozen years the relationships of the
contemporary primates have been clarified by molecular biology, the finding of
numerous fossils, and radiometric dates which give a validated chronological
framework. Ethologists pay no attention to locomotion, or archaeology, and little
to the brain. They are so accustomed to using analogies, very general concepts,
and uncontrolled comparisons that they do not seem to realize that this whole
habit of thought is misleading when applied to human beings.
The problem is not only one of evolution; the methods of ethology effectively
remove most of what is known about the biological basis of human behavior. For
example, humans can easily learn a variety of facial expressions, and when it is
that each is socially appropriate. Ethology attempts to find universal expressions
with common meanings. But what is observed superficially depends on the brain,
which makes possible the diversity of learning. Massive removal of the cortex in
monkeys does not affect facial expression, but even a moderate insult may cause
facial paralysis in humans. Clearly, in comparing facial expressions in human
beings and even the most closely related of other animals, it is necessary to
stress the differences in the cortex of the brain. For comparison, externally visible
behaviors must be accurately described, but most of the biology is not externally
visible, and it is for this reason that ethology omits most of human biology, just as
it omits the study of human evolution. For example, the comparison of human
hand skills with those of the apes requires a comparison of motions and of the
joints and muscles that make them possible. It also requires a consideration of
the great difference in the parts of the brain controlling the motor functions. An
evolutionary speculation might be that tool using, bipedal locomotion, hand skills,
and the brain evolved in a feedback relation. More speculatively, social life,
hunting, and delayed maturity may be part of the same complex. If so, a traditional
ethogram (biogram) would destroy the very complex functional pattern, the
understanding of which is the goal of the research.
If comparisons begin with problems of human behavior, the issues appear very
different from those of traditional ethology. Speech (phonemes combined in
morphemes and into sentences) is unique to human beings and is dependent on a
large part of the brain. The comparison of design features in human and other
animals gives no information on the basic biology, or on the vast difference
between what humans can communicate and the very limited possibilities of
communication in other animals.
Stressing what is known about human speech, then comparing, keeps funda-
mental biology under consideration. Ethological methods and principles cannot
be usefully applied to human behavior if ethology omits both the basic biology that
humans share with other primates, and the biology that is unique to human
beings.
by Edward 0= Wilson
Museum of Comparative Zoology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 02138
Ethology and sociobiology: a point of definition. E-E's excellent review
illustrates very well the richness of new discoveries that he and other investigators
have made under the rubric of human ethology. The implications of this work for
the social sciences will be obvious to anyone with an open mind. I am concerned
at this time only with a point of metascience: the possibility of a confusion
between the definitions of the two disciplines of ethology and sociobiology, which
have been perhaps more clearly distinguished in the United States (since the
1950s) than in Europe Here is what I stated in my recent book On human nature
(1978):
"The communal beings of the three pinnacles [of social evolution] are among the
principal objects of the new discipline of sociobiology, defined as the systematic
study of the biological basis of all forms of social behavior, in all kinds of
organisms, including man. The enterprise has old roots. Much of its basic
information and some of its most vital ideas have come from ethology, the study
of whole patterns of behavior of organisms under natural conditions. Ethology
was pioneered by Julian Huxley, Karl von Frisch, Konrad Lorenz, Nikolaas
Tinbergen, and a few others and is now being pursued by a large new
generation of innovative and productive investigators. It has remained most
concerned with the particularity of the behavior patterns shown by each species,
the ways these patterns adapt animals to the special challenges of their
environments, and the steps by which one pattern gives rise to another as the
species themselves undergo genetic evolution. Increasingly, modern ethology is
being linked to studies of the nervous system and the effects of hormones on
behavior. Its investigators have become deeply involved with developmental
processes and even learning, formerly the nearly exclusive domain of
psychology, and they have begun to include man among the species most
closely scrutinized. The emphasis of ethology remains on the individual organism
and the physiology of organisms.
Sociobiology, in contrast, is a more explicitly hybrid discipline that
incorporates knowledge from ethology (the naturalistic study of whole patterns
of behavior), ecology (the study of the relationships of organisms to their
environment), and genetics in order to derive general principles concerning the
biological properties of entire societies. What is truly new about sociobiology is
the way it has extracted the most important facts about social organization from
their traditional matrix of ethology and psychology and reassembled them on a
foundation of ecology and genetics studied at the population level in order to
show how social groups adapt to the environment by evolution. Only within the
past few years have ecology and genetics themselves become sophisticated
and strong enough to provide such a foundation."
As I suggested in Sociobiology: The new synthesis {op. cit, 1975), much of the
content of ethology is destined to be absorbed into the explanatory systems of
integrative neurobiology on the one side and behavioral ecology and sociobiology
on the other, for the reason that these are the subjects most directly linked
through chains of analysis and causal explanation to the remainder of biology.
Integrative neurobiology is to be increasingly regarded as an extension of cellular
biology and developmental genetics, while the basic theory of behavioral ecology
and sociobiology stems from population biology. But this programmatic trajectory
in no way lessens the pioneering role of ethology in discovering and conducting
the essential first stage of analysis of patterns of behavior, a function well
exemplified in E-E's review.
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Human ethology; methods and limits
The commentaries cover a wide range, both in style and in content.
In general, my intention to evoke replies from which I could learn
was achieved. Only very few responses do not seem to be germane to
the points I was trying to make.
Van den Bergfie has charmingly pointed to the arcane dominance
rituals expressed in our journals, those cultural substitutes for penile
displays. There are certainly ethological features for study in our
efforts to communicate. However, focal attention seeking and
display constitute but one aspect of the rituals that open an encoun-
ter, and I hope that my own intent to bond has been perceived as
well. I certainly want to thank all who have contributed to the
discussion. The commentaries converge upon a number of points,
which I wish to answer in succession.
Ethology versus sociobiology. As to the claims of human
ethology, some commentators thought that the definition was overly
broad (e.g., Izard); some that culture should not be the subject of
ethological research (e.g. BoISes) others that only the sociobiological
approach would contribute to a "profound" understanding of
behavior (Barash). I think that the last viewpoint involves a basic
confusion concerning the question of proximate and ultimate causes.
One main concern of ethology is the investigation of proximate
causes. What makes a behavior occur in a concrete situation? How
does the machinery work? What starts and stops it? The physiology
of behavior is a very important aspect of ethology, and certainly in
one way this research contributes to deepening our understanding.
But, as Tinbergen has repeatedly emphasized, the question as to why
an animal behaves in the way it does must also be answered by the
study of individual development. Is this question of lesser
importance? I do not think so. In the end, we must seek an
explanation for the ultimate causes that have brought any particular
behavior in to being. This inquiry about phylogenetic (and in man,
cultural) evolution is inseparable from the question as to the ways in
which a behavior contributes to survival. But to argue that it is only
this search for the ultimate cause that contributes to our
understanding does not make much sense. All aspects must
eventually be covered. Ethology, traditionally defined as the biology
of behavior, has explicitly declared that its program is to answer all
these questions through a diversity of subfields like neuroethology,
ethoecology, and the like (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, op. cit., 1975b).
Sociobiology certainly aims at an understanding of ultimate causes,
and in this spirit, exciting theories and research strategies have
recently been developed. One should keep in mind, however, that
Tinbergen was the first to demonstrate by ethological techniques the
selective value of certain behaviors. I am the last to belittle the
contribution of sociobiologists, but nonetheless I fail to see
sociobiology replacing ethology, even in combination with
neuroethology.
Kin selection versus group selection. As to the question of the
level - kin or group - at which selection operates, I am certainly
open to the facts. So far, however, the evidence is controversial. Nice
mathematical models are available but nobody has yet been able to
tell me what proportion of my genes I actually share with my
brother, compared with the proportion I share with any other group
member. My guess is that the latter do not differ much from my
close kin. For most of man's history groups speaking a common
language have consisted of no more than several hundred to a few
thousand people. And since special cultural institutions (marriage
rules) cause constant mixing of the gene pool and prevent inbreeding,
individual fitness can only result in a gradual enrichment of the gene
pool with particular genes, the final selection taking place at the
group level. For man, history proves this to be the case. Undoubtedly
parents invest more in their children than in others, but this can be
explained in terms other than some sort of genetic mystique. The
young need to be cared for. One adaptive solution is that this be done
by specific individuals who become emotionally bonded to them.
And since the mother is present, as a rule, just when the young hatch
or are born, it seems practical that this bonding should occur
primarily between mother and child [see Rajecki et al.: "Toward a
theory of infantile attachment" BBS 1(3) 1978].
Once the capacity for individual bonding evolved, the family
ethos could be expanded to incorporate others and to form closed
groups that acted as units (for details see Eibl-Eibesfeldt, op. cit.,
1972). From that stage onward at least we have to consider groups as
having been competing units. Before that the kin selection principle,
as proposed by the sociobiologists, may well have been dominant.
I basically agree on many points with the sociobiologists (and I in
particular appreciate Wilson's contribution as outstanding), but what
sometimes irritates me are certain simplistic conceptions
camouflaged by impressive mathematical models. Mathematical
models such as those used by sociobiologists can certainly lead to
more precise testing of various hypotheses. But there are many
phenomena that do not lend themselves to this approach, and these
too must be investigated. Furthermore, I feel that, for the moment at
least, such models are highly speculative, and their expression in
print has been sloppy, to say the least. Statistically speaking, I ought
to share with my children 50% of those genes that came about by
mutation (as Hamilton states correctly). But how often does one read
that one in fact shares 50% of one's genes with one's children!
Likewise, one often reads that it would only pay for an individual to
sacrifice his life for the survival of two children or four
grandchildren and the like, and that this would explain nepotism.
But does nepotism really maximize inclusive fitness to the degree
postulated by the sociobiologist, when members of each ethnic group
share so many genes?
There are also other statements to which I object. To speak, for
example, of "genetic selfishness," or to say that organisms (including
man) are just machines for the reproduction of genes, fails to
recognize the fact that there are different levels of existence
(Seinsehenen) each characterized by new system attributes
(Systemeigenschaften) which emerge but cannot be deduced from
the characteristics of the components of the lower level of
integration. Molecular evolution certainly led to the formation of
self-replicating molecules. The newly discovered viroids are just
naked molecules. They have no protective cover, no organelles at all;
they lack metabolism (Betriebsstoffwechsel). In short, they are not
organisms. To be sure, organismic evolution did start out by ensuring
the replication of the molecules that carried the genetic code by the
development of a variety of additional machinery. But, more and
more, the emphasis shifted, and I would not hesitate for a moment
simply to turn the statement of the sociobiologists on its head by
saying that the genes, from a certain stage of evolution onward, are a
means of reproducing organisms. At least in the case of man this view
is tenable, since man certainly perceives genes as such. He is
theoretically able to control his genes, to "engineer" them in a
variety of ways, if he wishes to do so. With man, evolution evidently
became conscious of itself and thus became capable of self control. Is
a hen an egg's way toproduce more eggs? Perhaps, but as a biologist I
would not accept such a simplistic view for man, and I am reluctant
to do so even in the case of the hen.
Research strategy. It is certainly true that human ethologists have
not yet sunk their probes in all the possible directions of research, but
ethology does provide the theoretical background for the
development of a program (even though in my target article some of
this was admittedly presented in a sketchy way) and the references
that I cited point to a number of detailed analyses. I emphasized that
it is not just biologists who are developing the new study but that a
number of scientists from different backgrounds and fields converge
therein. In fact, there are by now so many that I had to restrict
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myself to mentioning only a few, thus not doing justice to others who
have contributed equally. This I hope to correct on another occasion.
For the moment, I had to be highly selective, and of course by bias
led me to present those works that I consider the most compelling
(consisting primarily of developmental and deprivation studies, as
well as our own program of cross-cultural cinematographic
documentation). This approach certainly has its precursors, and since
Hailman feels that Darwin or Mead should be mentioned in this
context, I can give assurances that I have done so on other occasions,
such as in my ethology textbook (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, op. cit., 1975b).
However, at that time a systematic documentation of social
interactions on a cross-cultural basis had not yet begun. Only recently
have the interests of anthropologists converged on this point.
As to the documentation program itself, Finley has asked why I
concentrate on primitive cultures. The answer is that they constitute
interesting models for different culturally evolved survival strategies
in a wide variety of rapidly vanishing cultures. I therefore consider
this research a kind of "data rescue work" within the framework of
urgent problems in anthropology. (In addition, I have begun
documentation projects in Japan and Europe.) Since the burden of
this task falls chiefly on my own shoulders and means three to four
months of fieldwork per year, I have to restrict my focus to the five
cultures mentioned in my paper, repeatedly returning to particular
villages. This may explain why I have not, for example, collected
electromyographic data on the eyebrow flash, as suggested by
Klopfer, or carried out experimental research on the function of this
signal. Even though I recognize a need, I simply cannot do
everything! I am happy simply to be able to uncover
cinematographically such phenomena as eyebrow flashes, and to
determine their function from numerous observations.
My emphasis on the "natural setting" was questioned by van den
Berghe and Delgado. Is there such a thing? I was probably mistaken.
I meant a setting not experimentally manipulated and staged by the
investigator. A group on a street corner, people in a church - in my
terminology these are all in "natural settings." As to interference by
the observer: I am certainly seen with my camera, but it makes an
enormous difference whether one focuses directly on a person (he or
she normally evades the attempt to be photographed) or whether one
observes through the mirror lens. My films show the intimate details
of social interactions and thus demonstrate the value of the method. I
hoped that the tender interactions shown in the first figures would
illustrate this point. In this context van den Berghe and Peterson
raise the question of ethics. I have considered this thoroughly and
have come to the following conclusions. First of all, I film only
behavior occurring in public. Furthermore, my documentation is in
no way derogatory; on the contrary, by showing how alike people are
in so many charming ways, I attempt to evoke a sense of familiarity.
So far the prevailing tendency has been to depict other people as
"exotic."
Evolutionary function of social interaction patterns. Concerning
the question of cultural factors, BoIIes and others feel that the
biological approach may not be adequate for their study. I certainly
see it differently. We can indeed inquire into the ways that cultural
patterns contribute to survival. We must, however, distinguish
intended function (what people think they are achieving by
performing a ritual) from observed function. We may very well find
that a religious ritual intended to appease deities in fact serves the
function of group cohesion, identification, and so forth.
BoIIes, Borgia, and Klopfer have asked how a function can be
proven to exist; others have emphasized the need for
experimentation. I agree; but from observing what is regularly
achieved by a certain behavioral pattern, and by applying the
comparative approach, we get evidence at least as good as that of the
morphologist, who rarely investigates function experimentally, often
deriving it solely from detailed anatomical investigation.
Anthropologists like Harris (1974) deduce function in a similar way;
Godelier (1977, 1978) and others, in investigating "social relations of
production," describe how man forms alliances, creating groups that
function as systems of production, thus adapting to the environment.
Our own conclusion, for example, that the ritual of Tanirri Het helps
the couples to "find" each other is derived from observation, detailed
film analysis, and inquiry. The frame-by-frame analyses demonstrate
that the partners synchronize their movements and that between
some partners harmony is established faster than between others,
thereby providing one of the factors that determine individual
preferences. Inquiry has supported the thesis that this ritual
constitutes the familiarizing process that leads to marriage. There is,
of course, the need to perform a long-term study for the final proof.
To understand the selective advantage of social patterns is
certainly a most important task. But to argue, as BoIIes does, that the
proper business is not to show that phylogenetic adaptations are
present, which no one doubts, but to show their "functional
significance," is a bit onesided. After all, some still do seem to have
doubts.
We certainly have to consider that not every social pattern may be
functional. Yet functional hypotheses are good to start with and can
help indicate what to search for. Our studies in the "natural context"
at least provide us with reasonable hypotheses. BoIIes was "stunned"
when he heard that the Japanese learn to suppress the eyebrow flash.
But he failed to specify just why he was stunned, and hence it is now /
who am "puzzled." If I have understood him correctly, he felt it odd
that a successful ethnic group comprising 100 million people should
drop such an important signal if it has survival value (as I do suggest).
After all, we know from many instances that certain affective
expressions get suppressed in a number of cultures, as well as in
various contexts, such as in communicating with strangers. For
example, in our own culture we are not supposed to cry in the street
or to express ourselves too freely. Etiquette demands that we keep
ourselves reserved and controlled. A plausible explanation, backed by
circumstantial evidence, is that life in the anonymous society fosters
the avoidance of contact as on adaptation against possible
exploitation by strangers. The suppression of the eyebrow flash
(which occurs to a certain degree in our culture as well) can be
interpreted as one pattern of contact avoidance in a crowded society,
and thus as adaptation to a new situation.
The experimental study of function is certainly within the scope of
our program but it should be clear that we have to start out with
some realizable goal in mind. For the moment, we assign priority to
the documentation and attendant uncovering of phenomena as well
as the study of their ontogeny in a cross-cultural perspective. The
question "and why didn't you do this and that?" would be
understandable only if the target paper had not taken this matter into
consideration. However, I did in fact emphasize the need for
experimental investigation to determine proximate and ultimate
causes, and I further referred to a number of publications dealing
with these issues in more detail.
Homology versus analogy. One question repeatedly raised by the
commentators concerns the question of universality (Finley,
Peterson, Hull, Wahlsten, and others). When do I consider a pattern
to be universal and what does such an ascription mean? I mentioned
that I concentrate on a number of model populations which are
selected to represent different geographical areas, different cultures
and races, and different levels of cultural evolution. Besides these
cultures, in which we have over the years been accumulating as
complete a documentation as possible, we also make single visits to
other ethnic groups to obtain selected samples of specific patterns
such as greeting or surprise reactions, responses to smell and taste,
and the like. We also obtain samples of social interaction patterns
encountered by chance. Such samples have been obtained with the
Gidjingali, Pintubi, and Walbiri of Australia; with the Tasaday,
Tboli, Blit, and Agta of the Philippines, with the Japanese, Chinese,
Ceylonese and Singhalese, with Niloto Hamitic tribes (the Turkana,
Massai, and Karamojo), Pygmies, Samoans (and other Polynesians),
the Ayoreo, Quechua, Polar Eskimos, and others.
In our own culture, we extensively document children and parent-
child interactions in investigations of behavioral ontogeny. Were we
now to discover a pattern that tended in both form and detail to
occur repeatedly in the same context, we would certainly ask
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whether the similarity was a result of analogous development or
whether we ought to assume a common origin. In determining this
we proceed in a fashion similar to that of the cultural anthropologist
who, upon finding stone axes of similar shape in tropical Asia, Africa,
and South America, would not (nowadays at least) jump to the
conclusion that this was indicative of cultural contact. The shape of
the axe is dictated by its function and, independently, man would
tend to invent similar tools. But if the anthropologist found a number
of similar-sounding words (such as; one, two, three; uno, due, tre) in
different cultures, he would interpret this as evidence for common
cultural origin, irrespective of whether many intermediate cultures
would have to be posited in such a case to serve as links between the
two languages (Wickler, 1965). Independent invention of such a
language similar in sound and meaning would be highly
improbable.
In part, this reasoning also holds for nonverbal expressive patterns
such as facial expressions. If in groups as remote from each other as
Eskimos, Kalahari Bushmen, and Papuans, we find identical patterns
of expressive behavior, we can assume either traditional (cultural) or
phylogenetic homologies at their base. The latter have a greater
probability, since it is well known that ritual patterns based on
cultural traditions change rapidly as demonstrated by the fast
evolution of languages. So far, results of developmental studies on
experiential deprivation and comparative studies on primates
conform very nicely to this homology assumption. Of course, much
still remains "speculative," as a hypothesis to be tested for its value. I
would also like to point out that these universals in expressive
patterns, aside from their specific role in communicating concrete
intentions, also have the much more general function of
communicating across ethnic barriers. Although the Japanese
suppress the eyebrow flash in adult communication, they still
understand it as indicating friendly intent when emitted by visitors
from America or Europe.
Commentators repeatedly asked the question of how I come to
infer that a particular pattern is homologous; and doubts were
expressed as to the interpretation of particular cases that I used to
illustrate my points (Delgado, Benedict, Fraser, Petersen,
Hausfater). I thought I had already provided the answer: My
inferences are based on the application of the concept of homology,
as elaborated by the rnorphologist. These are: (1) the criterion of
special quality; (2) the criterion of the relative position within the
structural system; and (3) the most important criterion of the linkage
by intermediate forms.
Let us elaborate with an example. Hausfater expressed the
opinion that intuition and empathy led me to assume that human
kissing derived from kiss feeding. His intuition, however, would tell
him that the kiss is derived from grooming behavior, which involves
licking movements with the tongue. Can we decide? If we look at the
special quality of the movement we will soon discover that the
movement patterns of kissing are very similar to those of kiss feeding.
Upon mouth to mouth contact, a pushing activity of the tongue (not
to be confused with licking) occurs and, in response, there occur
movements similar to those by which the child accepts the proffered
food. In fact, saliva is often exchanged during kissing (for example,
between lovers), and the Kama Sutra mentions the exchanging of
wines. Furthermore, there are forms intermediate between kiss
feeding and the kiss. In fact, the example of the bush girl feeding her
sister a morsel to comfort her (target article: figure 1) is shortly
afterwards followed by a kiss without an attempt at food exchange,
but with the same pushing movements of the tongue. Both events are
fortunately recorded on film.
If we turn to nonhuman primates, we frequently observe kiss
feeding and kissing in maternal behavior as well as in expression of
seeking friendly contact. This being the case, we arrive at the
conclusion that kiss feeding and kissing are homologous patterns.
Grooming patterns and their derivates look different. These have
been repeatedly ritualized into friendly bonding behaviors. Thus the
Mongoose lemur uses ritualized grooming in greeting. He performs
the fur combing movements of the lower jaw in the air, at the same
time performing licking movements. Many mammals use their lower
and upper teeth in a tender action nibbling while combing their fur.
And indeed, this can be observed in nearly identical form as a sign of
affection in man. Another ritualization which might be derived from
grooming movements is a special form of tongue display, one of
whose functions is to establish heterosexual bonds.
Some intuition is certainly necessary for a scientist (Lorenz, 1977).
but there also exist proven procedures for discovering certain
relations. Applying these methods makes it clear that the
interpretation of phallic displays as ritualized mounting threats is not
just a wild speculation (as Delgado seems to suggest). Again, all three
criteria of homology are fulfilled, but owing to space limitations I
must refer the reader to the original publications (Ploog et al. op. cit.,
1963; Wickler, op. cit., 1967a; Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Wickler, op. cit.,
1968; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, op. cit., 1970). In man, the mounting threat
finds a new expression in certain cultural substitutes. We referred to
the unique ability of man to "translate" social interaction strategies,
for example, by verbalizing the event or by substituting cultural
patterns for innate ones. In such cases we must ask in what respect
the observed behaviors are homologous.
Let us construct a theoretical example. In the service of
communication, mutual adaptation of the sender and receiver of a
signal has often taken place. Releasers (e.g., "expressive
movements") and innate releasing mechanisms (IRMs) have evolved.
In a changing environment, new selection pressures may cause a
signal to become more rudimentary, with the unchanged IRM of the
receiver still remaining tuned to the original signal (there are specific
examples from animal behavior studies). In such cases the sender's
activities may develop an analogous bias to compensate for its own
modified signal. We have some indication that cross-cultural similar-
ities in male fashion (emphasis on shoulders) as well as in female
fashion come about this way (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, op. cit., 1972). In this
case, analogies are brought about by a homologous IRM.
Relevant in this context is Eraser's question as to whether, if the
pathways of a movement pattern are plastic, the behavior can still be
considered to be homogous. Homologous movements will in most
cases have homologous neuronal substrates and will be performed by
homologous muscles. But changes may take place during evolution,
and in this case the question as to whether or not similar behavior
patterns with different pathways are homologous can only be
answered if we find a link in intermediate forms (by far the most
important criterion of homology). Fortunately, most cases are not so
complicated, otherwise morphologists and taxonomists would simply
despair. But the problem is well known to them. Structures, too, can
be homologous to one another at one level and analogous at another.
The flippers of penguins and whales are analogous structures, if
looked at as flippers, but homologous if looked at as vertebrate front
extremities.
The nature/nurture problem. Ghiselie felt that I was too much of
a typologist, and that this constituted a vestige of early ethological
tradition. It is true that some of the early founders like Jacob von
Uexkiill were antiselectionists. But I do not see how my discussion of
the "universality" of behavioral traits would indicate a similar
attitude. I admit that terms like "human nature" are more
ambiguous in this context, but the term is often used to point to
features of man that characterize him as a "species." This may not
serve as excuse, however, since "species" is after all a similar
construct. Nonetheless, it is used by taxonomists, and no one would
charge them with being antievolutionists. I am certainly open to the
view that the polymorphism of the human populations is also
expressed in behavior (see also the comment of Hull). In fact,
Freedman and Freedman (1969) found that Mongolian and
Caucasian neonates born in New York under practically identical
situations show differences in their behavior. These differences are
not in the actual patterns of behavior, but only in the frequency of
their occurence (for example, restlessness). So far, I too have failed to
find any qualitative differences, and whether observed quantitative
differences (such as more expressiveness) are due to differences in
genetic or in cultural background cannot be said at the moment. In
the area of expressive behavior the cultural cast seems so far to be the
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main factor contributing to behavioral diversity, but this field is
practically unexplored.
Numerous commentators discussed the nature/nurture issue
(Hallmae, Charlesworth, Montagu, Klopfer, Block, Wahlstee).
One of the arguments advanced was that there may be precursors of
innate behavior which became integrated - for instance, during
early ontogenetic stages - into functional wholes (Gottlieb). I do not
doubt this. However, the concept of phylogenetic adaptation versus
adaptation by individual learning is not changed by such findings. In
one of my earlier papers (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1963) I demonstrated that
European red squirrels develop the stereotyped movement pattern of
nut hiding even if raised on a diet of semiliquid food, in wiremesh
cages, and deprived of any opportunity to dig or handle solid objects.
The pattern consists of searching for a hiding place (preferably near
a vertical obstacle, which allows easier rediscovery of the hidden
food), digging a hole, depositing the nut, tamping it down by rapid
blows with the snout, covering it with earth by sweeping movements
of the paws, and, finally, pressing the earth down with the paws.
Squirrels deprived of any opportunity to imitate a conspecific or to
learn this behavior by themselves through trial and error still hide
nuts on their first given occasion. They search for a hiding place and
show preference for digging at the base of vertical obstacles. The
stereotypy of the movements is especially evident when the animals
attempt to hide a nut on the solid floor, such as in one corner of the
room. After some scratching movements the nut is deposited, tamped
down with the snout, and, even though nothing has been dug up,
sweeping movements are performed as in an attempt to cover the nut
with earth, finally, the imaginary earth is pressed down. This trait
can only have derived its adaptedness as a result of phylogenetic
adaptation. As I pointed out, this would hold true even if someone
were to prove that at a lower level of integration the coordination of
the antagonistic muscles of the limbs used in the nut-hiding
performance were really lea ned in early ontogenetic stages.
Nonetheless, the adaptedness at the higher level of integration would
be considered a phylogenetic one.
Similarly, should it be demonstrated that a bird, having learned
the coordination of breathing movements - certainly a prerequisite
of singing - and having been raised in complete social isolation,
could produce the species-specific courtship or territorial song, we
would be forced to conclude that the patterning of song movements
results from phylogenetic adaptation. There are different levels of
adaptation, and our statements refer to the origin of specific
adaptedness. We cannot escape the logic that, in order for a copy of a
pattern to occur, information concerning the "original" (the
template) must be acquired by the adapted system. Hence,
deprivation experiments are indeed of great heuristic value, even
though they constitute only the first (but most important) step in the
analysis. Judging from the commentaries of Hallmae and Gottlieb, I
feel that in fact our points of view no longer diverge so much in this
respect. I agree with their emphasis on the importance of further
studying ontogeny, and am also sure that Hailman understood my
point. I am all the more puzzled, therefore, by Hailman's assertion
that "Austro-German" ethology tries to define away the nature/
nurture problem.
Block remarks that "innate" should not be equated with "resistant
to change" and he misses the idea of the "norm of reaction." It may
comfort him that on p. 30 in my ethology text book (Eibl-Eibesfeldt,
op. cit., 1975b) I write "Characteristics in themselves are not
inherited but are developed within the bounds of inherited
variation." The potentiality (range of modifiability) may include a
number of alternatives. For example, it could well be that, as Block
suggests, the program for aggression consists in the instruction: be
aggressive unless adults are around who are not aggressive. But this
does not imply that statements as to the innateness of a response are
irrelevant to social policy, since sometimes the range of modifiability
and the openness for alternatives are very limited indeed.
If we punish a rooster with an electric shock whenever he displays,
he will eventually stop doing so, and as a result he will also lose his
rank. If we apply the same punishing stimulus whenever the rooster
shows submissive behavior, this will not result in a similar extinction
of the response. On the contrary, the more the cock is punished for
his submissive behavior, the more he will act submissively, since that
is how the cock is phylogenetically programmed to behave. In
combat, submission functions to save the loser from further attack;
the more severe the defeat (punishment), the more submissively the
animal must act in order to escape further attacks. Behavior
therapists ought to consider the possibility of similar constraints in
the responses of man.
Charlesworth feels that only certain kinds of experiments that
cannot be carried out in man could prove the existence of
phylogenetic adaptation in man. He considers my data important,
but not sufficient to prove my case. I certainly see it differently.
Congenitally deaf and blind children grow up under deprivation
more rigid than the deprivation schedules applied in the experiments
of animal ethologists. Furthermore, cultural differences in child-
rearing constitute experiments that can be evaluated.
Kovach expresses the opinion that only behavior genetic
experiments could ascertain how phylogeny may influence the
ontogeny of behavior. How does he propose to do this in man? It is
certainly important to explore the genes in order to determine the
contribution of heredity, but we have to be aware that there are a
diversity of questions to be asked, and that they aim at different
levels.
May I point in this context to the fact that there exists a field called
the psychology of learning, which successfully explores the laws of
learning? Now, is the value of these laws at all compromised by the
fact that nobody knows for sure the "nature" of the engram? And I
may draw the attention of those who are overexacting in the
demonstration of facts to a stimulating publication by Hull (1978) in
which, in discussing this very issue, he refers to T. H. Huxley, who
pointed out that the inductive foundations of evolutionary theory
would remain insecure until the evolution of a new species was
actually observed - which nobody has done to this day. Are we
therefore less sure that evolution took place? Certainly not. The
circumstantial evidence is simply overwhelming.
Wahlstee criticizes "the ethologists," and me in particular, for
stubbornly clinging to their original ideas, while merely
incorporating criticisms into their writings in the form of disclaimers.
It may occasionally sound this way, but I hope that by once again
specifying what we mean by the source of specific adaptations, it
may become clear what we mean by "phylogenetically adapted" or
"innate": The source is the process by which template information is
acquired by the adapted system, so that the latter can copy it. Once
again, I emphasize that the term innate refers to a specific level of
adaptation, and that this is why it would be wrong to deduce, once
phylogenetic adaptation has been demonstrated at one level, that the
behavior in its totality is to be considered innate. Nor does it make
sense to calculate in percentage terms the contribution of the genes
versus that of the environment. It does make sense, however, to ask
whether phylogenetic adaptations determine certain aspects of
territoriality and ranking, or any other aspect of man's social
behavior. And it is indeed important to know whether or not a
pattern grows in a process of self-differentiation. It is, after all,
different if a bird - to return to our example - needs to hear a
conspecific in order to sing like him, as opposed to developing his
song without need of patterned information during ontogeny.
We can indeed demonstrate that some patterns develop even
under a great variety of deprivation schedules, thus exhibiting
resistence to environmentally induced modification. It should also be
clear from my discussion that the deprivation experiment does not
just provide supportive evidence for the hypothesis of phylogenetic
adaptedness - as claimed by Wahlsten, but must be considered to be
as good a proof as can be gained by manipulating the genes
themselves: We observe that an adaptation copies a template. We
deprive the organism of the template and of any other opportunity
individually to acquire information pertaining to it. It nonetheless
develops the copy. The only logical conclusion is that information
concerning the features of the template must have been fed into the
system at some time other than during ontogeny, and the only
possibility remaining is phylogeny (unless we are to believe in a
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prestabilized harmony due to a Creator who made organs and
behaviors just so as to fit).
As to Wahlsten's remark that I first disclaim universality as a
criterion for innateness, and then later deduce innateness from
universality, I am a bit at loss, since I specifically say that universality
alone will not do, and that we must also determine whether
universally similar environmental conditions or some universal
function could independently have shaped the behavior along similar
lines. Only if this has been shown to be improbable can we
hypothesize innateness. Supportive evidence must come from the
study of ontogeny and from comparative primate studies; and finally
it may also be helpful to study the pattern in question in cultures,
which, for some reason, consider the behaviour in question
inappropriate, and thus discourage its development by education.
This occurs in some cultures with respect to certain aspects of
aggression, striving for rank, and possessive behavior, which still
seem to develop, despite negative cultural pressure.
Fear of strangers. The fear-of-strangers response, which I used to
illustrate how a comparatively simple innate response significantly
influences human social conduct, was the target of several comments.
Izard argues that fear in the infant and adult are not continuous but
two different phenomena, since- the emotional quality is variable in
the infant and we do not know whether the negative response is due
to "fear," "sadness," "shyness," and so forth. Moreover, the response
diminishes one month after onset and in the second year is most
frequently called "shyness." Finally, a stranger may elicit a variety
of emotional responses, including interest and contempt.
This involves a confusion in the argument. First of all, I explicitly
stated that a variety of responses are released by the stranger, and in
fact by any fellow human. Otherwise, how could I have spoken of
"ambivalence?" In using the term "fear" I followed the traditional
terminology, but from what I wrote it should be clear that I do not
interpret the baby's response in subjective terms. I group the
responses descriptively as approach behaviors (contact-seizing:
turning toward, moving toward, signalling readiness for contact) and
behaviors belonging to the agonistic system (aggression, flight,
submission), which are again characterized by a number of patterns.
However, I find these in the child's responses, as well as in the adult's.
The degree of "strangeness" determines the degree to which the
so-called "negative" responses show up as opposed to the "positive"
ones. (This should also answer BoIIes's question as to the motivational
basis of the response). I am at a loss to see what difference it makes,
whether one speaks of fear or shyness in the adult; apparently Izard
considers these to be different (on what grounds?) Nowhere did I say
(as Izard seems to think) that I consider fear of strangers to be the sole
reason for man's forming individualized groups. In fact, in my book
Love and Hate (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, op. cit., 1972) I discuss in detail
various roots of sociality, with emphasis on those developed in
context with parental behavior.
My statement that negative experience is not needed for fear of
strangers to develop was attacked by Hoffman on the basis of
experimental studies on a response in ducks. Once ducks have
followed an object, they stick to that class and show fear response to
novel objects. If kept in isolation long enough, however, they do not
show this fear, but follow any object, which according to Hoffmann
proves that the subject's fear response is dependent upon his prior
opportunity to form a neuronal model of a given source of visual
stimulation.
But, first of all, this is not the "fear of strangers" phenomenon that
Eibl-Eibesfeldt describes, but another type of response in another
species! The ducks react to another class of objects with fear, once
they have become imprinted to a particular object. Human beings,
however, react with "fear" to the same class of objects (namely
humans) to which they are individually bonded, the response
showing gradations according to familiarity.
As to the selective advantage of the fear response (Bolles), we have
reason to assume that primarily it served to strengthen the bond
between mother and child as individuals. It might secondarily have
been advantageous to emphasize contrast between group members
and nongroup members [see also Rajecki et al.: "Toward a General
Theory of Infantile Attachment" BBS 1(3)1978.]
Montagu tries to.convince us that fear of strangers is not universal
since it occasionally happens that strangers are received in a friendly
way, as derived from the study of old travel logs. Again, I must
return to my statement that people release friendly and aversive
responses in other people. On our travels we have had the experience
again and again of people's fear, after a short period of tension,
melting away once our friendly intent has been realized. This must
certainly also have happened to the old explorers, who may not
always describe in their reports when there was slight tension at the
beginning of an encounter.
Sins of omission. A number of commentators felt that particular
points were not treated adequately or were even omitted. Hausfater
missed my mentioning the value of the ethogram as a starting point
for analysis. But did this not become clear from my emphasis on
documentation? I did not go into the historical background, of
course, since I had to be brief. But I have repeatedly emphasized the
importance of the ethogram (see, for example, Eibl-Eibesfeldt, op.
cit.,). Izard found it a "most serious shortcoming" that I virtually
neglected the "richest nesting place of phylogenetic adaptation,"
namely emotion-related facial behaviors. Again, I wanted to discuss
different phenomena. I doubt that much discussion would have been
aroused on the topic of facial expression; I wanted instead to get
responses to more controversial issues. I have dealt in more detail
with universals in facial expression in other publications (see, for
instance, in my ethology textbook, op. cit.).
Concerning the study of the grammar of human social interaction,
I have started a collaboration with sociolinguists. Volker Heeschen,
whom I mentioned, is a linguist, and we also have close contacts with
the research group of Willem Levelt in Holland. The methodology is
presented in the paper of Heeschen et al. (op. cit. 1979) that I cited.
In this context, I would also emphasize that what I call a "grammar
of social interactions" is quite a different thing from what is termed
"biogrammar" of Count or Tiger (see the commentary of Barash). I
refer to rules by which specific social interaction strategies are
structured. My thesis, that these rules apply to verbal and nonverbal
behaviors alike, of course needs further cross-cultural investigation.
But should it prove correct, I would consider the discovery as of
major importance. To clarify my point: These common strategies of
social interaction and the general principles of behavioral
organization can certainly not be elucidated at the level of the fixed
action pattern. I emphasize this since some commentators (e.g.
Kovach) felt that the ethological concepts were too restrictive. Fixed
action patterns, innate releasing mechanisms, and central motor
generators are important constituents of behavior. Their integration
into larger functional wholes is mediated by other mechanisms,
including those underlying the "higher" mental functions, which I,
for reasons of space, omitted from my review, especially since
Lorenz (1977) has presented a thorough discussion of the biology of
cognition. We may ask at each level of integration, and with specific
reference to that level, the question concerning the origin of
particular adaptations.
Birdwhistell (1970), whom I failed to cite in context with our
efforts to study the grammar of social interaction, worked at a
different level. He started from the assumption that the motor
patterns of expressive behavior are composed of elements that can be
treated like phonemes. So far it appears as if this assumption has not
stood close examination and it is my opinion that the commonality of
verbal and nonverbal behavior begins at a much higher level of
organization.
Washburn criticized me for not discussing primate evolution and
the process of hominization. But the phylogeny of human behavior
was not the theme of my presentation. My concern was with the
phylogenetic adaptations in human behavior, and that is quite a
different matter. Once again, my textbook (op. cit., 1975b) discusses
the questions concerning human evolution, the importance of
upright gait, the skills of the human hand, and so forth. Contrary to
Washburn's accusation "ethologists" do not neglect human biology;
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they consider what is common with other primates and what is
unique to man. Since such considerations are not published in some
remote journal, I felt that there was no reason to repeat them. This
holds true for many other comments on points I did not mention in
the article.
My aim was to present many aspects for discussion, but still the
article was far from being comprehensive. For example, I did not
discuss such aspects of human behavior as obedience, rank ordering,
the formation of groups, the determination of gender roles, and the
like, even though there exists a rich literature pointing to the decisive
contribution of genetic factors. Nor did I discuss the evidence on
innate neurohormonal mechanisms activating many behaviors. Space
being limited, I cannot now discuss all the contributions of the
commentators and apologize to those to whom I have not responded
here. There remarks were certainly considered and appreciated, and
I will reply to them in my future works.
In closing, however, I would like to address those who in my
opinion made too sweeping (and I feel, sometimes unqualified)
statements as to the value of ethological theory. Some spoke of the
concepts developed by the founders (Lorenz, Tinbergen, von Hoist,
von Frisch) as if they were outdated, but instead of being supported
with arguments, these statements seem to be profferred on the basis
of belief. I am certainly not trying to convert believers. The
contribution of ethology, and of Lorenz and Tinbergen in particular,
has been acknowledged, and if someone comments on basic issues he
has to be more specific and to avoid sweeping statements if he wants
to be taken seriously.
With regard to my own special concerns, however, it is a relief to
read in a summarizing evaluation: 'Although no substantial part of
the Old Austro-German ethology kept pace with modern conceptual
frameworks, one must not conclude that Eibl's results are invalid . . . "
(Hailman). That certainly sounds encouraging - if a touch of
mockery (including self-mockery) is not out of place. But humor, of
course, is always useful in friendly bonding, which is a most
important aspect of communication with fellow colleagues across the
territorial boundaries of personal bias.
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